Look, perhaps I've been to hard on you. Maybe you have an intellectual disability or something, I don't know you or your situation, my bad. I get that you're pr

Look, perhaps I've been to hard on you. Maybe you have an intellectual disability or something, I don't know you or your situation, my bad. I get that you're proud of your project, and I don't want to take that from you. By all means, explore, tinker, hack around and explore, these are great traits/qualities. Just don't tell people what you're offering is safe, or worse, safer than alternative offerings. That claim simply isn't true. To be direct with you, the 'how' of an attack isn't a riddle, it's a documented reality of the modern threat landscape. You're hyper-focused on the front door, asking how an attacker would even message the bot, but you're ignoring the fact that modern attackers don't bother knocking. Read cloudflare's 2026 threat report, it's eye opening. Between automated session cloning and browser-based info-stealers (among many other modern headaches), the 'whitelisted user' is no longer a static, trusted entity. If a user on your list has their session token scraped via a malicious browser extension or a hijacked desktop app, the attacker effectively becomes that user. At that point, your bot doesn't see an intruder; it sees a 'trusted' account and hands them a loaded gun in the form of arbitrary SQL execution. Now, the problem is you aren't the only one with access to LLM's and obscurity never really was security, even less so now. An llm with credentials could easily probe its way through your bot's capabilities and connected data and exfiltrate everything. So, the reason I'm calling into question your claims of having a 'safer' personal agent/bot/whatever is a matter of blast radius. A standard bot usually interacts with a restricted API or a set of hard-coded functions, so even if the account is compromised, the damage is capped. By giving an LLM the keys to the entire database, you've created a single point of failure that can result in total data exfiltration or a complete 'drop table' wipe, among any number of other nasty things. That's just _one_ issue in this project. If you actually want this to live up to the 'safer than average' description, you have to move past the idea that a whitelist is a firewall. You need to distinguish between authentication and authorisation and implement defense-in-depth, starting with a database user that has zero permissions beyond simple 'Select' queries. You should be using a proxy that intercepts the LLM's generated SQL and kills any string containing 'Drop', 'Update', or 'Delete' before it ever touches your server, without some form of parsing/checking. Right now, you’ve built a powerful engine with no brakes, and telling people it’s safer just because it's on Signal is a dangerous misunderstanding of how modern exploits actually work. Alternatively, fix how the project is described to be more accurate/honest than it is now.