3 ms·

Trusted computing means trusted by the vendor and content providers, not trusted by the user. In that sense I consider it very evil.

by wolvoleo 10mo ago

charcircuit 10mo ago
If the user doesn't trust an operating system, why would they use it. The operating system can steal sensitive information. Trusted computing is trusted by the user to the extent that they use the device. For example if they don't trust it, they may avoid logging in to their bank on it.
- mzajc 10mo ago
  > If the user doesn't trust an operating system, why would they use it. Because in the case of smartphones, there is realistically no other option. > For example if they don't trust it, they may avoid logging in to their bank on it. Except when the bank trusts the system that I don't (smartphone with Google Services or equivalent Apple junk installed), and doesn't trust the system that I do (desktop computer or degoogled smartphone), which is a very common scenario.
- bigyabai 10mo ago
  Do you actually, bottom-of-your-heart believe that ordinary consumers think like this? They use TikTok and WhatsApp and Facebook and the Wal-Mart coupon app as a product of deep consideration on the web of trust they're building? Users don't have a choice, and they don't care. Bitlocker is cracked by the feds, iOS and Android devices can get unlocked or hacked with commercially-available grey-market exploits. Push Notifications are bugged, apparently. Your logic hinges on an idyllic philosophy that doesn't even exist in security focused communities.
  - charcircuit 10mo ago
    Yes, I do believe from the bottom of my heart the users trust the operating systems they use. Apple and Google have done a great job at security and privacy which is why it seems like users don't care. It's like complaining why you have a system administrator if the servers are never down. When things are run well the average person seems ignorant of the problems.
    - bigyabai 10mo ago
      > which is why it seems like users don't care. ...and not because, in truth, they don't care? How would we even know if people distrusted a company like Microsoft or Meta? Both companies are so deeply-entrenched that you can't avoid them no matter how you feel about their privacy stance. The same goes for Apple and Google, there is no "greener grass" alternative to protest the surveillance of Push Notifications or vulnerability to Pegasus malware.
      - charcircuit 10mo ago
        They would stop using them, or reduce what kinds of things they do on them if they didn't trust them. No one is forcing you to document your life on these palatforms.
        bigyabai 10mo ago
        > They would stop using them Would they? Nobody that I know would.
    - wolvoleo 10mo ago
      Google certainly hasn't done a great job on privacy. Android devices leak so much information. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/10/phone-tracking-tool-lets-government-agencies-follow-your-every-move/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/10/phone... https://peabee.substack.com/p/everyone-knows-what-apps-you-use https://peabee.substack.com/p/everyone-knows-what-apps-you-u... About Apple I just don't know enough because I haven't seriously used them for years
      - charcircuit 10mo ago
        Yet, in the big picture Google is doing a good enough job that those information leaks have not caused them harm. When you really zoom in you can find some issues, but the real world impact of them is not big enough to influence most consumers.
- LoganDark 10mo ago
