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> But they are fundamentally different in kind, in that those models respond to immediate sensory stimuli. Per se, they do not allow for abstract reasoning over
by D-Machine 7mo ago
> But they are fundamentally different in kind, in that those models respond to immediate sensory stimuli. Per se, they do not allow for abstract reasoning over internally generated representations
This is obviously deeply incorrect, and the kind of thing that people call "wordcel" thinking. Mathematical intelligence is highly visuospatial, and often requires constructing images and/or imagining motion (arguably invoking also either proprioceptive and/or kinaesthetic qualia).
Is it possible you are aphantasic? This seems to me to be the only way one could think that one cannot have non-verbal internally generated representations.
- uoaei 7mo agoVisuospatial abstraction as distinct from visuospatial perception/interpretation is the dichotomy in question here. I have a fine mind's eye and a functional inner voice. I'm speaking to the difference between, say, a reactive perception model (which is a model) and an abstracted cognition model (which is also a model, but one that can be interacted with without external input). It is clear almost all animals have the former, and a couple might have the latter, but this distinction is a core concern for usage of abstract systems such as linguistics.
- D-Machine 7mo ago> I'm speaking to the difference between, say, a reactive perception model (which is a model) and an abstracted cognition model (which is also a model, but one that can be interacted with without external input). It is clear almost all animals have the former, and a couple might have the latter, but this distinction is a core concern for usage of abstract systems such as linguistics. This distinction seems perfectly fine and clear to me, so I suspect we probably actually don't disagree that much on specifics, and that this was maybe a semantic / violent agreement thing. I still don't think this distinction helps defend your statement "Language constrains your perception of reality to only the set of concepts conceivable within that language.", because, obviously, you can have abstract cognitive models ('concepts') that are non-linguistic, and thus, your perception of reality is not constrained only by language. I.e. remove the "only" and I have no real substantive disagreement. So it seems we can probably mostly agree on something like "Your abstractions constrain your perception of reality to only the set of concepts [ideas, representations] conceivable from those abstractions". It is tricky because "concept" can strongly imply a linguistic model, and "model" is really the term we want here, e.g. a "visuospatial concept" is unusual, I admit. But, still, linguistic models are definitely not the only game in town re: perception.