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General Failure: How the American military rewards failure at the highest ranks
- bediger4000 14y agoSo, considering individuals as "human resources" instead of people (personnel) has consequences in the US Military as well as in corporate life. Who would have thought that change in how people are considered would have such an impact?
- tomstokes 14y agoVery interesting perspective into the shortcomings of our military system. The article is worth reading through, but in summary: The author suggests that our drawn-out, meandering wars are the result of a perverse incentive system among the higher ranks of the military. Leaders are not rewarded for successes or, perhaps more importantly, punished for their shortcomings and failures. Instead, they are given short, time-limited appointments in leadership roles, which changes the goal from military success to simply ensuring that nothing too bad happens on their watch. Likewise, these time-limited roles result in a diffusion of success, where everyone can claim that progress was at least partially due to some of their own actions. Perhaps the most succinct explanation from the article: But the Army continues to do too little to sort the average performers from the outstanding ones. That has long-term consequences for the caliber of military leaders. A recent survey by students at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government found that good young officers have left the military in large part because of frustration with military bureaucracy and the sense that the armed forces do not have a performance-oriented system for managing personnel. The author proposes that the military should more frequently relieve poor performers from their positions until they find the person with the right personality and intelligence for the position. I've never been involved in the military, but I feel as though this perverse incentive structure is common among many businesses as well. Most big companies I've worked with have a few obviously incompetent employees in leadership positions, but harbor an unwillingness to demote or fire them because they've "earned" their position through hard work and loyalty to the company. Taken to the extreme, this is the famous "Peter Principle," which suggests that employees will continue to be promoted until they reach a position beyond their abilities, at which point they languish in mediocrity. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_principle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_principle )
- guylhem 14y agoMaking sure that nothing bad happens under your watch may not be such a bad thing in the military. Most of the critiques in this tread sound like this comment by Davidson about the french change of leadership in Vietnam: On arrival, Navarre was shocked by what he found. There had been no long-range plan since de Lattre's departure. Everything was conducted on a day-to-day, reactive basis. Combat operations were undertaken only in response to enemy moves or threats. There was no comprehensive plan to develop the organization and build up the equipment of the Expeditionary force. Finally, Navarre, the intellectual, the cold and professional soldier, was shocked by the "school's out" attitude of Salan and his senior commanders and staff officers. They were going home, not as victors or heroes, but then, not as clear losers either. To them the important thing was that they were getting out of Indochina with their reputations frayed, but intact. They gave little thought to, or concern for, the problems of their successors. Just look at the ambition and creativity displayed by Navarre's "hedgehog" strategy, and the (spoiler alert: dismal) result it got for France in the Vietnam war: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dien_Bien_Phu http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dien_Bien_Phu Not losing may in fact be one of the requirements for winning :-) In corporations, the consequences are not that bad - closing door is not a big tragedy. Ten of thousands dead on the other hand, and a war lost is a tragedy. So please don't dismiss the military just because they work differently. They are on a different problem space. They need different solutions.
- michael_fine 14y agoThe hedgehog strategy there worked, brilliantly, but it is a strategy, a strategy designed around not losing. In the case of the American military, most of our missions now have specific aims that can't be accomplished by simply avoiding disasters.
- subsystem 14y agoThe early decisions in the Iraq war like de-Ba'athification, dissolution of the military and not protecting vital government sites, could be seen as thinking to much about "winning the war" and not enough about not losing it. On the other hand it was somewhat the tactic of the Iraqis, or even more so the Taliban. To not lose by disrupting society enough that their enemy can't "win".
- EliRivers 14y agoThis was ever the way. The needs (and goals) of a peacetime armed forces (which is what the US still has, despite meandering wars in the Middle East still running) are different to those of a wartime armed forces. The only question is how quickly, given the shift to wartime footing, one can replace the peacetime command with that needed to win wars.
