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There is a big problem with generals with battlefield experience An interesting datapoint, historically is Churchill. If your read his history of the world war

by 001sky 14y ago

There is a big problem with generals with battlefield experience An interesting datapoint, historically is Churchill. If your read his history of the world wars, he was the 'sea lord' or somesuch and head of the royal navy. in advance of wwi, he actualy revolutionized the fate of the world in the 20th century, by preparing GB for the next war (WWI). In particular, the switch to the use of diesel vs coal, to increase the range of the Naval fleet. This is the source of the WWII battleships example. And also the origin of the politicization of the Middle east. This supports your notion (becaue he wasn't a general), but undermines the idea that you cannot act with foresight. He also had battlefield experience. [1] [1] Also, your last sentence is curious, as I think you missed the example of Hitler conquering europe from russia to the english channel, inventing the Blitzcrieg, and the various dry-run live-fire experiments, eg Spanish Civil war.

WalterBright 14y ago
Hitler made numerous serious errors from applying WW1 tactics, such as over-reliance on fixed fortifications.
- paganel 14y ago
  > such as over-reliance on fixed fortifications. Which "fixed fortifications" would those be? If you're talking about the Allies' final attack on Germany of late 1944-early 1945, then I'd say by that time Hitler had already lost the war. The two most crucial moments I can think about are the battle of Stalingrad which did not allow the German Army to lay its hands on the Caucasus and its oil resources, and then the battle of Kursk, which had nothing to do with WW1 tactics. And to copy-paste Clausewitz's name in here (the article makes a passing reference to him when it talks about "Franks fundamentally misunderstood generalship, which at its topmost levels must link military action to political results"), I'd say Hitler's final chances were political in nature, more exactly I'm talking about his tries to intervene between Churchill and the US on the one hand and the USSR on the other, trying to convince the first bunch about the perils of letting the Soviets be on the victorious side. The Tehran Conference put an end to that. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran_Conference https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran_Conference)
  - WalterBright 14y ago
    Hitler did fall into the battleship trap, grossly underestimated the value of long range aircraft and fighter aircraft, relied heavily on fixed fortifications like the Atlantic Wall and the Siegfried Line, both of which were easily bypassed, etc. He squandered his men by not allowing them to retreat and regroup, again thinking like it was WW1. Of course he would have lost anyway, but he could have made it much harder.
    - antman 14y ago
      Against fixed targets battleships gave higher firepower. Aircraft cqrriers were the new technology for naval operations away from large land masses. The heavy fortification of the atlantic wall was only for first landing, the defence line was deep but it was annihilated with heavy bombardment from allied battleships. The Siegfried line was pretty much abandoned during the war and was hastily manned during the last defence. German efficiendy wasn't very good at this point since t was against the original planing and they had even lost their fortifications and underground plans in some places. The doctrine after WW1 was not keeping an advanced position but moving forward with tanks and keeping the enemy of balance. That was an extarpolation of Rommels "Infantry attacks" book, who was succesful in the WW1 and was already famous and a teacher in the german military academy in the interwar period.
      - WalterBright 14y ago
        The problem with battleships is they were incredibly vulnerable to air attack. Ambrose's book "Citizen Soldiers" details the failure of Hitler's fixed fortifications, and Galland's book "The First and the Last" details Hitler's failure to understand air power.
        001sky 14y ago
        The texbook counter-example on circumvention of fixed fortifications was done by Hitler's army, at the start of the war. Viz: The Manstein Plan is often seen as either the result of, or the cause of a mid-twentieth century Revolution in military affairs. In the former hypothesis, expounded by Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart immediately after the events, the Manstein Plan is presented as a natural outcome of deliberate changes in the German military doctrine during the twenties and thirties by men as Guderian or Hans von Seeckt implementing Fuller's or Liddell Hart's ideas.[1] Diesel-electric Submarines were ultimately also vulnerable to air power. But not before their use in warfare was pioneered by the Germans, to devastating effect. And france was germany's "aircraft carrier", don't forget its less than 100 miles from the UK, couldn't be sunk, and didn't need a fleet-escort. (etc). Further innovations: - Jet fighters - Cruise Missles - Ballistic Missles - Submarine Warfare - Armored Calvary It was a war, and 'improvisation' would be expected as losses mount and access to resources were curtailed. The general thesis that the Nazis were fighting "ww1" style is not really a teneble notion. At all. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manstein_Plan http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manstein_Plan

