If I were to design an OS from the ground up today, that's probably the approach I'd take. Separate risky drivers off into virtual machines with limited attack

If I were to design an OS from the ground up today, that's probably the approach I'd take. Separate risky drivers off into virtual machines with limited attack surface and a controlled I/O system so that a hacked driver can't infect the rest of the system. Plus, if the code crashes, the kernel doesn't go down with it. Windows and Linux have been moving drivers towards userland to deal with kernel instability and security risks but with modern virtualisation capabilities, I think going one step further only makes sense. Windows itself is already using something called "virtualisation based security" to leverage VMs to secure the kernel and this is just the logical next step. Qubes does this stuff too, though it works with fully-featured Linux kernels rather than minimal driver interfaces, for exactly the same reasons. A hacked wifi driver may be able to inspect and redirect traffic, but it can't do much more than that, which combined with a strong VPN can protect from quite complicated attack scenarios that normal people have no other recourse against.