3 ms·
I don't imagine it would be too difficult to snoop the instruction stream to identify a software implementation of AES and yoink the keys from it, at least if t
by wat10000 9mo ago
I don't imagine it would be too difficult to snoop the instruction stream to identify a software implementation of AES and yoink the keys from it, at least if the implementation isn't obfuscated. If your threat model includes an adversarial CPU then you probably need to at least obfuscate your implementation, if not entirely offload the crypto to somewhere you trust.
- bflesch 9mo agoYes but it's much easier to tell devs "put your keys here" and then just take that.
- wat10000 9mo agoWe’re talking about a hidden CPU backdoor that would let you secretly come in and retrieve keys you’ve squirreled away somewhere. I don’t think finding the keys is the hard part.
- bflesch 9mo agoAre you serious? The CPU firmware blobs are encrypted and nobody except Intel can see what is running there. A handful of people on the planet have the tools and skills to analyze the chip for backdoors. A small section of CPU cache could stay powered even though the OS is shut down, persisting the keys that were passed to the AES CPU instruction. As CPU is directly linked to wifi/bluetooth and USB chipsets, exfiltration could be possible both wirelessly and via special USB payload.
- wat10000 9mo agoCompared to all of that, looking for certain patterns in the instruction stream is barely any more effort than looking for specific instructions.