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> The same type of anonymity can be provided by an automated program parsing emails that I can write in about an hour. No, it cannot. The process of the pollin
by mindslight 14y ago
> The same type of anonymity can be provided by an automated program parsing emails that I can write in about an hour.
No, it cannot. The process of the polling place can be verified by everybody who turns up. The integrity of your centralized program cannot.
- maratd 14y ago> The integrity of your centralized program cannot. Open source it. And not in the traditional sense, either. I mean setup the server to expose source code. Have a 3rd party verify security and integrity. This is actually much easier to do than in the traditional process.
- mindslight 14y ago> I mean setup the server to expose source code Please explain how you envision this being implemented. (Warning: while 'remote attestation' is a valid answer for some assertions, it means that we are once again back to trusting the central signing authority. which might seem less scary, but we'd really be having the same argument at a much more technical and nitpicky level)
- maratd 14y ago> Please explain how you envision this being implemented. Make the directory containing source code read-accessible using your web server? There is nothing you can truly implement that can guarantee that the code being executed is the same as the code being exposed, but you can hire a 3rd party to audit the server and verify as much.
- mindslight 14y agoSo to paraphrase, your answer is "give up, forget about the property that every voter can audit the system, and fall back to relying on a trusted third party to certify the opaque process" ? But yet you call it an "obvious direction" ? And we haven't even talked about coercion resistance.. Hurricane madness indeed. Please read up on actual electronic voting systems, what properties are expected of them, and what properties the state of the art ones can actually provide.
- 0x0 14y agoWouldn't help if they hid a backdoor in the compiled code, and the compiler, etc. "Reflections on trusting trust" and all that.
- unimpressive 14y agoKen's compiler trojan is not invulnerable, and could here be defeated by checksums and versioning. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_trus.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_tru...
- dllthomas 14y agoDiverse double compiling is not "checksums and versioning". You need other compilers from sufficiently different sources as to minimize the chance that they all were subject to the same modification. Edited to add: Which is to say, it's actually a pretty cool idea, and not super complicated[1], and amazing it took 20ish years to spot. [1] Though do be careful; I'm amazed at the number of comments that misunderstand it.
- unimpressive 14y ago>Diverse double compiling is not "checksums and versioning". You need other compilers from sufficiently different sources as to minimize the chance that they all were subject to the same modification. I was assuming you would write your own. Of course, if you keep going along this line of thinking, you end up wire wrapping your own computer and writing your OS and other utilities in assembly.
- dllthomas 14y ago> I was assuming you would write your own. That only works if you do it in machine code (and your hex-editor is clean). The point of the whole thing is that you can use compilers from untrusted sources, just provided you use several of them, and trust that at least one of the compilers you are checking won't have the same modifications as the others.