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FPTP and IRV for single-winner elections are completely compromised, due to tactical voting (and lack of fairness to third parties) in common scenarios. I don'

FPTP and IRV for single-winner elections are completely compromised, due to tactical voting (and lack of fairness to third parties) in common scenarios. I don't think you can support your claim that other systems are just as bad. In every informed discussion of voting systems I've ever encountered, FPTP and IRV are considered inferior to voting systems like Condorcet variants [1] or Range Voting [2] [3]. Preference between condorcet and range voting is a lot more murky. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system#Compliance_of_selected_systems_.28table.29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system#Compliance_of_sel... http://rangevoting.org/rangeVcond.html http://rangevoting.org/rangeVcond.html [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Range_voting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Range_voting [3] http://rangevoting.org http://rangevoting.org

baddox 14y ago
Unfortunately, I believe all voting systems are subject to tactical voting, because of Condorcet's paradox. Please correct me if I'm wrong. edit: I forgot to mention that all voting systems are subject to tactical voting, except for ones which are dictatorial or non-deterministic (and those are generally considered nonviable systems).
- harshreality 14y ago
  Range voting at its worst turns into approval voting. RV is not an ordered list voting system, so Arrow's theorem, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite thorem, and Condorcet's paradox do not strictly apply. For ranked ballot voting systems, there's a difference in what kinds of tactical voting are possible, and in how likely it is for tactical voting to improve your perception of the outcome (baysian regret comparison of honest vs tactical voting). Ranked voting systems are not all equivalently bad simply because they're each subject to some kinds of tactical voting. I think Condorcet is promising (among all the ranked-ballot methods) because the Condorcet principle is easy to agree with. The choice of cycle-breaking method is where the fault lines appear, but new cycle-breaking methods could attract a consensus.

baddox 14y ago

Unfortunately, I believe all voting systems are subject to tactical voting, because of Condorcet's paradox. Please correct me if I'm wrong. edit: I forgot to mention that all voting systems are subject to tactical voting, except for ones which are dictatorial or non-deterministic (and those are generally considered nonviable systems).

harshreality 14y ago
Range voting at its worst turns into approval voting. RV is not an ordered list voting system, so Arrow's theorem, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite thorem, and Condorcet's paradox do not strictly apply. For ranked ballot voting systems, there's a difference in what kinds of tactical voting are possible, and in how likely it is for tactical voting to improve your perception of the outcome (baysian regret comparison of honest vs tactical voting). Ranked voting systems are not all equivalently bad simply because they're each subject to some kinds of tactical voting. I think Condorcet is promising (among all the ranked-ballot methods) because the Condorcet principle is easy to agree with. The choice of cycle-breaking method is where the fault lines appear, but new cycle-breaking methods could attract a consensus.