5 ms·

SCOTUS has deemed Kavanaugh stops to be legal, i.e. you can be stopped on the basis of your apparent ethnicity alone

estearum 9mo ago
You can be stopped on reasonable suspicion, which Kavanaugh expanded (and he seems to have immediately realized his name is permanently besmirched). But they definitely cannot arrest people based on reasonable suspicion. Anyone speaking on behalf of DHS should know the difference.
- zahlman 9mo ago
  Kavanaugh's concurrence does not "expand" reasonable suspicion. It explains that a combination of factors including "apparent race or ethnicity" may cause reasonable suspicion. Which, in fact, as a basic matter of probabilistic reasoning, given the other information in https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf, it might. And an important part of the decision is that (emphasis his): > Plaintiffs’ standing theory is especially deficient in this case because immigration officers also use their experience to stop suspected illegal immigrants based on a variety of factors. So even if the Government had a policy of making stops based on the factors prohibited by the District Court, immigration officers might not rely only on those factors if and when they stop plaintiffs in the future. and to affirm existing understanding of reasonable suspicion: > Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and “considerably short” of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 274. Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 885, n. 10; Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273. Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884–885 (listing “[a]ny number of factors” that contribute to reasonable suspicion of illegal presence). (In other words, he clearly lays out the reasons why such a "combination of factors" may create reasonable suspicion, per precedent.) As for Kavanaugh "realizing" any such thing, I can't fathom why you think so. This is the same guy who has been very visibly protested by activists of a similar stripe from the beginning.
  - estearum 9mo ago
    Sure: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a443_new_kkg1.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a443_new_kkg1.... Footnote on Page 7, written by Kavanaugh mere weeks after the Perdomo decision, says the opposite: "the officers must not make interior immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity... “[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”" So is race a consideration or is it not? He says here that it's well-established that the Constitution prevents it. Or did he just throw in that sentence as a complete non-sequitur, unrelated to the immediately preceding sentences?
    - zahlman 9mo ago
      There is no contradiction between your quote and my quotes. They cannot make the stop "based on" that sole factor. It may become part of "the totality of the circumstances" that "contribute to" reasonable suspicion. See also https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=46685060 https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=46685060.
      - estearum 9mo ago
        Kavanaugh literally says that it's well-established that race cannot be a consideration in the application of law. You (and Kavanaugh a few weeks prior) are saying that it can be. That's a contradiction.
        zahlman 9mo ago
        > [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race > it's well-established that race cannot be a consideration in the application of law. You seem to think these statements are equivalent. They are not. "Kavanaugh a few weeks prior" is perfectly consistent, as explained in the other post I linked.
        estearum 9mo ago
        Please articulate a scenario that bisects them, then. And no, your "solely due to" vs "contributing factor to" does not satisfy this. The quoted text (from Whren v United States) is extremely clear: race cannot be a consideration.
zahlman 9mo ago
Kavanaugh's concurrence (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf) literally says the opposite: > To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court’s case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a “relevant factor” when considered along with other salient factors. Id., at 887.
- THX1137 9mo ago
  Yeah, you would need more than just ethnicity. You can read the Justice's examples directly in the case. Being or looking Mexican on a parking lot may be enough to justify a Kavanaugh stop, but just being Mexican or looking Mexican on it's own is not enough.
  - actionfromafar 9mo ago
    "Parking while looking Mexican." "Looking Mexican in LA." Mm... I can smell them Freedom Fries.
    - defrost 9mo ago
      There's also being Native American in America: https://narf.org/narf-statement-ice/ https://narf.org/narf-statement-ice/
  - lovich 9mo ago
    Well since I can do all of those things without being stopped due to my race, it appears that being Mexican would be the sole determining reason
- jakelazaroff 9mo ago
  Sure, but the intent and effect is to give cops more leeway in using perceived ethnicity as a factor. In the full passage, he explicitly says that given the prevalence in LA of undocumented immigrants from Latin America working in particular jobs, local police are permitted to detain such workers who appear Latine (i.e. to racially profile them). A fuller quote: > To stop an individual for brief questioning about immigration status, the Government must have reasonable suspicion that the individual is illegally present in the United States ... Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and "considerably short" of the preponderance of the evidence standard ... Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances ... Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court's case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a "relevant factor" when considered along with other salient factors. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavanaugh_stop?wprov=sfti1#Supreme_Court https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavanaugh_stop?wprov=sfti1#Sup...
shimman 9mo ago
Why people act surprised that an institution that was literally made to uphold the interests of the elite and is extremely undemocratic continues to act undemocratic? You have to stop thinking these institutions are worth protecting when they have been the impediment to any progress this country has made.

