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The decision to block all downloads is pretty disruptive, especially for people on pinned known good versions. Its breaking a bunch of my systems that are all l

The decision to block all downloads is pretty disruptive, especially for people on pinned known good versions. Its breaking a bunch of my systems that are all launched with `uv run`

cpburns2009 6mo ago
That's PyPI's behavior when they quarantine a package.
Shank 6mo ago
> Its breaking a bunch of my systems that are all launched with `uv run` From a security standpoint, you would rather pull in a library that is compromised and run a credential stealer? It seems like this is the exact intended and best behavior.
MeetingsBrowser 6mo ago
Are you sure you are pinned to a “known good” version? No one initially knows how much is compromised
tedivm 6mo ago
You should be using build artifacts, not relying on `uv run` to install packages on the fly. Besides the massive security risk, it also means that you're dependent on a bunch of external infrastructure every time you launch. PyPI going down should not bring down your systems.
- zbentley 6mo ago
  This is the right answer. Unfortunately, this is very rarely practiced. More strangely (to me), this is often addressed by adding loads of fallible/partial caching (in e.g. CICD or deployment infrastructure) for package managers rather than building and publishing temporary/per-user/per-feature ephemeral packages for dev/testing to an internal registry. Since the latter's usually less complex and more reliable, it's odd that it's so rarely practiced.
- lanstin 6mo ago
  There are so many advantages to deployable artifacts, including audibility and fast roll-back. Also you can block so many risky endpoints from your compute outbound networks, which means even if you are compromised, it doesn't do the attacker any good if their C&C is not allow listed.
saidnooneever 6mo ago
known good versions and which are those exactly??????
zbentley 6mo ago
That's a good thing (disruptive "firebreak" to shut down any potential sources of breach while info's still being gathered). The solve for this is artifacts/container images/whatnot, as other commenters pointed out. That said, I'm sorry this is being downvoted: it's unhappily observing facts, not arguing for a different security response. I know that's toeing the rules line, but I think it's important to observe.
wasmitnetzen 6mo ago
Take this as an argument to rethink your engineering decision to base your workflows entirely on the availability of an external dependency.

The decision to block all downloads is pretty disruptive, especially for people on pinned known good versions. Its breaking a bunch of my systems that are all launched with `uv run`

cpburns2009 6mo ago

That's PyPI's behavior when they quarantine a package.

Shank 6mo ago

> Its breaking a bunch of my systems that are all launched with `uv run` From a security standpoint, you would rather pull in a library that is compromised and run a credential stealer? It seems like this is the exact intended and best behavior.

MeetingsBrowser 6mo ago

Are you sure you are pinned to a “known good” version? No one initially knows how much is compromised

tedivm 6mo ago

You should be using build artifacts, not relying on `uv run` to install packages on the fly. Besides the massive security risk, it also means that you're dependent on a bunch of external infrastructure every time you launch. PyPI going down should not bring down your systems.

zbentley 6mo ago
This is the right answer. Unfortunately, this is very rarely practiced. More strangely (to me), this is often addressed by adding loads of fallible/partial caching (in e.g. CICD or deployment infrastructure) for package managers rather than building and publishing temporary/per-user/per-feature ephemeral packages for dev/testing to an internal registry. Since the latter's usually less complex and more reliable, it's odd that it's so rarely practiced.
lanstin 6mo ago
There are so many advantages to deployable artifacts, including audibility and fast roll-back. Also you can block so many risky endpoints from your compute outbound networks, which means even if you are compromised, it doesn't do the attacker any good if their C&C is not allow listed.

saidnooneever 6mo ago

known good versions and which are those exactly??????

zbentley 6mo ago

That's a good thing (disruptive "firebreak" to shut down any potential sources of breach while info's still being gathered). The solve for this is artifacts/container images/whatnot, as other commenters pointed out. That said, I'm sorry this is being downvoted: it's unhappily observing facts, not arguing for a different security response. I know that's toeing the rules line, but I think it's important to observe.

wasmitnetzen 6mo ago

Take this as an argument to rethink your engineering decision to base your workflows entirely on the availability of an external dependency.