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Help center - https://tailscale.com/kb/1596/secure-node-state-storage https://tailscale.com/kb/1596/secure-node-state-storage: >Secure node state storage can h
by usefulposter 9mo ago
Help center - https://tailscale.com/kb/1596/secure-node-state-storage https://tailscale.com/kb/1596/secure-node-state-storage:
>Secure node state storage can help protect against a malicious actor copying node state from one device to another, effectively cloning the node. By using platform-specific capabilities, Tailscale ensures node state encrypts at rest, making theft from disk and node cloning more difficult.
Marketing blogpost - https://tailscale.com/blog/encrypting-data-at-rest https://tailscale.com/blog/encrypting-data-at-rest:
>What we really care about here are those private keys stored in the state file, since those are used to identify your node to the coordination server and to other nodes. We need to protect them from exfiltration.
>If the Tailscale state file is unencrypted, an attacker with that kind of root access could use the file’s contents from a different machine and impersonate your node. From the perspective of the Tailscale coordination server, it’s as if your device switched to a different network and got a new IP address. We call this attack “node cloning”.
- nottorp 9mo agoSo it protects you from an attacker who already has local root?
- cronos 9mo agoNot even that. An attacker with local root can just extract the wireguard keys from process memory, or use the TPM to decrypt the state file like Tailscale would. The only scenario where it helps is a local attacker who can read the state file on disk, but is not full root. Kinda unlikely on Linux, but could happen on Windows.
- nottorp 9mo ago> An attacker with local root can just extract the wireguard keys from process memory, or use the TPM to decrypt the state file like Tailscale would. That was my point :)