5 ms·
I think a big part of "criminally low" is that you'll make much more money selling it on the black market than getting the bounty.
by salviati 8mo ago
I think a big part of "criminally low" is that you'll make much more money selling it on the black market than getting the bounty.
- consumer451 8mo agoI am far from the halls of corporate decision making, but I really don't understand why bug bounties at trillion dollar companies are so low.
- arcfour 8mo agoBecause it's nice to get $10k legally + public credit than it is to get $100k while risking arrest + prison time, getting scammed, or selling your exploit to someone that uses it to ransom a children's hospital?
- kspacewalk2 8mo agoIs it in fact illegal to sell a zero day exploit of an open source application or library to whoever I want?
- IggleSniggle 8mo agoDepends. Within the US, there are data export laws that could make the "whoever" part illegal. There are also conspiracy to commit a crime laws that could imply liability. There are also laws that could make performing/demonstrating certain exploits illegal, even if divulging it isn't. That could result in some legal gray area. IANAL but have worked in this domain. Obviously different jurisdictions may handle such issues differently from one another.
- consumer451 8mo agoThanks, great answer. I was just thinking from a simple market value POV.
- sailfast 8mo agoWhat about $500K selling it to governments?
- bell-cot 8mo agoIssue 1: Governments which your own gov't likes, or ones which it doesn't? The latter has downsides similar to a black market sale. Issue 2: Selling to governments generally means selling to a Creepy-Spooky Agency. Sadly, creeps & spooks can "get ideas" about their $500k also buying them rights to your future work.
- duozerk 8mo agoI read this often, and I guess it could be true, but those kinds of transaction would presumably go through DNM / forums like BF and the like. Which means crypto, and full anonymity. So either the buyer trusts the seller to deliver, or the seller trusts the buyer to pay. And once you reveal the particulars of a flaw, nothing prevents the buyer from running away (this actually also occurs regularly on legal, genuine bug bounty programs - they'll patch the problem discreetly after reading the report but never follow up, never mind paying; with little recourse for the researcher). Even revealing enough details, but not everything, about the flaw to convince a potential buyer would be detrimental to the seller, as the level of details required to convince would likely massively simplify the work of the buyer should they decide to try and find the flaw themselves instead of buying. And I imagine much of those potential buyers would be state actors or organized criminal groups, both of which do have researchers in house. The way this trust issue is (mostly) solved in drugs DNM is through the platform itself acting as a escrow agent; but I suspect such a thing would not work as well with selling vulnerabilities, because the volume is much lower, for one thing (preventing a high enough volume for reputation building); the financial amounts generally higher, for another. The real money to be made as a criminal alternative, I think, would be to exploit the flaw yourself on real life targets. For example to drop ransomware payloads; these days ransomware groups even offer franchises - they'll take, say, 15% of the ransom cut and provide assistance with laundering/exploiting the target/etc; and claim your infection in the name of their group.
- moring 8mo ago> Even revealing enough details, but not everything, about the flaw to convince a potential buyer would be detrimental to the seller, as the level of details required to convince would likely massively simplify the work of the buyer should they decide to try and find the flaw themselves instead of buying. Is conning a seller really worth it for a potential buyer? Details will help an expert find the flaw, but it still takes lots of work, and there is the risk of not finding it (and the seller will be careful next time). > And I imagine much of those potential buyers would be state actors or organized criminal groups, both of which do have researchers in house. They also have the money to just buy an exploit. > The real money to be made as a criminal alternative, I think, would be to exploit the flaw yourself on real life targets. For example to drop ransomware payloads; these days ransomware groups even offer franchises - they'll take, say, 15% of the ransom cut and provide assistance with laundering/exploiting the target/etc; and claim your infection in the name of their group. I'd imagine the skills needed to get paid from ransomware victims without getting caught to be very different from the skills needed to find a vulnerability.