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This is especially interesting in regard to the recent HN dicussion on spyware by for-profit intel firms having access to Whatsapp, Telegram, Signal, etc. (http
by mentalgear 8mo ago
This is especially interesting in regard to the recent HN dicussion on spyware by for-profit intel firms having access to Whatsapp, Telegram, Signal, etc. (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47033976 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47033976) through OS-level no-click hijacks.
I wonder how secure GrapheneOS is in that regard, and what the other contenders are?
- cartoonworld 8mo agoGrapheneOS have hardened_malloc which is a huge advantage, I think. It makes the weird machines problem much harder. I would say be very careful, because you can still get previews of images, or old and weird media formats that could be exploitable, and android/GrapheneOS doesn't have the same sorts of policy as say Apple with the iMessage blast door. They control safari, etc. Android's attack surface seems pretty jagged. For example there is only one webrender engine on iOS, where you can run anything you like on Android/GrapheneOS.
- tranq_cassowary 8mo agoChromium is the only web engine present on a fresh install. If a user doesn't install a browser with another engine, the attack surface doesn't get increased. Chromium/Blink is more secure than Safari/Webkit overall so I don't really think this is an argument in favour of iOS. iOS for sure does some good things though and is better than Android in some areas.
- subscribed 8mo agoHard to say how it fares against those specific attacks but some of the vulnerabilities that will go out in the mid-2026 on the mainstream handsets are already patched: https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026021200 https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026021200 (it's not magic. All big vendors have these details, just choose to take their sweet time to patch them. GOS has partnered with a major OEM vendor who provides them with access) Other than the specific patches above, there's a list of generic GOS features: https://grapheneos.org/features#exploit-protection https://grapheneos.org/features#exploit-protection All in all you're probably much safer.
- zozbot234 8mo agoIt's quite secure against casual attacks, but a proprietary mobile platform has inherent issues wrt. withstanding even mildly sophisticated attackers, including mercenary spyware services. You still have a huge attack surface from all sorts of proprietary firmware blobs and hardware IP blocks that are running directly on the SoC. It's not clear that it's really worth even trying to secure it as opposed to just treating it like an untrusted toy.
- cartoonworld 8mo agowell, a concerted attack could easily subvert the baseband if you have a few million dollars and the correct letterhead or private contacts. GrapheneOS really wants the software in the phone to not pwn the phone. This is good. Its a different, and much more difficult problem to secure the connection to the telco, and the larger internet, because the transport is attacker controlled. Think of it this way: Say you use Qubes because security is valued very highly for you. Even if you run Qubes, if your router is controlled by your attacker, what kind of a security guarantee could you really get for yourself?
- fsflover 8mo ago> Even if you run Qubes, if your router is controlled by your attacker, what kind of a security guarantee could you really get for yourself? I do run Qubes, and a compromised router, e.g., will not get access to any passwords that I store in an offline VM as text, even with any previously known vulnerability since 2006.
- raron 8mo ago> well, a concerted attack could easily subvert the baseband In theory Pixel phones have IOMMU and GrapheneOS is using them, so even a compromised baseband doesn't result unrestricted access to the system.
- tranq_cassowary 8mo agoGrapheneOS distrusts the network. Connections use HTTPS and the integrity of important things like updates is also verified via signatures.
- ozlikethewizard 8mo agoGrapheneOS themselves dont pretend that their secure from that level of attack, but its about evaluating your own threat level. State sponsered actors aren't burning zero days on the vast majority of people, and you only need to look at how badly several european governments want to ban graphene and similar to see that such exploits aren't even being burned on organised crime. Realistically unless you're a journalist or considered a political target you're gonna be fine with graphene.
- mentalgear 8mo agoThank you for the insight. Indeed, a concerning state of the world where criminals are less at risk from spyware than journalists and activists.
- ozlikethewizard 8mo agoIts definitely a scary world, safe to assume all your online activity could be hacked if so wanted. Just gotta hope its not wanted and that it doesnt become possible to do it on a mass scale (UK is currently pushing to ban E2E lol, and I know the EU has contemplated similar. If you do fall into the wanted category, face 2 face is really the only option. I know a lot of politcal/investigative journalists also constantly cycle and maintain burner devices but even thats a risk of just how long is a safe time before a device is considered burned.
- StilesCrisis 8mo agoIt's just an Android fork. Almost certainly it's equally affected.
- microtonal 8mo agoThat's too simple. First of all, Pixel (which GrapheneOS requires) is one of the few Android phones with a separate secure enclave. GrapheneOS also applies a lot of hardening that other vendors do not: https://grapheneos.org/features#exploit-protection https://grapheneos.org/features#exploit-protection This does make a material difference, e.g.: https://x.com/MetroplexGOS/status/1982163802188575178 https://x.com/MetroplexGOS/status/1982163802188575178 That said, if a state-level actor is up against you, then it's hard to defend yourself against that.