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If your plan to secure the machines is to have the source be open, you have already failed. You need a system that works well even if the source has been alter
by danielweber 14y ago
If your plan to secure the machines is to have the source be open, you have already failed. You need a system that works well even if the source has been altered.
Paper ballots have issues, too. They are different issues, and largely unseen by the general public until you have a really close election and have to use human judgment to decide whether that mark counts as a vote or not.
- revelation 14y agoAnd here I thought in the Turing year of 2012 people would finally start to understand what it means that any electronical voting machine contains a Turing equivalent machine. No magic can make the halting problem decidable.
- EvilTerran 14y agoAn electronic voting machine doesn't have to be Turing-complete, surely? It would require especially-fabricated non-Turing-complete chips / ICBs, and some very simple interface like an LED bank and good old-fashioned physical buttons (as a touch-screen LCD unit alone is probably turing-complete), but I'm pretty sure it'd be possible to devise a specialised electronic voting system that couldn't have its behaviour altered without physical modification. [edit PS] Of course, this is purely academic. You might as well fantasise about a voting system made of Babbage-esque clockwork.
- Peaker 14y agoIn really close elections, the outcome matters much less than the potential for systematic rigging of non-close elections.