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Master keys are the very definition of "security through obscurity". As Bruce says, this is a very hard problem and one that has been reasonably solved for a lo
by MattRogish 14y ago
Master keys are the very definition of "security through obscurity". As Bruce says, this is a very hard problem and one that has been reasonably solved for a long time. However, thinking that sophisticated terrorists or criminals have been unable to exploit this merely because they haven't been to eBay is naïve to the extreme.
- nathan_long 14y ago>> Master keys are the very definition of "security through obscurity". Not really. A key is like a physical password. Security by obscurity is "I'm betting you don't know what kind of lock/encryption I'm using." Legitimate security is "I won't give you my key/reveal my password." Just because there's a secret doesn't mean you're Doing it Wrong. "Something you know" is a valid authentication factor.
- mikeash 14y agoSecurity through obscurity is, ultimately, betting your system on something you can't ever change. A key that you give out to thousands of people and cannot be changed afterwards ceases to be a key and becomes an intrinsic part of the system. With a real key, when a leak like this happens, you invalidate the leaked key and issue a new one. In this particular case, they're basically stuck hoping that nobody does anything nefarious with this key. The mere existence of a physical key does not make it security through obscurity. It's the fact that the same physical key is distributed to thousands of people with no good way to control them all or compensate for a leak that makes it security through obscurity.
- TeMPOraL 14y ago> The mere existence of a physical key does not make it security through obscurity. It's the fact that the same physical key is distributed to thousands of people with no good way to control them all or compensate for a leak that makes it security through obscurity. Semantic nitpick, but how does that make this security through obscurity? S.T.O. is not betting your system on something you can't ever change, it's betting your system on hoping the attacker won't guess how the lock works. I think we should be careful not to use inappropriate labels, as this dilutes the language and makes it more difficult to communicate.
- gknoy 14y agoIt's a different sort of "security through obscurity". We all know that many locks (elevators, etc) have a master key -- we see the receptacles every time we ride in such an elevator. The obscure part is not that there IS a master key, but rather its shape. A master key is the same as a backdoor known to few. Whether you're using a key that fits the lock, or know that 'Joshua' is the superuser's login, it's still a "secret" which only provides protection while it's actually secret. I think it still counts as STO.
- TeMPOraL 14y agoNot meaning to start any kind of semantic flame war, but I'm still not convinced. > Whether you're using a key that fits the lock, or know that 'Joshua' is the superuser's login, it's still a "secret" which only provides protection while it's actually secret. But isn't the same true about passwords? Aren't passwords secrects providing protection only when they remain unknown? The problem here lies, IMO, not with secrecy but with the password/key distribution and protection. I could imagine a situation similar to described in the article if an administrator gave server's root password to half of the company staff, hoping that no one leaks it.
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- mikeash 14y agoMy point is that if you set up a master key in the fashion described, such that thousands of people have access to it and it's basically impossible to change, that key becomes part of the system, rather than being a separate key. It becomes part of "how the lock works". To quote Kerckhoffs's principle, which Wikipedia leads me to believe is the basis of the whole concept of security through obscurity: "Its key must be communicable and retainable without the help of written notes, and changeable or modifiable at the will of the correspondents" Despite the name, this master key is not a "key" in the cryptographic sense. Any system intended to provide security without a key is necessarily relying on security through obscurity.
- Avenger42 14y agoAs I see it, though, the issue is that I can walk up to your house, notice that you're using a XYZ-brand lock as I knock on the door, give you a standard door-to-door spiel, you turn me away and you forget about me before you're back on your couch. Half an hour later I have a master key to your house because I Googled "XYZ master key" and filed the appropriate key blank to match. How do you combat that? That's the security-by-obscurity argument - once the information on "XYZ master key" is available, your house is compromised and you can't fix it by rekeying, only by replacing all XYZ-brand locks with a different brand.
- itsgeneral 14y agoI would say a "shared secret" is not "security through obscurity." After all, the only cryptographic system you can mathematically prove to be unbreakable in theory given any advances in mathematics or physics and unlimited resources, involves the two parties sitting down together and sharing a secret beforehand. (OTP). Everything else is less secure, not more secure. Security through obscurity would be if the "shared secret" was something about the design of the security mechanisms, and not about the shared key. (For example, if firefighters knew that pulling up on a doorknob quickly three times caused it to open. That's not a secure key, people would have already guessed it whenever they did so and doors just opened.)
- njharman 14y agoNo. Obscurity is not the only or even any of the protection keys master or otherwise provide. Regardless of whether attacker knows of the existence of master key or not. They still need a key. A master key represent reduction of security (by bypassing depth of security and putting more eggs in one locked basket). Both security trade-offs for convenience.