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It's more intellectually lazy to think boolean logic at a sufficient scale crosses some event horizon wherein its execution on mechanical gadgets called compute
by measurablefunc 8mo ago
It's more intellectually lazy to think boolean logic at a sufficient scale crosses some event horizon wherein its execution on mechanical gadgets called computers somehow adds up to intelligence beyond human understanding.
- hodgehog11 8mo agoIt is intellectually lazy to proclaim something to be impossible in the absence of evidence or proof. In the case of the statement made here, it is provably true that Boolean logic at sufficient scale can replicate "intelligence" of any arbitrary degree. It is also easy to show that this can be perceived as an "event horizon" since the measurements of model quality that humans typically like to use are so nonlinear that they are virtually step function-like.
- measurablefunc 8mo agoDoesn't seem like you have proof of anything but it does appear that you have something that is very much like religious faith in an unforeseeable inevitability. Which is fine as far as religion is concerned but it's better to not pretend it's anything other than blind faith. But if you really do have concrete proof of something then you'll have to spell it out better & explain how exactly it adds up to intelligence of such magnitude & scope that no one can make sense of it.
- hodgehog11 8mo ago> "religious faith in an unforeseeable inevitability" For reference, I work in academia, and my job is to find theoretical limitations of neural nets. If there was so much of a modicum of evidence to support the argument that "intelligence" cannot arise from sufficiently large systems, my colleagues and I would be utterly delighted and would be all over it. Here are a couple of standard elements without getting into details: 1. Any "intelligent" agent can be modelled as a random map from environmental input to actions. 2. Any random map can be suitably well-approximated by a generative transformer. This is the universal approximation theorem. Universal approximation does not mean that models of a given class can be trained using data to achieve an arbitrary level of accuracy, however... 3. The neural scaling laws (first empirical, now more theoretically established under NTK-type assumptions), as a refinement of the double descent curve, assert that a neural network class can get arbitrarily close to an "entropy level" given sufficient scale. This theoretical level is so much smaller than any performance metric that humans can reach. Whether "sufficiently large" is outside of the range that is physically possible is a much longer discussion, but bets are that human levels are not out of reach (I don't like this, to be clear). 4. The nonlinearity of accuracy metrics comes from the fact that they are constructed from the intersection of a large number of weakly independent events. Think the CDF of a Beta random variable with parameters tending to infinity. Look, I understand the scepticism, but from where I am, reality isn't leaning that way at the moment. I can't afford to think it isn't possible. I don't think you should either.
- measurablefunc 8mo agoAs I said previously, you are welcome to believe whatever you find most profitable for your circumstances but I don't find your heuristics convincing. If you do come up or stumble upon a concrete constructive proof that 100 trillion transistors in some suitable configuration will be sufficiently complex to be past the aforementioned event horizon then I'll admit your faith was not misplaced & I will reevaluate my reasons for remaining skeptical of Boolean arithmetic adding up to an incomprehensible kind of intelligence beyond anyone's understanding.
- hodgehog11 8mo agoWhich part was heuristic? This format doesn't lend itself to providing proofs, it isn't exactly a LaTeX environment. Also why does the proof need to be constructive? That seems like an arbitrarily high bar to me. It suggests that you are not even remotely open to the possibility of evidence either. I also don't think you understand my point of view, and you mistake me for a grifter. Keeping the possibility open is not profitable for me, and it would be much more beneficial to believe what you do.
- measurablefunc 8mo agoI didn't think you were a grifter but you only presented heuristics so if you have formal references then you can share them & people can decide on their own what to believe based on the evidence presented.
- hodgehog11 8mo agoFine, that's fair. I believe the statement that you made is countered by my claim, which is: Theorem. For any tolerance epsilon > 0, there exists a transformer neural network of sufficient size that follows, up to the factor epsilon, the policy that most optimally achieves arbitrary goals in arbitrary stochastic environments. Proof (sketch). For any stochastic environment with a given goal, there exists a model that maximizes expected return under this goal (not necessarily unique, but it exists). From Solomonoff's convergence theorem (Theorem 3.19 in [1]), Bayes-optimal predictors under the universal Kolmogorov prior converge with increasing context to this model. Consequently, there exists an agent (called the AIXI agent) that is Pareto-optimal for arbitrary goals (Theorem 5.23 in [1]). This agent is a sequence-to-sequence map with some mild regularity, and satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3 in [2]. From this universal approximation theorem (itself proven in Appendices B and C in [2]), there exists a transformer neural network of a sufficient size that replicates the AIXI agent up to the factor epsilon. This is effectively the argument made in [3], although I'm not fond of their presentation. Now, practitioners still cry foul because existence doesn't guarantee a procedure to find this particular architecture (this is the constructive bit). This is where the neural scaling law comes in. The trick is to work with a linearization of the network, called the neural tangent kernel; it's existence is guaranteed from Theorem 7.2 of [4]. The NTK predictors are also universal and are a subset of the random feature models treated in [5], which derives the neural scaling laws for these models. Extrapolating these laws out as per [6] for specific tasks shows that the "floor" is always below human error rates, but this is still empirical because it works with the ill-defined definition of superintelligence that is "better than humans in all contexts". [1] Hutter, M. (2005). Universal artificial intelligence: Sequential decisions based on algorithmic probability. Springer Science & Business Media. [2] https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.10077 https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.10077 [3] https://openreview.net/pdf?id=Vib3KtwoWs https://openreview.net/pdf?id=Vib3KtwoWs [4] https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.14548 https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.14548 [5] https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.16859 https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.16859 [6] https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.08361 https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.08361