- protomyth 14y ago"These corrosive tendencies were reinforced by a new policy of officer rotation after six months in command, which encouraged many leaders to simply keep their heads down until they could move on—and likewise encouraged superior officers to wait out the tours of bad officers serving beneath them. Instead of weeding out bad officers, senior leaders tended to closely supervise them, encouraging habits of micromanagement that plague the Army to this day." Some companies have this policy and it seems to be at the root of their management trouble. It causes short-term thinking and what make me look good as opposed to what makes this place better.
- Evbn 14y agoI don't get how this article an on the one hand condemn rotations and on the other hand condemn keeping people in he or positions too long.
- protomyth 14y agoIt does seem odd, but my explanation is the "I know I'm moving" problem. If you have mandatory rotations[1], then optimizing for a better next jump is just smart behavior. You know you're leaving so optimize for "flashy" improvements and curry favor with superiors. Its the known deadline that's the problem. That being said, people should move on at some point. The US Navy before and after WWII rotated out its officers to Washington DC. It made sure operational experience was put into policy. Bringing someone home to teach is a smart move. [1] a typical IT strategy for managers doing the rotation to "learn new areas" is to cut Q&A people. The effects of the cuts will be a lower budget in the near term with looks good. The next person will get to deal with the slipping quality since the down effects take a while as "professionals" work harder to keep the trains running. Burnout occurs during the next dudes shift.
- stcredzero 14y ago> Relief of generals has become so rare that a private who loses his rifle is now punished more than a general who loses his part of the war. This is a part of our society's disconnection from meritocracy and transition to a state where a privileged caste rules and extracts from society on the basis of arbitrary marks of differentiation.
- pron 14y ago> This is a part of our society's disconnection from meritocracy I would argue the opposite, but that depends on the elusive definition of "meritocracy". When people use that term, they usually mean that people's status or influence is bestowed on them based on their past performance, or "merit" (whatever that means). That is, a person is given a position based on his earned "merit", and "merit" is like some general currency that can be accumulated. The article argues that successful organizations behave differently. They assign, or remove, roles and influence not based on accumulated "merit", but based on performance at a very particular task. If you're not good at this specific task, you will be immediately given another, regardless of your past "merit". This is not meritocracy where those with much earned "merit" rise to the top, but rather an organization where the goals are more important than the current job holders. It is an organization that assigns importance to collective results over the importance of individuals. I think that such an organization is hard to maintain over time because, in the end, it, too, is composed of people, each with their private interests, that may sometimes clash with those of the collective. But it is a far cry from meritocracy, that is, in practice, little more than simply bestowing privilege on horders of "merit" rather than horders of money, noble blood, or other more quantifiable currencies. This may actually make meritocracies worse than other privileged-class structures, precisely because those at the top can easily change their definition, and exchange-rate, of "merit". At no point does the article suggest that General Franks was promoted, say, because he was someone's relative, or a member of the right party; in fact, nowhere is it suggested that he was promoted for anything but merit. And that is why he wasn't relieved - precisely because he was a "holder of merit". This is how meritocracy works. In WWII, someone would possible have told him "we don't care what you did or can do. At this point, your particular actions are not helping our collective war effort, so you must step aside for a while". But people like meritocracy, because, for some, "merit" isn't hard to achieve. You get the right credentials, put in some talent and a lot of effort, and presto, you're part of the elite. People don't like being judged over and over, be only as good as their last action. They want to rest without losing their status. Only an organization where people truly put aside their egos for the good of the public can function as the article claims the military used to function in WWII.
- vondur 14y agoI've always assumed that the Military tended to function as a giant bureaucracy, which tends to discourage many from staying in. That seems to be the norm for Government institutions. I would blame politicians for the drawn out wars we are engaged in. I'm sure if we gave the military carte blanche command of the wars, they could end them. (We may not like the tactics, but that's another discussion)
- afterburner 14y agoPeacetime armies (ie. not WWII) end up with careerists on top, not warriors. So you get the same as any mediocre corporation. The immediate stakes to national security aren't high enough to demand results "or else".
