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How does this increase security? The actual code is distributed over github and is digitally signed. Same goes for the installers/updates. Attempts to replace t
by gruez 1y ago
How does this increase security? The actual code is distributed over github and is digitally signed. Same goes for the installers/updates. Attempts to replace the contents would be easily detected, and would won't do much, aside from maybe compromising someone installing in that short time frame. Moreover darknet sites have an identity problem. It's easy to validate that "grapheneos.org" is the official site, not least because there's no grapheneos.com or similar. If you're using a hidden service you'll get an address like graphenenlhxh74dsi1kk1k8se0wutcc2v4f7bnohqe8zxbkfk8z3wp8.onion. How do you know whether that's the official site, or graphenenlhxr1uvl0i8oiuzx587fpgcesik0apij5axd1a0xbdvj5eg.onion?
- vbezhenar 1y ago> It's easy to validate that "grapheneos.org" Is it? Why not graphene-os.org? Why not graphene.org? Why not grapheneos.com? Why not grapheneos.io? How do you validate it, really? Also who REALLY controls that domain in the end? Someone with access to `.org` nameservers. Do you trust that person? What's their name?
- fragmede 1y agoYou plug it into Google and hope they got it right
- vbezhenar 1y agoTry putting Putty into Google.
- gruez 1y ago>Also who REALLY controls that domain in the end? Someone with access to `.org` nameservers. Do you trust that person? What's their name? Same way you trust/verify that you got Tor Browser from the right domain, and the organization behind it hasn't backdoored it (didn't the tor project recieve government funding?).