You can be stopped on reasonable suspicion, which Kavanaugh expanded (and he seems to have immediately realized his name is permanently besmirched). But they definitely cannot arrest people based on reasonable suspicion. Anyone speaking on behalf of DHS should know the difference.

zahlman 9mo ago
Kavanaugh's concurrence does not "expand" reasonable suspicion. It explains that a combination of factors including "apparent race or ethnicity" may cause reasonable suspicion. Which, in fact, as a basic matter of probabilistic reasoning, given the other information in https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf, it might. And an important part of the decision is that (emphasis his): > Plaintiffs’ standing theory is especially deficient in this case because immigration officers also use their experience to stop suspected illegal immigrants based on a variety of factors. So even if the Government had a policy of making stops based on the factors prohibited by the District Court, immigration officers might not rely only on those factors if and when they stop plaintiffs in the future. and to affirm existing understanding of reasonable suspicion: > Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and “considerably short” of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 274. Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 885, n. 10; Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273. Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884–885 (listing “[a]ny number of factors” that contribute to reasonable suspicion of illegal presence). (In other words, he clearly lays out the reasons why such a "combination of factors" may create reasonable suspicion, per precedent.) As for Kavanaugh "realizing" any such thing, I can't fathom why you think so. This is the same guy who has been very visibly protested by activists of a similar stripe from the beginning.
- estearum 9mo ago
  Sure: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a443_new_kkg1.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a443_new_kkg1.... Footnote on Page 7, written by Kavanaugh mere weeks after the Perdomo decision, says the opposite: "the officers must not make interior immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity... “[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”" So is race a consideration or is it not? He says here that it's well-established that the Constitution prevents it. Or did he just throw in that sentence as a complete non-sequitur, unrelated to the immediately preceding sentences?
  - zahlman 9mo ago
    There is no contradiction between your quote and my quotes. They cannot make the stop "based on" that sole factor. It may become part of "the totality of the circumstances" that "contribute to" reasonable suspicion. See also https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=46685060 https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=46685060.
    - estearum 9mo ago
      Kavanaugh literally says that it's well-established that race cannot be a consideration in the application of law. You (and Kavanaugh a few weeks prior) are saying that it can be. That's a contradiction.
      - zahlman 9mo ago
        > [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race > it's well-established that race cannot be a consideration in the application of law. You seem to think these statements are equivalent. They are not. "Kavanaugh a few weeks prior" is perfectly consistent, as explained in the other post I linked.
        estearum 9mo ago
        Please articulate a scenario that bisects them, then. And no, your "solely due to" vs "contributing factor to" does not satisfy this. The quoted text (from Whren v United States) is extremely clear: race cannot be a consideration.

zahlman 9mo ago

Kavanaugh's concurrence (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf) literally says the opposite: > To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court’s case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a “relevant factor” when considered along with other salient factors. Id., at 887.

THX1137 9mo ago
Yeah, you would need more than just ethnicity. You can read the Justice's examples directly in the case. Being or looking Mexican on a parking lot may be enough to justify a Kavanaugh stop, but just being Mexican or looking Mexican on it's own is not enough.
- actionfromafar 9mo ago
  "Parking while looking Mexican." "Looking Mexican in LA." Mm... I can smell them Freedom Fries.
  - defrost 9mo ago
    There's also being Native American in America: https://narf.org/narf-statement-ice/ https://narf.org/narf-statement-ice/
- lovich 9mo ago
  Well since I can do all of those things without being stopped due to my race, it appears that being Mexican would be the sole determining reason
jakelazaroff 9mo ago
Sure, but the intent and effect is to give cops more leeway in using perceived ethnicity as a factor. In the full passage, he explicitly says that given the prevalence in LA of undocumented immigrants from Latin America working in particular jobs, local police are permitted to detain such workers who appear Latine (i.e. to racially profile them). A fuller quote: > To stop an individual for brief questioning about immigration status, the Government must have reasonable suspicion that the individual is illegally present in the United States ... Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and "considerably short" of the preponderance of the evidence standard ... Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances ... Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court's case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a "relevant factor" when considered along with other salient factors. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavanaugh_stop?wprov=sfti1#Supreme_Court https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavanaugh_stop?wprov=sfti1#Sup...

shimman 9mo ago

Why people act surprised that an institution that was literally made to uphold the interests of the elite and is extremely undemocratic continues to act undemocratic? You have to stop thinking these institutions are worth protecting when they have been the impediment to any progress this country has made.