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> Why can't we authenticate the issuance of new certificates out-of-band? Authenticate with who, Verisign (the ones that have the authority to determine who ow
by comex 14y ago
> Why can't we authenticate the issuance of new certificates out-of-band?
Authenticate with who, Verisign (the ones that have the authority to determine who owns the domain)? I guess making it out of band alleviates some situations where Verisign gets hacked (but not where Verisign is untrustworthy, which you could argue is the case for recent US domain seizures), but the number of domains requiring certificates is high enough that they're just going to end up checking the same database.
> Also, in a TACK+TLS/CA world, Libya could not have surreptitiously swapped out BIT.LY's certificate. In a TACK+TLS+DNSSEC world, they can; stub resolvers don't verify signatures in DNSSEC.
Huh? In a TLS/CA world, Libya could get a legitimate new certificate (although I guess this could be noisier); in a TLS+DNSSEC world, Libya could produce a valid signature. TACK has the same effect on both, protecting some but not all users; invalid DNSSEC signatures are irrelevant. (But in general, the stub resolver issue is one such practical problem that I'm here not worrying about.)
As I said, I believe that Convergence doesn't really help as long as the trusted third parties are validating using DNS, and the only way around that is a new DNS root designed from the start to be decentralized and cryptographically secure.
- tptacek 14y ago(We're getting far out to the margin of the thread, and as we do so, I get more and more terse, if not in language then in thinking). Regarding your first question: To a first approximation, everyone that needs a TLS certificate already has one. The concern about authenticating requests for certificates is about attempts to get certificates issued against entities that already attest to having them. An entity that already has a cert can authenticate new requests for different certs; for instance, they can put a PGP or S/MIME key on file with the CA, and that key can be used to authenticate new requests. Actually, every tool in the web authentication toolbox, from S/MIME through 2-factor auth keys, is fully available to CA authentication, which is a good thing. So the question then is, why should ability to answer an email sent to a domain trump every other authentication mechanism we could use instead? To your second question: my point is just that Libya can more quietly hijack BIT.LY under DNSSEC than they can under an HTTPS CA model. I agree that we need better trust anchors for peer-to-peer verification than DNS.