Range voting at its worst turns into approval voting. RV is not an ordered list voting system, so Arrow's theorem, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite thorem, and Condor

Range voting at its worst turns into approval voting. RV is not an ordered list voting system, so Arrow's theorem, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite thorem, and Condorcet's paradox do not strictly apply. For ranked ballot voting systems, there's a difference in what kinds of tactical voting are possible, and in how likely it is for tactical voting to improve your perception of the outcome (baysian regret comparison of honest vs tactical voting). Ranked voting systems are not all equivalently bad simply because they're each subject to some kinds of tactical voting. I think Condorcet is promising (among all the ranked-ballot methods) because the Condorcet principle is easy to agree with. The choice of cycle-breaking method is where the fault lines appear, but new cycle-breaking methods could attract a consensus.