5 ms·

What are those better tools? I've been broadly looking into this space, but never ventured too deep.

singpolyma3 10mo ago
Sequoia for example has been doing a great job and implements the latest version of the standard which brings a lot of cryptography up to date
- perching_aix 10mo ago
  I'm yet to finish watching the talk, but it starts with them confirming the demo fraudulent .iso with sequoia also (they call it out by name), so this really makes me think. :)
  - tptacek 10mo ago
    Sequioa hasn't fixed the attack from the beginning of the talk, the one where they convert between cleartext and full signature formats and inject unsigned bytes into the output because of the confusion.
- akerl_ 10mo ago
  The latest version of a bad standard is still bad. This page is a pretty direct indicator that GPG's foundation is fundamentally broken: you're not going to get to a good outcome trying to renovate the 2nd story.
  - singpolyma3 10mo ago
    That's just not true. Nothing in this page is a problem with the standard and everything in this page is the outdated parts of the old standard.
    - akerl_ 10mo ago
      So then why do a bunch of these affect Sequoia as well?
arccy 10mo ago
ssh or minisign for signing age for file encryption
- johnisgood 10mo ago
  There are people who use GPG for more than that. Those that are fine with just those two features, sure. Heck, you can encrypt with "openssh", no need for age. :D I have a bash function for encryption and decryption!
  - cpach 10mo ago
    Those people should perhaps ponder if it’s a reasonable thing to insist on using this broken standard/tool in 2025.
    - johnisgood 10mo ago
      Yeah, well, I wish I could convince people to use 2-4 different tools when one does it "just fine".
      - akerl_ 10mo ago
        I thought the whole unix philosophy was to have a bunch of tools that each do one thing well, and to compose them into the workflow you want.
        johnisgood 10mo ago
        And I thought most projects would be licensed as GNU by now but alas.
- pabs3 10mo ago
  The gpg.fail page mentions minisign vulns too.
  - arccy 10mo ago
ameliaquining 10mo ago
https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#the-answers https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#th... lists a bunch of them.
- p2detar 10mo ago
  > Encrypting email > Don't. https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#encrypting-email https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#en... I’m not sure I completely agree here. For private use, this seems fine. However, this isn’t how email encryption is typically implemented in an enterprise environment. It’s usually handled at the mail gateway rather than on a per-user basis. Enterprises also ensure that the receiving side supports email encryption as well. edit: formatting
  - tptacek 10mo ago
    Your mail either needs to be encrypted reliably against real adversaries or it doesn't. A private emailing circle doesn't change that. If the idea here is, a private group of friends can just agree never to put anything in their subjects, or to accidentally send unencrypted replies, I'll just say I ran just such a private circle at Matasano, where we used encrypted mail to communicate about security assessment projects, and unencrypted replies happened.
    - p2detar 10mo ago
      > Your mail either needs to be encrypted reliably against real adversaries or it doesn't. It is, GPG take care of that. > If the idea here is, a private group of friends can just agree never to put anything in their subjects, or to accidentally send unencrypted replies That’s not what I’m talking about. It’s an enterprise - you cannot send non-encrypted emails from your work mail account, the gateway takes care of it. It has many rules, including such based on the sender and recipient. Surely, someone can print the mail and carry it out of the company’s premises, but at this point it’s intentional and the cat’s already out of the bag.

Sequoia for example has been doing a great job and implements the latest version of the standard which brings a lot of cryptography up to date

perching_aix 10mo ago
I'm yet to finish watching the talk, but it starts with them confirming the demo fraudulent .iso with sequoia also (they call it out by name), so this really makes me think. :)
- tptacek 10mo ago
  Sequioa hasn't fixed the attack from the beginning of the talk, the one where they convert between cleartext and full signature formats and inject unsigned bytes into the output because of the confusion.
akerl_ 10mo ago
The latest version of a bad standard is still bad. This page is a pretty direct indicator that GPG's foundation is fundamentally broken: you're not going to get to a good outcome trying to renovate the 2nd story.
- singpolyma3 10mo ago
  That's just not true. Nothing in this page is a problem with the standard and everything in this page is the outdated parts of the old standard.
  - akerl_ 10mo ago
    So then why do a bunch of these affect Sequoia as well?

arccy 10mo ago

ssh or minisign for signing age for file encryption

johnisgood 10mo ago
There are people who use GPG for more than that. Those that are fine with just those two features, sure. Heck, you can encrypt with "openssh", no need for age. :D I have a bash function for encryption and decryption!
- cpach 10mo ago
  Those people should perhaps ponder if it’s a reasonable thing to insist on using this broken standard/tool in 2025.
  - johnisgood 10mo ago
    Yeah, well, I wish I could convince people to use 2-4 different tools when one does it "just fine".
    - akerl_ 10mo ago
      I thought the whole unix philosophy was to have a bunch of tools that each do one thing well, and to compose them into the workflow you want.
      - johnisgood 10mo ago
        And I thought most projects would be licensed as GNU by now but alas.
pabs3 10mo ago
The gpg.fail page mentions minisign vulns too.
- arccy 10mo ago

ameliaquining 10mo ago

https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#the-answers https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#th... lists a bunch of them.

p2detar 10mo ago
> Encrypting email > Don't. https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#encrypting-email https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#en... I’m not sure I completely agree here. For private use, this seems fine. However, this isn’t how email encryption is typically implemented in an enterprise environment. It’s usually handled at the mail gateway rather than on a per-user basis. Enterprises also ensure that the receiving side supports email encryption as well. edit: formatting
- tptacek 10mo ago
  Your mail either needs to be encrypted reliably against real adversaries or it doesn't. A private emailing circle doesn't change that. If the idea here is, a private group of friends can just agree never to put anything in their subjects, or to accidentally send unencrypted replies, I'll just say I ran just such a private circle at Matasano, where we used encrypted mail to communicate about security assessment projects, and unencrypted replies happened.
  - p2detar 10mo ago
    > Your mail either needs to be encrypted reliably against real adversaries or it doesn't. It is, GPG take care of that. > If the idea here is, a private group of friends can just agree never to put anything in their subjects, or to accidentally send unencrypted replies That’s not what I’m talking about. It’s an enterprise - you cannot send non-encrypted emails from your work mail account, the gateway takes care of it. It has many rules, including such based on the sender and recipient. Surely, someone can print the mail and carry it out of the company’s premises, but at this point it’s intentional and the cat’s already out of the bag.