- jseliger 14y ago>Peacetime armies (ie. not WWII) end up with careerists on top, not warriors. So you get the same as any mediocre corporation. But armies don't have the pressure of potential bankruptcy that acts as a safety valve against poor performance.
- afterburner 14y agoYes, good point. Although consider that many a corporate behemoth has been able to carry on for a long time with little competence at the top due to a large stable revenue stream from some product or other. It gets them in the end (probably), but for a long time they can coast on mediocrity. Example: GM.
- hindsightbias 14y agoWe've been at war for over a decade. That's 3X the length of WWII.
- michaelt 14y ago3x the length, but only 0.03% the number of coalition troops lost. More allied troops died on an average day in WWII than coalition troops died in the entire Iraq conflict.
- afterburner 14y agoIt's a matter of how much the civilian population is focused on the effort. WWII was a total war, everyone back home was involved in some way, usually through rationing, working a war-effort job, buying a war bond, paying increased taxes, and/or worrying about loved ones serving in the military (often though the draft). Things like Iraq and Afghanistan are basically peacetime military actions. It's a war over there... but back home, not so much. That affects what kind of talent, attention, priority, etc. goes into it.
- taligent 14y agoSorry but what does this have to do with IT or HN in general ?
- coderdude 14y ago"[...] anything that gratifies one's intellectual curiosity" is equal to "anything" given enough users. I think we got some good discussion out of this one, though.
- taligent 14y agoThat's Fox News quality quoting there. How about not taking it out of context. Off-Topic: Most stories about politics, or crime, or sports, unless they're evidence of some interesting new phenomenon. Pretty sure the US military counts as political.
- robryan 14y agoI don't think so. This isn't a right/left piece where everyone is going to come and comment based on their views and their opposition to the opposing viewpoint and be unswayed at all based on the discussion.
- randomafrican 14y agoThis is more about organization theory than politics
- RockyMcNuts 14y agoThe soldier who loses his rifle faces harsher punishment than the general who loses the war.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- AYBABTME 14y agoI think there are two major factors leading to the promotion of incompetent personnel to leadership positions. The first one is the bureaucratic nature of personnel evaluation, the second being the lack of actual 'real' wars to train the leaders (as sadistic as it appears). _Disclaimer_ : I only have an observer experience of the US Army (I went on tour in Afghanistan in a mixed US/Canada brigade), but my actual employment was in the Canadian Forces. I was on tour when Gen McChrystal was relieved and replaced by Gen Petraeus, and also when (CA) Gen Menard was relieved and replaced by Gen Vance. 1. In the early ranks of officers, promotions are very strongly linked to evaluation reports. Evaluation reports came to be very sanitize and politically corrected documents where you need a load of supporting documentation if you want to negatively score someone. If someone received an hypothetical score of 3 last year, you need very strong arguments if you want to reduce that score the year after. The system is somehow 'humanitarian' in that it believes that no one can become worse over time, and no one is incompetent. Also, there is a lot of 'political' pressure coming from relationships inside the military. I saw first hand some obviously incompetent Captain be promoted to the rank of Major, simply for political reasons. Somebody back in the country had plans back home for this officer, and this promotion was planned ahead of time (the officer had time in rank and was put in the position they were to give them some 'action' cred). Put together with the fact that promotions are expected after certain specific check-in-the-boxes, this leads to the promotion of incompetent leaders on purely bureaucratic grounds. Eventually leading to a wider range of incompetent officers in the pool of Colonel in which Generals are chosen. 2. Recent wars are not related in 'danger factor' to what WWII has been. Nobody's in actual danger of having their family killed/their country harmed if they don't succeed in their missions oversea. Those missions are political disturbance of far away countries. They are, sadistically, good for the troops as they give them first hand experience with real combat - it's essential for an army to always have veterans in their ranks to train other members. If a generation of the army would go without seeing combat actions, the technical abilities of this army would quickly evaporate. In that regard, while recent conflicts provided combat experience to field personnel, they have not been of a large enough scale to train generals. Generals thus can't really become battle-hardened and provide hands-on experience while on tour. Finally, the idea of doing a 'tour' when you're a general, like noted by the article. They come in theater with a vision (but often no general field experience, and sometimes even no field experience at all) and have only a few weeks/months to try out their vision and see what happens, and that's when they're actually on site and not back home dealing with politicians. Then regardless of the outcome, they are relieved and replaced by another general.
