4 ms·
> The kernel owns the page tables. not entirely, IOMMU is a thing, that is IIRC how Amazon and other hyperscalers can promise you virtual machines whose memory
by mschuster91 8mo ago
> The kernel owns the page tables.
not entirely, IOMMU is a thing, that is IIRC how Amazon and other hyperscalers can promise you virtual machines whose memory cannot be touched even in the case the host is compromised (and, by extension, also if the feds arrive to v& your server).
- ronsor 8mo agoIf your threat model is being v& by feds, maybe you should keep your server at home behind Tor.
- iberator 8mo agoHosting tor outbound server at home is stupid idea. Your home is gonna be raided by Police and you will wait months or year to get your shit back and then if nothing, gonna be charged for having pirated windows and Photoshop lol real story
- r_lee 8mo agolmao please tell more
- mschuster91 8mo agoNot even two years ago, see https://www.golem.de/news/nach-hausdurchsuchung-deutscher-tor-node-betreiber-kapituliert-2409-188913.html https://www.golem.de/news/nach-hausdurchsuchung-deutscher-to... And it's not just a one off occurrence either. Tor exit node operators getting v& has been a thing for decades: https://www.heise.de/news/Anonymisierungsserver-bei-Razzia-beschlagnahmt-160475.html https://www.heise.de/news/Anonymisierungsserver-bei-Razzia-b...
- mschuster91 8mo agoThese days, every American's threat model should include being v& by the feds, and here in Germany, the situation isn't much better, you can get v& for saying the Minister of Interior is a dick [1]. Yes, this was later on ruled unconstitutional, but it doesn't change the facts, and, worse, Germany doesn't have a "fruit of the forbidden tree" rule. [1] https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/hamburg-wohnungsdurchsuchung-wegen-pimmelgate-war-unrechtmaessig-a-de489269-6589-453f-896f-56e728128cea https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/hamburg-wohnungsdurch...
- matheusmoreira 8mo agoProper OPSEC dictates that the server be located as far away from home as possible, ideally in a location with zero ties to your person.
- gruez 8mo ago>how Amazon and other hyperscalers can promise you virtual machines whose memory cannot be touched even in the case the host is compromised (and, by extension, also if the feds arrive to v& your server). Even if we take those promises at face value, it practically doesn't mean much because every server still needs to handle reboots, which is when they can inject their evil code.
- Borealid 8mo agoMK-TME allows having memory encrypted at run time, and the platform TPM signs an attestation saying the memory was not altered. Malicious code can't be injected at boot without breaking that TPM.
- fc417fc802 8mo agoSubject to the huge caveat that the attacker does not have physical access. https://tee.fail/ https://tee.fail/
- deleted 8mo ago[deleted]
- Borealid 8mo agoAn interesting implementation flaw, but not a conceptual problem with the design.
- fc417fc802 8mo agoWell, it kind of is actually. The previous iteration of the design didn't have that vulnerability but it was slower because managing IVs within the given constraints adds an additional layer of complexity. This is the pragmatic compromise so to speak. Does it count as a conceptual problem when technical challenges without an acceptable solution block your goal?
- matheusmoreira 8mo agoThis is excellent. The ability to trick remote servers into believing our computers are "trusted" despite the fact we are in control will be a key capability in the future. We need stuff like this to maintain control over our computers.