4 ms·

I'm genuinely curious what you think the most likely attack vector currently is and what the next most low-hanging security fruit for coinbase are. From my per

I'm genuinely curious what you think the most likely attack vector currently is and what the next most low-hanging security fruit for coinbase are. From my perspective it looks like coinbase is currently the most secure and redundant way to store your bitcoins. Of course everyone could store them on their own and design my own security system, but I doubt many people can do better than what the OP describes.

ghshephard 14y ago
Security concerns that occupy 90%+ of our architects' minds: o What happens if one or more employees goes rogue? o What happens if an employee is "hit by a truck"? o What happens if an employee is blackmailed/extorted? o What happens if your offsite archive is vandalized/broken into/crashed into by a plane? These all have solutions that have been in place for 20+ years in the military/banking industry.
- krasin 14y ago
  Unfortunately, these well-paid professionals didn't save us from the utterly broken scheme with credit card numbers. And, what's worse, nobody in banking industry is taking any action to fix that.
  - kalleboo 14y ago
    Credit card security seems pretty well-solved in Europe, at least once we can ditch all the backcompat measures. For physical transactions, we have chip-and-pin, which can't be copied like a magstripe. For online transactions, we have securecode/verified by visa.
    - tallanvor 14y ago
      Unfortunately chip and pin is not as secure as the industry wants you to believe. --There have been several examples of where people have modified card terminals to allow the chip and pin information to be intercepted and used elsewhere.
      - kalleboo 14y ago
        Any links? All the breaches I've seen so far have been either to fool the user to fall back to magstripe (after having them enter their PIN), or to fake the display of the amount you're charging. IIRC there was one problem where the encryption used between the card and the bank was bad or the card's chip still had its write pins exposed but I think that was solved by replacing the cards with newer ones.
        mentat 14y ago
        https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/09/new_attack_agai_2.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/09/new_attack_ag...
    - krasin 14y ago
      Thanks for the reference. I have just activated "verified by visa" feature on my primary card, but it appears to be a nonsense again: "After you activate Verified by Visa, your card will be recognized when you buy at participating online stores. You'll enter your password in the Verified by Visa window, your identity will be verified, and the transaction will be completed. In stores that are not yet participating in Verified by Visa, your Visa card will continue to work as usual." basically, everyone still has the power to charge me, when it knows my card number. The feature seems to be protecting merchants, not customers (yes, I understand that my bank will likely refund all stolen funds, but I would prefer a sane solution)
- konstruktor 14y ago
  And by disclosing that amateurish procedure and a barely "anonymized" picture of one of their employees, they are basically inviting criminals to have a go at your third scenario. Part of professional security schemes is protecting your employees and their families. That's why money messengers don't have keys to the boxes they transport. That's why there are deposit-only safes.

ghshephard 14y ago

Security concerns that occupy 90%+ of our architects' minds: o What happens if one or more employees goes rogue? o What happens if an employee is "hit by a truck"? o What happens if an employee is blackmailed/extorted? o What happens if your offsite archive is vandalized/broken into/crashed into by a plane? These all have solutions that have been in place for 20+ years in the military/banking industry.

krasin 14y ago
Unfortunately, these well-paid professionals didn't save us from the utterly broken scheme with credit card numbers. And, what's worse, nobody in banking industry is taking any action to fix that.
- kalleboo 14y ago
  Credit card security seems pretty well-solved in Europe, at least once we can ditch all the backcompat measures. For physical transactions, we have chip-and-pin, which can't be copied like a magstripe. For online transactions, we have securecode/verified by visa.
  - tallanvor 14y ago
    Unfortunately chip and pin is not as secure as the industry wants you to believe. --There have been several examples of where people have modified card terminals to allow the chip and pin information to be intercepted and used elsewhere.
    - kalleboo 14y ago
      Any links? All the breaches I've seen so far have been either to fool the user to fall back to magstripe (after having them enter their PIN), or to fake the display of the amount you're charging. IIRC there was one problem where the encryption used between the card and the bank was bad or the card's chip still had its write pins exposed but I think that was solved by replacing the cards with newer ones.
      - mentat 14y ago
        https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/09/new_attack_agai_2.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/09/new_attack_ag...
  - krasin 14y ago
    Thanks for the reference. I have just activated "verified by visa" feature on my primary card, but it appears to be a nonsense again: "After you activate Verified by Visa, your card will be recognized when you buy at participating online stores. You'll enter your password in the Verified by Visa window, your identity will be verified, and the transaction will be completed. In stores that are not yet participating in Verified by Visa, your Visa card will continue to work as usual." basically, everyone still has the power to charge me, when it knows my card number. The feature seems to be protecting merchants, not customers (yes, I understand that my bank will likely refund all stolen funds, but I would prefer a sane solution)
konstruktor 14y ago
And by disclosing that amateurish procedure and a barely "anonymized" picture of one of their employees, they are basically inviting criminals to have a go at your third scenario. Part of professional security schemes is protecting your employees and their families. That's why money messengers don't have keys to the boxes they transport. That's why there are deposit-only safes.