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> Morality is a feeling It isn't. Otherwise, the Nazis were moral. As were the Jews. But in that case, all moral truth is relative, which means absolute mor
by svieira 11mo ago
> Morality is a feeling
It isn't. Otherwise, the Nazis were moral. As were the Jews. But in that case, all moral truth is relative, which means absolute moral truth doesn't exist. Which means that "moral" is a synonym for "feeling" or "taste". Which it is not.
> My philosophy is that consciousness is orthogonal to reality.
It is how you and I experience reality and we exist in reality, so I'm not sure how it could be anything other than congruent with reality.
> Whether or not anything is conscious has, by definition, no observable effect to anything else.
It would be an interesting and rather useless definition of "conscious" that didn't allow for expressions of consciousness. Expression isn't required for consciousness, but many conscious observers can be in turn observed in action and their consciousness observed. Which maybe is what you are saying, just from the perspective that "sometimes you can't observe evidence for the consciousness of another"?
- armchairhacker 11mo agoMorality is relative, in that "the universe is uncaring". However, many many more people believe the Nazis were immoral vs. the Jews, even if they don't say it. Humans have evolved a sense of morality, and everyone's is slightly different, but there are common themes which have and continue to strongly influence the progression of society's laws and norms. > It would be an interesting and rather useless definition of "conscious" that didn't allow for expressions of consciousness. It basically is useless, by definition. And you can define "consciousness" differently, like "has neurons" or "convincingly acts like an animal", in which case I've been referring to something different. How do the authors of the "AI Consciousness Paper" and the author of this blog post (I assume Scott Alexander) and the define consciousness? I have to actually read them... OK, instead of specifically defining consciousness itself, the paper takes existing definitions and applies them to AI. The theories themselves are on page 7, but the important part is that the paper looks at indicators, i.e. expression, so even in many theories, it uses your general definition of consciousness. The blog post essentially criticizes the article. Scott defines ("one might divide") three kinds of consciousness: physical (something else), supernatural (my definition), and computational (your definition). He doesn't outright state he prefers any one, but he at least doesn't dismiss the supernatural definition.