4 ms·

1Password wrote a response to the paper: https://1password.com/blog/eth-zurich-zero-knowledge-malicious-server-review https://1password.com/blog/eth-zurich-zero

• herczegzsolt 7mo ago
  I am bit disappointed they did not immediately jump on implementing the two straightforward recommendations: > PROPOSED MITIGATION. A straightforward mitigation is to have the client sign vault keys using the RSA private key in the keyset before encrypting them with the RSA public key. > PROPOSED MITIGATION. [...] it would be easy for 1Password to prevent it entirely: the secret key can be used (with proper key derivation) to authenticate the KDF parameters with a cryptographic MAC. To be fair, these issues are not really impacting long-time users. I have hundreds if not thousands of items in my vaults, there's no way i'm not noticing if they dissappear (which would be a side effect of these attacks). Overall, I think 1password can be proud of their architecture and product quality, but i'd love to see these improvements - and maybe something like a "signal verification code" for sharing?