4 ms·

Point 5 is the one nobody's actually doing yet. It's pretty apparent that everyone agrees we need to measure blast radius but where's the tooling? I've been ru

Point 5 is the one nobody's actually doing yet. It's pretty apparent that everyone agrees we need to measure blast radius but where's the tooling? I've been running AI models against real vulnerable targets, giving them a Kali box and an objective, letting them go autonomous. Every model I tested popped almost every OWASP top 10 challenge we had. The interesting part is the cost of getting there. One model solved a JWT forgery in 16 seconds and 5K tokens. Another took 170 seconds and 210K tokens. Same result, completely different blast pattern. If we're serious about measuring agent risk, we need to stop theorizing about what they can do and start actually benchmarking it. Note On the othr hand, we had a lab that a jr pentest would have caught in 10 mins, and the best models couldn't figure it out..

saltpath 8mo ago
The blast radius framing is right but the tooling gap is actually worse than debugging. It's about third-party verifiability. A regulator or auditor can't trust a log produced by the same operator who runs the agent. Spent the last few months on this specific problem. chain hash per outbound call + external timestamp so anyone can verify independently what the agent called, when, and what it got back. works across providers which matters when you're chaining claude -> mistral -> internal endpoint. Early days but if useful for the nist response: https://arkforge.tech/trust/v1/proof/prf_20260310_182226_cbc743 https://arkforge.tech/trust/v1/proof/prf_20260310_182226_cbc...
saltpath 7mo ago
The token cost difference is the metric nobody's capturing. 5K vs 210K tokens for the same JWT forgery isn't just efficiency — it's the blast surface. A contained agent leaves a narrow call trace. A thrashing one touches five APIs, retries three times, leaks context in every hop. If your proxy logs the full call chain with timestamps and response sizes per hop, that cost delta becomes a measurable risk signal, not just a billing line. The hard part isn't the instrumentation, it's getting teams to route agent traffic through anything they don't own.

saltpath 8mo ago

The blast radius framing is right but the tooling gap is actually worse than debugging. It's about third-party verifiability. A regulator or auditor can't trust a log produced by the same operator who runs the agent. Spent the last few months on this specific problem. chain hash per outbound call + external timestamp so anyone can verify independently what the agent called, when, and what it got back. works across providers which matters when you're chaining claude -> mistral -> internal endpoint. Early days but if useful for the nist response: https://arkforge.tech/trust/v1/proof/prf_20260310_182226_cbc743 https://arkforge.tech/trust/v1/proof/prf_20260310_182226_cbc...

saltpath 7mo ago

The token cost difference is the metric nobody's capturing. 5K vs 210K tokens for the same JWT forgery isn't just efficiency — it's the blast surface. A contained agent leaves a narrow call trace. A thrashing one touches five APIs, retries three times, leaks context in every hop. If your proxy logs the full call chain with timestamps and response sizes per hop, that cost delta becomes a measurable risk signal, not just a billing line. The hard part isn't the instrumentation, it's getting teams to route agent traffic through anything they don't own.