  To trust an Android device, I need to have ultimate authority over it. That means freedom to remove functionality I don't like and make changes apps don't like. Otherwise, there are parts of practically every Android that I don't approve of, like the carrier app installer, any tracking/telemetry, most preinstalled apps, etc. I recently moved to Apple devices because they use trusted computing differently; namely, to protect against platform abuse, but mostly not to protect corporate interests. They also publish detailed first-party documentation on how their platforms work and how certain features are implemented. Apple jailbreaking has historically also had a better UX than Android rooting, because Apple platforms are more trusted than Android platforms, meaning that DRM protection, banking apps and such will often still work with a jailbroken iOS device, unlike most rooted Android devices. With that said though, I don't particularly expect to ever have a jailbroken iOS device again, unfortunately. Apple implements many more protections than Android at the OS level to prevent abuse of trusted computing by third-party apps, and give the user control. (Though some Androids like, say, GrapheneOS, implement lots that Apple does not.) But of course all this only matters if you trust Apple. I trust them less than I did, but to me they are still the most trustworthy.
  - charcircuit 10mo ago
    >to protect against platform abuse, but mostly not to protect corporate interests What do you mean by this? On both Android and iOS app developers can have a backend that checks the status of app attestation.
    - LoganDark 10mo ago
      "App attestation" means different things for Android than for iOS. On iOS, it verifies the app was installed from the right place. On Android, it tries to check if the device is tampered with, or hasn't been fully certified by Google, or etc... Android's far more finicky because Google uses this process to crack down on OEMs and hobbyists, while Apple implicitly trusts itself. Also, "checking the status of app attestation" is the wrong approach. If you want to use app attestation that way, then you should sign/encrypt communications (requests and responses) with hardware-backed keys; that way, you can't replay or proxy an attestation result to authorize modified requests. (I believe Apple attestation doesn't directly support encryption itself, only signing, but that is enough to use it as part of a key exchange process with hardware-backed keys - you can sign a public key you're sending to the server, which can verify your signature and then use your public key to encrypt a server-side public key, that then you can decrypt and use to encrypt your future communications to the server, and the server can encrypt its responses with your public key, etc.)
UltraSane 10mo ago
Pre-TC mobile/embedded security was catastrophic: Persistent bootkits trivial to install No verified boot chain Firmware implants survived OS reinstalls No hardware-backed key storage Encryption keys extractable via JTAG/flash dump Modern Secure Boot + hardware-backed keystore + eFuse anti-rollback eliminated entire attack classes. The median user's security posture improved by orders of magnitude.
- michaelmrose 10mo ago
  Did this ever effect real users?
  - fc417fc802 10mo ago
    Arguably yes. By preventing entire classes of attack real users are never exposed to certain risks in the first place. If it were possible it would be abused at some rate (even if that rate were low). It's not that trusted computing is inherently bad. I actually think it's a very good thing. The problem is that the manufacturer maintains control of the keys when they sell you a device. Imagine selling someone a house that had smart locks but not turning over control of the locks to the new "owner". And every time the "owner" wants to add a new guest to the lock you insist on "reviewing" the guest before agreeing to add him. You insist that this is important for "security" because otherwise the "owner" might throw a party or invite a drug dealer over or something else you don't approve of. But don't worry, you are protecting the "owner" from malicious third parties hiding in plain sight. You run thorough background checks on all applicants after all!
    - tosti 10mo ago
      I get your point, but I think your example doesn't make sense. I can get drugs delivered to a psych ward if I'd want that. Dealers don't need a key.
  - QuiEgo 10mo ago
    Yes. See attacks like Pegasus.