by 001sky 14y ago

WalterBright 14y ago

Hitler made numerous serious errors from applying WW1 tactics, such as over-reliance on fixed fortifications.

paganel 14y ago
> such as over-reliance on fixed fortifications. Which "fixed fortifications" would those be? If you're talking about the Allies' final attack on Germany of late 1944-early 1945, then I'd say by that time Hitler had already lost the war. The two most crucial moments I can think about are the battle of Stalingrad which did not allow the German Army to lay its hands on the Caucasus and its oil resources, and then the battle of Kursk, which had nothing to do with WW1 tactics. And to copy-paste Clausewitz's name in here (the article makes a passing reference to him when it talks about "Franks fundamentally misunderstood generalship, which at its topmost levels must link military action to political results"), I'd say Hitler's final chances were political in nature, more exactly I'm talking about his tries to intervene between Churchill and the US on the one hand and the USSR on the other, trying to convince the first bunch about the perils of letting the Soviets be on the victorious side. The Tehran Conference put an end to that. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran_Conference https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran_Conference)
- WalterBright 14y ago
  Hitler did fall into the battleship trap, grossly underestimated the value of long range aircraft and fighter aircraft, relied heavily on fixed fortifications like the Atlantic Wall and the Siegfried Line, both of which were easily bypassed, etc. He squandered his men by not allowing them to retreat and regroup, again thinking like it was WW1. Of course he would have lost anyway, but he could have made it much harder.
  - antman 14y ago
    Against fixed targets battleships gave higher firepower. Aircraft cqrriers were the new technology for naval operations away from large land masses. The heavy fortification of the atlantic wall was only for first landing, the defence line was deep but it was annihilated with heavy bombardment from allied battleships. The Siegfried line was pretty much abandoned during the war and was hastily manned during the last defence. German efficiendy wasn't very good at this point since t was against the original planing and they had even lost their fortifications and underground plans in some places. The doctrine after WW1 was not keeping an advanced position but moving forward with tanks and keeping the enemy of balance. That was an extarpolation of Rommels "Infantry attacks" book, who was succesful in the WW1 and was already famous and a teacher in the german military academy in the interwar period.
    - WalterBright 14y ago
      The problem with battleships is they were incredibly vulnerable to air attack. Ambrose's book "Citizen Soldiers" details the failure of Hitler's fixed fortifications, and Galland's book "The First and the Last" details Hitler's failure to understand air power.
      - 001sky 14y ago
        The texbook counter-example on circumvention of fixed fortifications was done by Hitler's army, at the start of the war. Viz: The Manstein Plan is often seen as either the result of, or the cause of a mid-twentieth century Revolution in military affairs. In the former hypothesis, expounded by Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart immediately after the events, the Manstein Plan is presented as a natural outcome of deliberate changes in the German military doctrine during the twenties and thirties by men as Guderian or Hans von Seeckt implementing Fuller's or Liddell Hart's ideas.[1] Diesel-electric Submarines were ultimately also vulnerable to air power. But not before their use in warfare was pioneered by the Germans, to devastating effect. And france was germany's "aircraft carrier", don't forget its less than 100 miles from the UK, couldn't be sunk, and didn't need a fleet-escort. (etc). Further innovations: - Jet fighters - Cruise Missles - Ballistic Missles - Submarine Warfare - Armored Calvary It was a war, and 'improvisation' would be expected as losses mount and access to resources were curtailed. The general thesis that the Nazis were fighting "ww1" style is not really a teneble notion. At all. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manstein_Plan http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manstein_Plan