I'm not trying to defend the comment you are replying to, but if we're going to bring up NixOS in a discussion that started out being about security, I have to

I'm not trying to defend the comment you are replying to, but if we're going to bring up NixOS in a discussion that started out being about security, I have to point out that even by the low standards of Linux distros, NixOS's security is bad. For example, NixOS famously didn't require package maintainers to sign the artifacts they upload to NixOS's servers. (They still might not: it has been a year or two since I inquired.) The NixOS project considered it more important to make it easy for people to start maintaining NixOS packages (so that users would have a large selection of packages to choose from) than to have any kind of supply-chain integrity. Maintaining a distro that is even remotely secure is a great deal of work, and the people that are willing to put in that work don't pick a distro to base their work on at random: they strongly tend to base their work on the distros that already have a pretty good security story, so for example the relatively new distro "Secureblue" is based on Fedora Atomic Desktop because Fedora already had for many years a pretty good security story. (E.g., it and RHEL are the only distros that use selinux in any real way.) The point is that it is probably going to be hard for NixOS to improve its security much because most Linux maintainers either do not care about security much or do not even realize that the security of all Linux distros is lacking (compared to ChromeOS, MacOS, iOS or Android) The small fraction of Linux maintainers willing to work on improving security and aware of the immensity of the task naturally tend to direct their work toward a distro and an ecosystem (e.g., Qubes, Kicksecure, Fedora or Debian) that has already been the target of much previous security-improving effort.