Trusted computing means trusted by the vendor and content providers, not trusted by the user. In that sense I consider it very evil.

charcircuit 10mo ago

If the user doesn't trust an operating system, why would they use it. The operating system can steal sensitive information. Trusted computing is trusted by the user to the extent that they use the device. For example if they don't trust it, they may avoid logging in to their bank on it.

mzajc 10mo ago
> If the user doesn't trust an operating system, why would they use it. Because in the case of smartphones, there is realistically no other option. > For example if they don't trust it, they may avoid logging in to their bank on it. Except when the bank trusts the system that I don't (smartphone with Google Services or equivalent Apple junk installed), and doesn't trust the system that I do (desktop computer or degoogled smartphone), which is a very common scenario.
bigyabai 10mo ago
Do you actually, bottom-of-your-heart believe that ordinary consumers think like this? They use TikTok and WhatsApp and Facebook and the Wal-Mart coupon app as a product of deep consideration on the web of trust they're building? Users don't have a choice, and they don't care. Bitlocker is cracked by the feds, iOS and Android devices can get unlocked or hacked with commercially-available grey-market exploits. Push Notifications are bugged, apparently. Your logic hinges on an idyllic philosophy that doesn't even exist in security focused communities.
- charcircuit 10mo ago
  Yes, I do believe from the bottom of my heart the users trust the operating systems they use. Apple and Google have done a great job at security and privacy which is why it seems like users don't care. It's like complaining why you have a system administrator if the servers are never down. When things are run well the average person seems ignorant of the problems.
  - bigyabai 10mo ago
    > which is why it seems like users don't care. ...and not because, in truth, they don't care? How would we even know if people distrusted a company like Microsoft or Meta? Both companies are so deeply-entrenched that you can't avoid them no matter how you feel about their privacy stance. The same goes for Apple and Google, there is no "greener grass" alternative to protest the surveillance of Push Notifications or vulnerability to Pegasus malware.
    - charcircuit 10mo ago
      They would stop using them, or reduce what kinds of things they do on them if they didn't trust them. No one is forcing you to document your life on these palatforms.
      - bigyabai 10mo ago
        > They would stop using them Would they? Nobody that I know would.
  - wolvoleo 10mo ago
    Google certainly hasn't done a great job on privacy. Android devices leak so much information. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/10/phone-tracking-tool-lets-government-agencies-follow-your-every-move/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/10/phone... https://peabee.substack.com/p/everyone-knows-what-apps-you-use https://peabee.substack.com/p/everyone-knows-what-apps-you-u... About Apple I just don't know enough because I haven't seriously used them for years
    - charcircuit 10mo ago
      Yet, in the big picture Google is doing a good enough job that those information leaks have not caused them harm. When you really zoom in you can find some issues, but the real world impact of them is not big enough to influence most consumers.
LoganDark 10mo ago
To trust an Android device, I need to have ultimate authority over it. That means freedom to remove functionality I don't like and make changes apps don't like. Otherwise, there are parts of practically every Android that I don't approve of, like the carrier app installer, any tracking/telemetry, most preinstalled apps, etc. I recently moved to Apple devices because they use trusted computing differently; namely, to protect against platform abuse, but mostly not to protect corporate interests. They also publish detailed first-party documentation on how their platforms work and how certain features are implemented. Apple jailbreaking has historically also had a better UX than Android rooting, because Apple platforms are more trusted than Android platforms, meaning that DRM protection, banking apps and such will often still work with a jailbroken iOS device, unlike most rooted Android devices. With that said though, I don't particularly expect to ever have a jailbroken iOS device again, unfortunately. Apple implements many more protections than Android at the OS level to prevent abuse of trusted computing by third-party apps, and give the user control. (Though some Androids like, say, GrapheneOS, implement lots that Apple does not.) But of course all this only matters if you trust Apple. I trust them less than I did, but to me they are still the most trustworthy.
- charcircuit 10mo ago
  >to protect against platform abuse, but mostly not to protect corporate interests What do you mean by this? On both Android and iOS app developers can have a backend that checks the status of app attestation.
  - LoganDark 10mo ago
    "App attestation" means different things for Android than for iOS. On iOS, it verifies the app was installed from the right place. On Android, it tries to check if the device is tampered with, or hasn't been fully certified by Google, or etc... Android's far more finicky because Google uses this process to crack down on OEMs and hobbyists, while Apple implicitly trusts itself. Also, "checking the status of app attestation" is the wrong approach. If you want to use app attestation that way, then you should sign/encrypt communications (requests and responses) with hardware-backed keys; that way, you can't replay or proxy an attestation result to authorize modified requests. (I believe Apple attestation doesn't directly support encryption itself, only signing, but that is enough to use it as part of a key exchange process with hardware-backed keys - you can sign a public key you're sending to the server, which can verify your signature and then use your public key to encrypt a server-side public key, that then you can decrypt and use to encrypt your future communications to the server, and the server can encrypt its responses with your public key, etc.)

UltraSane 10mo ago

Pre-TC mobile/embedded security was catastrophic: Persistent bootkits trivial to install No verified boot chain Firmware implants survived OS reinstalls No hardware-backed key storage Encryption keys extractable via JTAG/flash dump Modern Secure Boot + hardware-backed keystore + eFuse anti-rollback eliminated entire attack classes. The median user's security posture improved by orders of magnitude.

michaelmrose 10mo ago
Did this ever effect real users?
- fc417fc802 10mo ago
  Arguably yes. By preventing entire classes of attack real users are never exposed to certain risks in the first place. If it were possible it would be abused at some rate (even if that rate were low). It's not that trusted computing is inherently bad. I actually think it's a very good thing. The problem is that the manufacturer maintains control of the keys when they sell you a device. Imagine selling someone a house that had smart locks but not turning over control of the locks to the new "owner". And every time the "owner" wants to add a new guest to the lock you insist on "reviewing" the guest before agreeing to add him. You insist that this is important for "security" because otherwise the "owner" might throw a party or invite a drug dealer over or something else you don't approve of. But don't worry, you are protecting the "owner" from malicious third parties hiding in plain sight. You run thorough background checks on all applicants after all!
  - tosti 10mo ago
    I get your point, but I think your example doesn't make sense. I can get drugs delivered to a psych ward if I'd want that. Dealers don't need a key.
- QuiEgo 10mo ago
  Yes. See attacks like Pegasus.