7 ms·

I guess one of the interesting things I learnt off this article(1) was that 7% of DNS query types served by 1.1.1.1 are HTTPS and started wondering what HTTPS q

by narmiouh 10mo ago

I guess one of the interesting things I learnt off this article(1) was that 7% of DNS query types served by 1.1.1.1 are HTTPS and started wondering what HTTPS query type was as I had only heard of A, MX, AAAA, SPF etc... Apparently that is part of implementing ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) in TLS 1.3 where the DNS hosts the public key of the server to fully encrypt the server name in a HTTPS request. Since Nginx and other popular web servers don't yet support it, I suspect the 7% of requests are mostly Cloudflare itself. (1) https://radar.cloudflare.com/?ref=loworbitsecurity.com#dns-query-type https://radar.cloudflare.com/?ref=loworbitsecurity.com#dns-q...

johnisgood 10mo ago
Wait, so you do not leak the host through DNS with this? I have not checked it out yet.
- SchemaLoad 10mo ago
  Encrypted DNS has existed for quite a while now through DNS over HTTPS, the missing link was that to connect to a website, you first had to send the server the hostname in plaintext to get the right public key for the site. So someone listening on the wire could not see your DNS requests but would effectively still get the site you connected to anyway. The new development (encrypted client hello) is you no longer have to send the hostname. So someone listening in the middle would only see you connected to an AWS/etc IP. This will make blocking websites very difficult if they use shared services like cloudflare or cloud VPS hosting.
  - deleted 10mo ago
    [deleted]
  - drnick1 10mo ago
    > blocking websites very difficult if they use shared services like cloudflare or cloud VPS hosting. I see this as a very good development and a big win for privacy. I have been running my own DNS server for years to prevent passive logging, but could basically do nothing against the SNI leak.
  - kijin 10mo ago
    > This will make blocking websites very difficult if they use shared services like cloudflare or cloud VPS hosting. Until some clueless judge orders all of cloudflare to be blocked.
    - andyferris 10mo ago
      True! Though I worry that instead western governments will beat the judges to the punch and start asking things like DNS providers or even HTTPS servers to keep logs that can be subpoenaed much like a telecom company keeps a log of each phone call ("metadata"), or else be blocked...
      - SchemaLoad 10mo ago
        Western governments just send a court order to the hosting provider to shut the site down / revoke their domain name. Site blocking is more of a problem for small counties trying to block sites the rest of the world allows to be hosted. In terms of privacy, your DNS history probably isn't very interesting. It's almost all going to be requests for the top social media sites. Which governments have full access to the stuff you post there.
- themafia 10mo ago
  My read is you still leak the host with DNS. This only prevents leaking the host with SNI. A useful piece but not at all the holy grail.
- johncolanduoni 10mo ago
  In principle, it means you could run multiple sites from the same IP and someone intercepting traffic to that IP (but not the client’s DNS path) couldn’t tell what site each connection was to. It mostly makes sense for CDNs, where the same IP will be used for many sites. If you don’t use a CDN at all, the destination IP leaks what site you’re trying to connect to (if the domain is well known). If you use a CDN without ECH, you send an unencrypted domain name in the HTTPS negotiation so it’s visible there. ECH+CDN is an attempt to have the best of both worlds: your traffic to the site will not advertise what site you’re connecting to, but the IP can still be shared between a variety of sites. It’ll be interesting to see how countries with lighter censorship schemes adapt - China etc. of course will just block the connection.
  - tialaramex 10mo ago
    Even for China so-called "overblocking" where to censor a small thing you have to block a much larger thing, is a real concern with these technologies. There's a real trade here, you have to expend effort and destroy potential and in some cases the reward isn't worth it. You can interpret ECH as an effort to move the ratio, maybe China was willing to spend $5000 and annoy a thousand people to block a cartoon site criticising their internal policies, but is it willing to sped $50 000 and annoy a ten thousand people? How about half a million and 100K people ?
    - johncolanduoni 10mo ago
      That requires the client to only emit ECH, even if the ISP-provided (and therefore government controlled) DNS blocks HTTPS/SVCB records. China can easily make the default for a browser in China be to never even try to use ECH as well. Then they'll only annoy people trying to actively circumvent their system. They already do TCP sessionization to extract the SNI domain. Detecting ECH and then just dropping the connection at L3 is functionally equivalent. In theory, sites could eventually require ECH to serve anything at all. But we're very far from that.
