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I think this relies on the old argument that anything connected to the internet is potentially insecure. While it might have some truth, practically we all do v
by tamimio 9mo ago
I think this relies on the old argument that anything connected to the internet is potentially insecure. While it might have some truth, practically we all do very sensitive stuff securely while connected to the internet. The risk is there, always, but you put all the measures to mitigate it and even prevent it.
The idea that a malware could be on a phone “altering things automatically” feels like a 90s FUD cliche. If an online voting system existed, it won't be like a poll that you see on Twitter, for instance; it will be far more involved. For example, we can have blockchain as the network, and not just transparent to all, but even after you vote you can still check your vote and see if it was potentially altered, and a proper electronic chain of custody can also ensure that the vote was counted per the process, and all of that is visible to anyone who would like to check and even count ALL the votes yourself, again, just like how transparent blockchain is.
And saying paper voting is more secure isn't true at all, because these votes will be counted electronically at some point, either by a machine or just a simple Excel sheet, opening the same risks as the previous one except here, if it would happen, you will never know and you as a voter can't trace the vote from when you voted all the way until it was counted. The voting process should be designed in a way with zero trust in mind, just like how secure systems are designed now, like storage, encryption, vpn, etc., and voting should too.
I personally believe that we can build a very secure, robust, and trustworthy system that can be used for voting online, but I think no one wants that for all sorts of political purposes, either by actually altering the results that could go unnoticed, or at least keeping the window open to blame the results on a faulty system.
- Vecr 9mo agoWhy is it FUD? It's a real thing any competent programming team could implement.
- tamimio 9mo agoWell it isn't primarily the technicality aspect but rather the same risks that apply to end users are also applied to the people working at the polling station and their equipment, bringing it up when you are talking about one side only is just a tactic to discredit it. That being said, modern phone OSes are also unlike before, app isolation among others prevent such attacks, I don't think I came across a new attack that just altered another app on the fly, otherwise, we would have hundreds of cases of people getting their bank accounts compromised. In fact, I think from a technical standpoint, the risks of having such malware on end users' devices are harder to implement compared to infecting say the Android OS running on the voting screen at the polling station, or anywhere else in the process. Because in the end users' ones you can restrict the app to run under certain criteria similar to banking ones, and independent security researchers can check it for potential vulnerabilities, meanwhile an internal app used in the polling station won't have these measures, and you can even assume the OS/packages are outdated and vulnerable, making it far less secure, something like how flock cameras Android OS is a security nightmare for example.
- Vecr 9mo agoEverything needs to be on paper.
- deathanatos 9mo agoIf we interpret "blockchain" "visibto to anyone" "transparent blockchain" charitably, TFA addresses your proposal pretty directly. (a.) Your design is likely not receipt-free — it is thus susceptible to coercion & bribery. (b.) How does your blockchain based proposal allow the voter to achieve confidence that extraneous votes are not being cast? > because these votes will be counted electronically at some point, either by a machine Random sampling (selecting a random subset of ballots, and manually counting them, and comparing against a machine total) is a cheap way to defend against this. But also, paper ballots mean that a full recount can be done, at which point any malfeasance becomes visible. It is likely that an attacker is going to want their tracks to not be so easily discoverable, so the mere possibility of such itself is a deterrent. > or just a simple Excel sheet, They needn't be, and results can be reported to various news agencies, interested observers, representatives of candidates or parties, etc. What is the likelihood of everyone's Excel sheet being compromised? > The voting process should be designed in a way with zero trust in mind, A paper process is explainable to a normal adult of reasonable intelligence, to a degree such that trust & confidence in the paper balloting process should be establishable. Most online voting systems cannot say that. Even I as a SWE would not be able to convince myself of most electronic systems, let alone an Internet based system. Is the source even available? (This is not a given.) Is the source correct? (Underhanded code is a thing, and it is unlikely that I, myself, can audit the entire thing.) Is the binary produced actually from the same source? Can the hardware used be trusted? (You literally cannot see transistors, and even if you could, you cannot verify their function!) Blockchain systems and similar relieve some of this pressure — but not all of it. E.g., I would still have a hard time explaining the math involved to 99% of the population beyond "trust me, it works" — and the point is that that answer is unacceptable as a requirement of the problem.
- pepa65 9mo agoBingo! I was wondering where the sane voices were on this topic.