>Malware on the voter’s phone (or computer) can transmit different votes than the voter selected and reviewed. Voters use a variety of devices (Android, iPhone,

>Malware on the voter’s phone (or computer) can transmit different votes than the voter selected and reviewed. Voters use a variety of devices (Android, iPhone, Windows, Mac) which are constantly being attacked by malware. Yeah see this is where I thought this was going. Phones can be insecure, but in aggregate they are secure enough for literally every other component of life to be conducted on them. >Malware (or insiders) at the server can change votes. Internet servers are constantly being hacked from all over the world, often with serious results. Again, great point. Accepting this point will the government erase all the private identifiable data it has collected on me from its systems? Probably not, because they have made a cost/benefit analysis that suggests the risk is middling compared to the reward. >Malware at the county election office can change votes (in those systems where the internet ballots are printed in the county office for scanning). County election computers are not more secure than other government or commercial servers, which are regularly hacked with disastrous results. This seems like a weird seppo thing. Currently the risk of an election being seen as fraudulent is high, and the reward of online voting is low. But we dont have to conceptualise the modern boring election when we look at online elections. We can look at alternative models, closer to real time use and other gains that tip things back in its favor. Actually the biggest issue I see with online democracy is apathy and minimum quorum sizes.