      - fc417fc802 10mo ago
- conradev 10mo ago
  This is so you do not leak the host through TLS. Using DNS to serve an encryption key. It’s not just encrypted server name indication (ESNI), it is the whole hello now (ECH)! So you don’t leak anything.
phalangion 10mo ago
Adguard Home and others can be configured to complete your DNS requests over HTTPS (using, for example, https://dns.cloudflare.com/dns-query https://dns.cloudflare.com/dns-query).
- tialaramex 10mo ago
  That's not what this is about. HTTPS is the name of a protocol, which is mostly used to make the World Wide Web work, but we do lots of other things with it, such as DNS-over-HTTPS aka DoH. However HTTPS is also the name of a type of DNS record, this record contains everything you need to best reach the named HTTPS (protocol) server, and this is the type of record your parent didn't previously know about In the boring case, say, 20 years ago, when you type https://some.name/stuff/hats.html https://some.name/stuff/hats.html into a web browser your browser goes "Huh, HTTPS to some.name. OK, I will find out the IPv4 address of some.name, and it makes a DNS query asking A? some.name. The DNS server answers with an IPv4 address, and then as the browser connects securely to that IP address, it asks to talk to some.name, and if the remote host can prove it is some.name, the browser says it wants /stuff/hats.html Notice we have to tell the remote server who we hope they are - and it so happens eavesdroppers can listen in on this. This means Bad Guys can see that you wanted to visit some.name. They can't see that you wanted to read the document about hats, but they might be able to guess that from context, and wouldn't you rather they didn't know more than they need to? With the HTTPS record, your web browser asks (over secure DNS if you have it) HTTPS? some.name and, maybe it gets a positive answer. If it does, the answer tells it not only where to try to connect, but also it can choose to provide instructions for a cover name to always use, and how to encrypt the real name, this is part of Encrypted Client Hello (or ECH) Then the web server tells the server that it wants to talk to the cover name and it provides an encrypted version of some.name. Eavesdroppers can't decrypt that, so if many people share the same endpoints then eavesdropper can't tell which site you were visiting. Now, if the server only contains documents about hats, this doesn't stop the Secret Hat Police from concluding that everybody connecting to that server is a Hat Pervert and needs to go to Hat Jail. But if you're a bulk host then you force such organisations to choose, they can enforce their rules equally for everything (You wanted to read News about Chickens? Too bad, Hat Jail for you) or they can accept that actually they don't know what people are reading (if this seems crazy, keep in mind that's how US Post worked for many years after Comstock failed, if you get a brown paper package posted to you, well, it's your business what is in there, and your state wasn't allowed to insist on ripping open the packaging to see whether it is pornography or communist propaganda)
johncolanduoni 10mo ago
It’s also how browsers detect a website supports HTTP3. Browsers will request it just to check if they should connect to an https:// URL via HTTP3 (though they generally don’t block on it - they fallback to HTTP1/2 if it takes too long).
- jsheard 10mo ago
  > It’s also how browsers detect a website supports HTTP3 It's one way, but a H1/H2 connection can also be promoted to H3 via the alt-svc header. The DNS method is slightly better though since it potentially allows a client to utilize H3 immediately from the first request.
  - grumbelbart 10mo ago
    Would that help against a man in the middle that blocks the H3 traffic to snoop the URL when the client falls back to H2?
    - jsheard 10mo ago
      Every browser requires H2 connections to be encrypted so I don't think a MITM downgrading to it would reveal anything. Downgrading to H1 might do since encryption is optional there, but the proper way to prevent that is to submit your domains to the HSTS preload list so that browsers will always require encryption, regardless of protocol, no exceptions.
bembo 10mo ago
Caddy supports it, and has quite a bit written about it: https://caddyserver.com/docs/automatic-https#encrypted-clienthello-ech https://caddyserver.com/docs/automatic-https#encrypted-clien...
miladyincontrol 10mo ago
Caddy has supported it for several months now, although I do agree most the requests are in fact Cloudflare.
rhplus 10mo ago
There’s an odd skew in that data which is saying the *third* most popular TLD is ‘.st’ which is… unexpected. The biggest service I can find using that TLD is `play.st` so maybe PlayStation clients are early adopters of DNS-over-HTTPS via 1.1.1.1.
- mh- 10mo ago
  Weird. Or maybe someone looking up `te.st` a lot?
- adikso 10mo ago
  The biggest .st "service" is Aisuru botnet.
topranks 10mo ago
iPhones regularly do these queries before / in addition to to A/AAAA. They’re used for more than ECH.

johnisgood 10mo ago

Wait, so you do not leak the host through DNS with this? I have not checked it out yet.

