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The export operation is guarded by TouchID. So the malware needs to trick you into performing the TouchID gesture. But yeh the malware only needs to trick you
by arianvanp 11mo ago
The export operation is guarded by TouchID. So the malware needs to trick you into performing the TouchID gesture.
But yeh the malware only needs to trick you to hit TouchID once. Instead of on each sign operation. So if that's in your threat model don't make the key exportable.
- gruez 11mo ago> So the malware needs to trick you into performing the TouchID gesture. That's not meaningfully more difficult than tricking you into revealing your key file password. >Instead of on each sign operation. But from your video each sign operation also requires a touchid prompt?
- deleted 11mo ago[deleted]
- palata 11mo ago> That's not meaningfully more difficult than tricking you into revealing your key file password. No, but that's meaningfully more difficult to do without an intervention from the user. Say your computer is infected, the malware won't silently do it: it will have to interact with you. And an important part is that you apparently don't have to make the key exportable: > So if that's in your threat model don't make the key exportable. Which now makes it meaningfully more difficult to extract. I would personally not export it, just like I don't export (and can't export) the key from a security key. That's a feature.
- Nextgrid 11mo ago> Say your computer is infected, the malware won't silently do it: it will have to interact with you. MacOS is so needy about all kinds of fingerprint/password-related things (and has no context of secure desktop) that it is trivial for malware to simulate and no way for the user to tell whether it's genuine, so it's not a real barrier at all.
- __turbobrew__ 11mo agoI hit my touchid probably 10 times a day, seems pretty easy for me to be tricked into hitting touchid thinking that okta forgot my session or something like that.
- palata 11mo agoWhich is why you don't have to export it.