This "secure gateway" shit is already tiring. Started with FCA/Stellantis in 2018+, thanks to the Jeep "hack" through the infotainment system. They slapped a "

This "secure gateway" shit is already tiring. Started with FCA/Stellantis in 2018+, thanks to the Jeep "hack" through the infotainment system. They slapped a "secure gateway" on the CANbus you had to authenticate through. They then took that system, refined it into "AutoAuth", an "independent" authority that controls access to the SGWs for "automakers". AutoAuth is for FCA, Stellantis, and some new Nissans (apparently the 2020+ Sentra?). VW and Mercedes also have their own "secure gateway" bullshit as well. -- As for this Hyundai situation, there is a workaround. Unfortunately, it's the "more expensive" option. People are using J2534 "passthrough" dongle devices to work with automotive service software. J2534 is an SAE standard for ECU programming, and thus there's a large market of cheap and expensive dongles to interface with OE software that allows J2534 "generic" access to program modules. That's what Hyundai is protecting with the NASTF login. If you spent even more money and bought a genuine Hyundai vehicle communications interface (VCI) pod, you could have just used the normal Hyundai GDS and accessed all the brake service functions instead of the "lower cost" J2534 generic access. It'd slide right past the NASTF stuff, and the only time you'd even be asked for NASTF is actually touching the immobilizer. All of this at the end of the day is because cheap-ass scan tools can, with the right software, be a one-click Kia Boyz solution to perform an "all keys lost" procedure, program in a new transponder key, and run off with your car.