SchemaLoad 10mo ago
Encrypted DNS has existed for quite a while now through DNS over HTTPS, the missing link was that to connect to a website, you first had to send the server the hostname in plaintext to get the right public key for the site. So someone listening on the wire could not see your DNS requests but would effectively still get the site you connected to anyway. The new development (encrypted client hello) is you no longer have to send the hostname. So someone listening in the middle would only see you connected to an AWS/etc IP. This will make blocking websites very difficult if they use shared services like cloudflare or cloud VPS hosting.
- deleted 10mo ago
  [deleted]
- drnick1 10mo ago
  > blocking websites very difficult if they use shared services like cloudflare or cloud VPS hosting. I see this as a very good development and a big win for privacy. I have been running my own DNS server for years to prevent passive logging, but could basically do nothing against the SNI leak.
- kijin 10mo ago
  > This will make blocking websites very difficult if they use shared services like cloudflare or cloud VPS hosting. Until some clueless judge orders all of cloudflare to be blocked.
  - andyferris 10mo ago
    True! Though I worry that instead western governments will beat the judges to the punch and start asking things like DNS providers or even HTTPS servers to keep logs that can be subpoenaed much like a telecom company keeps a log of each phone call ("metadata"), or else be blocked...
    - SchemaLoad 10mo ago
      Western governments just send a court order to the hosting provider to shut the site down / revoke their domain name. Site blocking is more of a problem for small counties trying to block sites the rest of the world allows to be hosted. In terms of privacy, your DNS history probably isn't very interesting. It's almost all going to be requests for the top social media sites. Which governments have full access to the stuff you post there.
themafia 10mo ago
My read is you still leak the host with DNS. This only prevents leaking the host with SNI. A useful piece but not at all the holy grail.
johncolanduoni 10mo ago
In principle, it means you could run multiple sites from the same IP and someone intercepting traffic to that IP (but not the client’s DNS path) couldn’t tell what site each connection was to. It mostly makes sense for CDNs, where the same IP will be used for many sites. If you don’t use a CDN at all, the destination IP leaks what site you’re trying to connect to (if the domain is well known). If you use a CDN without ECH, you send an unencrypted domain name in the HTTPS negotiation so it’s visible there. ECH+CDN is an attempt to have the best of both worlds: your traffic to the site will not advertise what site you’re connecting to, but the IP can still be shared between a variety of sites. It’ll be interesting to see how countries with lighter censorship schemes adapt - China etc. of course will just block the connection.
- tialaramex 10mo ago
  Even for China so-called "overblocking" where to censor a small thing you have to block a much larger thing, is a real concern with these technologies. There's a real trade here, you have to expend effort and destroy potential and in some cases the reward isn't worth it. You can interpret ECH as an effort to move the ratio, maybe China was willing to spend $5000 and annoy a thousand people to block a cartoon site criticising their internal policies, but is it willing to sped $50 000 and annoy a ten thousand people? How about half a million and 100K people ?
  - johncolanduoni 10mo ago
    That requires the client to only emit ECH, even if the ISP-provided (and therefore government controlled) DNS blocks HTTPS/SVCB records. China can easily make the default for a browser in China be to never even try to use ECH as well. Then they'll only annoy people trying to actively circumvent their system. They already do TCP sessionization to extract the SNI domain. Detecting ECH and then just dropping the connection at L3 is functionally equivalent. In theory, sites could eventually require ECH to serve anything at all. But we're very far from that.
    - fc417fc802 10mo ago
conradev 10mo ago
This is so you do not leak the host through TLS. Using DNS to serve an encryption key. It’s not just encrypted server name indication (ESNI), it is the whole hello now (ECH)! So you don’t leak anything.

