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I would love to see alternatives of educational code that implements these things in a "compliant" way. Security does not come from Compliance (sometimes they
by amichal 8mo ago
I would love to see alternatives of educational code that implements these things in a "compliant" way.
Security does not come from Compliance (sometimes they are at odds) but as someone who is not an academically trained security professional but who has read NIST* in detail, implements such code and has passed a number of code reviews from security professionals. And who has been asked to do things like STRIDE risk assessment on products I write code for I do appreciate the references and links along side actual code of any kind.
Now to be fair, I have not yet looked at any of the code here, it's commit history or its level of AI-induced fantasy confidence in the validity of the specific solutions. That could be good or bad but the intent of this is really on point for me.
Edit: I looked at some code:
This is missing a lot from NIST SP 800-63B
Looking at https://github.com/vhscom/private-landing/blob/main/packages/core/src/auth/services/account-service.ts https://github.com/vhscom/private-landing/blob/main/packages...
- the db select runs before the password has so you can detect if the account exists with timing attacks
- there is no enforced minimum nor maximum length on the stored secret (e..g para 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2 recommend length range of 8 to 64 unicode printable chars normalized to some form i forget)
- there is no enforced min max length on the account identifier (in this case email) and no normalization
At least not in the code i saw. so there is still a lot of basics/low hanging fruit from NIST recommendations at least you would find in any production grade auth framework missing
- vhsdev 8mo agoHi, amichal. Nice finds. I will dig into more of the particulars where sensible. Please feel free to send up a pull request! Thanks for taking a peek.
- vhsdev 8mo agoPretty sure all those are covered, upon more careful review. PRs open! Edit: The create account I hadn't thought of for the email enum. Thanks! Edit 2: Fixed up two schema issues identified and the last mitigated already via call: await passwords.rejectPasswordWithConstantTime(validatedData.password)
- tracker1 8mo agoOn the login... when failing either via user lookup, or password mismatch, I'll usually put a random 500-2500ms (or more) delay before logging and sending the response to handle timing attacks. You can try a db transaction against a lock table for IP and Username as part of multi-request mitigation during any given request. CF offers Durable objects that can be used for this purpose. Return "too many requests" error if a request is sent before another is finished... this will slow things down. On the minimum passphrase, there are some libraries you can use to get the printable character length... note: you should always normalize (NFC or NFKC) before doing any hashing or validation. function getPrintableLength(str) { // Use Intl.Segmenter for accurate, user-perceived character count const segmenter = new Intl.Segmenter("en-US", { granularity: "grapheme" }); return [...segmenter.segment(str)].length; } Personally, I usually just transparently set a max of 1024 bytes, I don't display a hint for it at runtime, only an error on submit though... if someone exceeds that, they deserve the generic error I return. Email validation can be a bit rough, depending on how permissive or restricting you want to be. If you're willing to wait for a DNS/MX check on the domain, that's a good place to start. You most likely don't want less than 5 characters or more than 100.