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>If it's that easy, how long do we really expect Advanced Data Protection to be free from government backdooring? Taking down an app is hardly unprecedented. F

by gruez 9mo ago

>If it's that easy, how long do we really expect Advanced Data Protection to be free from government backdooring? Taking down an app is hardly unprecedented. Forcing companies to add backdoors in secret is, so it's a stretch to think that ADP is compromised.

bigyabai 9mo ago
> Forcing companies to add backdoors in secret is We have precedent: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/12/apple-admits-to-secretly-giving-governments-push-notification-data/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/12/apple-admits-to-... Apple has since confirmed in a statement provided to Ars that the US federal government “prohibited” the company “from sharing any information,”
- gruez 9mo ago
  "secretly sharing notification data" (ie. asking for records kept in the usual course of business[1]) is not the same as "forcing companies to add backdoors in secret" [1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1732 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1732
  - bigyabai 9mo ago
    Thinking something is "unprecedented" is not an argument against it happening. Apple has surprised us before, I see no reason to expect ADP is any different.
    - gruez 9mo ago
      >Apple has surprised us before It really isn't. The reason I used the specific wording for "records kept in the usual course of business" is that's the legal standard for subpoenable information. It shouldn't be surprising to any legal expert that it was fair game for the government to request. The only thing surprising is that we didn't know it specifically happened before, so it's only as "surprising" as chatgpt logs being subpoenaed. Yes, it's "surprising" for the people using chatgpt as their therapist and think it should have been protected, but ask any lawyer and they'll all agree it's fair game. On the other hand forcing apple to specifically insert a backdoor runs into all sorts of constitution/due process issues.
  - autoexec 9mo ago
    I think it's safe to assume that there's a Room 641A (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A) at every major US company that deals in communications. That said, there's no reason to think that ICE or local law enforcement get access to the data being collected. iCloud may be completely backdoored either way, but there's a big difference between the NSA and ICE in terms of what they care about going after and what capabilities they want publicly confirmed.
- wolvoleo 9mo ago
  To be fair, most apps are guarding against this now by having the push notifications contain just a wake-up signal, the app then wakes up and retrieves the real content.
snypher 9mo ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A Literal back door, in secret. I doubt things have gotten better since this. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter The company couldn't say, even if they wanted to.
tremon 9mo ago
Forcing companies to add backdoors in secret has been precedented for nearly a decade now. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/09/australia-threatens-to-force-companies-to-break-encryption.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/09/australia-thr... > Technical Capability Notices (TCNs): TCNs are orders that require a company to build new capabilities that assist law enforcement agencies in accessing encrypted data. The Attorney-General must approve a TCN by confirming it is reasonable, proportionate, practical, and technically feasible.

by gruez 9mo ago

bigyabai 9mo ago

> Forcing companies to add backdoors in secret is We have precedent: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/12/apple-admits-to-secretly-giving-governments-push-notification-data/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/12/apple-admits-to-... Apple has since confirmed in a statement provided to Ars that the US federal government “prohibited” the company “from sharing any information,”

gruez 9mo ago
"secretly sharing notification data" (ie. asking for records kept in the usual course of business[1]) is not the same as "forcing companies to add backdoors in secret" [1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1732 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1732
- bigyabai 9mo ago
  Thinking something is "unprecedented" is not an argument against it happening. Apple has surprised us before, I see no reason to expect ADP is any different.
  - gruez 9mo ago
    >Apple has surprised us before It really isn't. The reason I used the specific wording for "records kept in the usual course of business" is that's the legal standard for subpoenable information. It shouldn't be surprising to any legal expert that it was fair game for the government to request. The only thing surprising is that we didn't know it specifically happened before, so it's only as "surprising" as chatgpt logs being subpoenaed. Yes, it's "surprising" for the people using chatgpt as their therapist and think it should have been protected, but ask any lawyer and they'll all agree it's fair game. On the other hand forcing apple to specifically insert a backdoor runs into all sorts of constitution/due process issues.
- autoexec 9mo ago
  I think it's safe to assume that there's a Room 641A (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A) at every major US company that deals in communications. That said, there's no reason to think that ICE or local law enforcement get access to the data being collected. iCloud may be completely backdoored either way, but there's a big difference between the NSA and ICE in terms of what they care about going after and what capabilities they want publicly confirmed.
wolvoleo 9mo ago
To be fair, most apps are guarding against this now by having the push notifications contain just a wake-up signal, the app then wakes up and retrieves the real content.

snypher 9mo ago

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A Literal back door, in secret. I doubt things have gotten better since this. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter The company couldn't say, even if they wanted to.

tremon 9mo ago

Forcing companies to add backdoors in secret has been precedented for nearly a decade now. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/09/australia-threatens-to-force-companies-to-break-encryption.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/09/australia-thr... > Technical Capability Notices (TCNs): TCNs are orders that require a company to build new capabilities that assist law enforcement agencies in accessing encrypted data. The Attorney-General must approve a TCN by confirming it is reasonable, proportionate, practical, and technically feasible.