- anigbrowl 14y agoI don't think this is an exclusively American problem. There's an eye-opening book called 'On the psychology of military incompetence' which ought to be required reading for anyone in a leadership position.
- confluence 14y agoLooks like a "General Failure" in statistics/randomness (oh no he didn't) and merely an example of the fundamental attribution error (the Generals - that's it! I mean what does the effectiveness of large hardware on underground entrenchments have to do with it! We just need better leadership - not more guns, grunts, bombs and money). Battlefields are highly path dependent (lose 50 men on one hill - combined with unreplaced troops on the previous one - you've just lost 10km^2), chaotic (that shell just randomly took out your battleship during a beach rush - no more covering fire - you get slaughtered), subject to the influence of volatile human psychology (sounds and sights can decimate morale, focus and the ability to shoot people in the face at random times), resources (platoon 3 runs out of ammo, bogged down on critical hill - backup platoon can't get to them - out of range of covering shelling - lose the hill and the valley), weather (it's raining - they have tanks and relieved troops), positions (your hill just turned to mud and blood), communications (platoon 1 - decimated - incoherent babble and screaming, platoon 2 - nothing, platoon 3 - incomprehensible, platoon 4 faulty intel) and hell - wind direction (dust blows into your platoons' eyes - but not into the enemies). None of that has much to do with the general on the ground - it's just shit that happens in highly chaotic, unpredictable, uncertain and resource constrained environments. I see the same kind of criticism leveled at CEOs. Granted, many of them are complete morons and can drive companies into the ground. However most are simply doing what appears reasonable at the time, and are just unlucky not to have the corporate/economic/technology winds (or dust) at their backs. People overrate what people can honestly achieve in highly chaotic environments. 15% of corporate CEOs are replaced every year - notice how companies don't change much from year to year though - I have. However, changing often definitely let's us lionize the lucky ones (see hedge funds, startups, novels, movies, tv shows and any other at scale, highly path dependent, chaotic and random systems). We failed in Iraq and Afghanistan because we needed 10x more troops on landing and about 15x more resources and a great deal more international support. This is by far the most predictive of success on any battlefield (and business) - irrelevant as to who is actually running it.
- adaml_623 14y agoIn World War II, the firing of a general was seen as a sign that the system was working as planned. Yet now, in the rare instances when it does occur, relief tends to be seen, especially inside the Army, as a sign that the system has somehow failed. Oh how I wish that governments would realise this. Making mistakes and then correcting the mistakes is the important thing. The whole phenomena of start-ups dominating over established companies is a guide to how you should be running the established businesses. Government departments hold onto their bad decisions, trying to justify them and hide the damning evidence when really they should be praised for acknowledging mistakes and changing their minds.
- antman 14y agoI totally agree. And there is also the fact that in a competitive environment, competiton is human. You can not folllow a strict procedure on paper, when the competition adapts, copies and even improves. Unfortunately the procedure is also the justification for any action, and it is easier to create metrics on how good the procedure was followed than creating metrics for the results of their actions.
- cafard 14y agoBefore we go too far down this road, what about Douglas MacArthur? He pushed the government to defend the Philippines, he lost most of his air in the first 24 hours--after the news from Pearl Harbor was known--and he returned home as a hero. And yes, he did have his moments, in WW II, and Korea, but some of his decisions in the latter war lead to a barely-contained fiasco.