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What secret is controlled by one person? That's just not how businesses manage secrets.
by yammosk 6mo ago
What secret is controlled by one person? That's just not how businesses manage secrets.
- MattPalmer1086 6mo agoYou are not consistent here. When talking about only needing a single signing key you say that is not subject to the whim of one person. When discussing an N-out-of-M scheme, you think that it's just down to the whims of whoever is in that group. That's just not how business manages secrets!
- yammosk 6mo agoI just don't think that keys would be accessible by only one person in either scenario for any large business. The article suggests this 3/5 key needed system prevents issues but I don't think so in practical terms. My suspicion is it thinks there is only one person per key but I think in any business scenario a team would have access to all of them negating the benefits. I don't think that's inconsistent, perhaps just my misunderstanding of what this proposed.
- MattPalmer1086 6mo agoOk, here's a scenario I have seen implemented before when dealing with HSMs and root CAs for a fairly serious PKI. You set up a 3 out of 5 share with each of the 5 keys stored on separate hardware tokens. The tokens are physically secured in safes, in tamper evident bags. To perform operations on the HSM, three out of the 5 tokens are required. The key custodians belong to different teams who can only open the safe for their token. Now, you need to compromise at least 3 safes to do anything on the HSM. If a token is lost, stolen or damaged, there are still 2 others which can be used. Loss or theft of any two tokens does not compromise the HSM. Any unauthorised access to a token can be detected due to the tamper evident bag. This gives you strong protection and assurance against any malicious insider or attacker. Having a single key (even if protected in a safe) is much weaker, and carries the risk of key loss (so you would have to have token backups, multiplying rather than dividing the risk).