Look I'm not even clear where you're trying to go with this. You honestly just come across as wanting to argue pointlessly. You compared bootloader validation

Look I'm not even clear where you're trying to go with this. You honestly just come across as wanting to argue pointlessly. You compared bootloader validation to TLS verification. The purpose of TLS CAs is to verify that the entity is who they claim to be. Nothing more, nothing less. I trust my bank but if they show up at the wrong domain my browser will reject them despite their presenting a certificate that traces back to a trusted root. It isn't a matter of trust it's a matter of identity. Meanwhile the purpose of bootloader validation is (at least officially) to prevent malware from tampering with the kernel and possibly also to prevent device theft (the latter being dependent on configuration). Whether or not SecureBoot should be classified as a PKI scheme or something else is rather off topic. The underlying purpose is entirely different from that of TLS. > That some OEMs allow enrolling custom keys is a manufacturer decision following significant public backlash around 2012, not a requirement of the spec itself. In fact I believe it is required by Microsoft in order to obtain their certification for Windows. Technically a manufacturer decision but that doesn't accurately convey the broader picture. Again, where are you going with this? It seems as though you're trying to score imaginary points. > Where exactly am I "demonstrably wrong"? Your claimed that the point of SecureBoot is to involve a third party. It is not. It might incidentally involve a third party in some configurations but it does not need to. The actual point of the thing is to prevent low level malware.