phalangion 10mo ago

Adguard Home and others can be configured to complete your DNS requests over HTTPS (using, for example, https://dns.cloudflare.com/dns-query https://dns.cloudflare.com/dns-query).

tialaramex 10mo ago
That's not what this is about. HTTPS is the name of a protocol, which is mostly used to make the World Wide Web work, but we do lots of other things with it, such as DNS-over-HTTPS aka DoH. However HTTPS is also the name of a type of DNS record, this record contains everything you need to best reach the named HTTPS (protocol) server, and this is the type of record your parent didn't previously know about In the boring case, say, 20 years ago, when you type https://some.name/stuff/hats.html https://some.name/stuff/hats.html into a web browser your browser goes "Huh, HTTPS to some.name. OK, I will find out the IPv4 address of some.name, and it makes a DNS query asking A? some.name. The DNS server answers with an IPv4 address, and then as the browser connects securely to that IP address, it asks to talk to some.name, and if the remote host can prove it is some.name, the browser says it wants /stuff/hats.html Notice we have to tell the remote server who we hope they are - and it so happens eavesdroppers can listen in on this. This means Bad Guys can see that you wanted to visit some.name. They can't see that you wanted to read the document about hats, but they might be able to guess that from context, and wouldn't you rather they didn't know more than they need to? With the HTTPS record, your web browser asks (over secure DNS if you have it) HTTPS? some.name and, maybe it gets a positive answer. If it does, the answer tells it not only where to try to connect, but also it can choose to provide instructions for a cover name to always use, and how to encrypt the real name, this is part of Encrypted Client Hello (or ECH) Then the web server tells the server that it wants to talk to the cover name and it provides an encrypted version of some.name. Eavesdroppers can't decrypt that, so if many people share the same endpoints then eavesdropper can't tell which site you were visiting. Now, if the server only contains documents about hats, this doesn't stop the Secret Hat Police from concluding that everybody connecting to that server is a Hat Pervert and needs to go to Hat Jail. But if you're a bulk host then you force such organisations to choose, they can enforce their rules equally for everything (You wanted to read News about Chickens? Too bad, Hat Jail for you) or they can accept that actually they don't know what people are reading (if this seems crazy, keep in mind that's how US Post worked for many years after Comstock failed, if you get a brown paper package posted to you, well, it's your business what is in there, and your state wasn't allowed to insist on ripping open the packaging to see whether it is pornography or communist propaganda)

johncolanduoni 10mo ago

It’s also how browsers detect a website supports HTTP3. Browsers will request it just to check if they should connect to an https:// URL via HTTP3 (though they generally don’t block on it - they fallback to HTTP1/2 if it takes too long).

jsheard 10mo ago
> It’s also how browsers detect a website supports HTTP3 It's one way, but a H1/H2 connection can also be promoted to H3 via the alt-svc header. The DNS method is slightly better though since it potentially allows a client to utilize H3 immediately from the first request.
- grumbelbart 10mo ago
  Would that help against a man in the middle that blocks the H3 traffic to snoop the URL when the client falls back to H2?
  - jsheard 10mo ago
    Every browser requires H2 connections to be encrypted so I don't think a MITM downgrading to it would reveal anything. Downgrading to H1 might do since encryption is optional there, but the proper way to prevent that is to submit your domains to the HSTS preload list so that browsers will always require encryption, regardless of protocol, no exceptions.

bembo 10mo ago

Caddy supports it, and has quite a bit written about it: https://caddyserver.com/docs/automatic-https#encrypted-clienthello-ech https://caddyserver.com/docs/automatic-https#encrypted-clien...

miladyincontrol 10mo ago

Caddy has supported it for several months now, although I do agree most the requests are in fact Cloudflare.

rhplus 10mo ago

There’s an odd skew in that data which is saying the *third* most popular TLD is ‘.st’ which is… unexpected. The biggest service I can find using that TLD is `play.st` so maybe PlayStation clients are early adopters of DNS-over-HTTPS via 1.1.1.1.

mh- 10mo ago
Weird. Or maybe someone looking up `te.st` a lot?
adikso 10mo ago
The biggest .st "service" is Aisuru botnet.

topranks 10mo ago

iPhones regularly do these queries before / in addition to to A/AAAA. They’re used for more than ECH.