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I think the bigger answer is certificate vendors won't stop using the term.
by ranger_danger 1y ago
I think the bigger answer is certificate vendors won't stop using the term.
- tempest_ 1y agoMaybe, but who is actually still buying tls certs from a vendor?
- ranger_danger 1y agoLots of people, I certainly don't trust free providers, and I think it's a lot less likely that malware will use a non-free cert, so some people trust those more. Plus there are email, code-signing and other cert types that aren't provided for free.
- ekr____ 1y agoWhat does it mean not to trust Let's Encrypt in this case? What is it you are concerned they will do?
- ranger_danger 1y agoI worry that the CA is somehow compromised (state actor holding private keys, etc).
- nixosbestos 1y agoI would have that concern, at minimum 100x more with random shitty unreliable SSL providers, than those being run by literal huge nerds and non-profits. Your analysis here is thin and lazy and that's being generous to your analysis.
- alwillis 1y ago> I worry that the CA is somehow compromised (state actor holding private keys, etc). "Somehow" is doing a lot work in that sentence. Operationally, there's no difference between the security procedures and requirements that a for-profit or a non-profit CA must adhere to.
- alwillis 1y agoBTW, all the recent certificate shenanigans have invovled for-profit CAs [1]. [1]: https://sslmate.com/resources/certificate_authority_failures https://sslmate.com/resources/certificate_authority_failures
- ranger_danger 1y agoI still believe in "if it's free, you are the product."
- alwillis 1y agoIn what way is a non-profit such as Lets Encrypt attempting to monetize their customer relationships? They've issued more 700 million certificates at no cost. While I don't get the cynicism in this case, you would agree supporting a secure web is in the public interest, right?
- ranger_danger 1y agoI wasn't referring to monetization, but government surveillance.
- edoceo 1y agoHow would they surveil? And also, have you disabled the certs you don't trust from these providers on your systems?
- nixosbestos 1y ago[flagged]
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- IgorPartola 1y agoTo each their own, but you do realize that you are using a free website running on free software secured by free TLS libraries transmitted via routers that often run free software and firmware? Also how much did you pay for the browser you used to make these comments? There is a sea of difference between something like Google/Facebook/TikTok and Let’s Encrypt/the Linux Foundation/FSF/etc. I can only assume you can’t see that difference if you have spent no time reading about these things, but I would encourage you to. This stuff is important especially if you get to make security decisions for any kind of product.
- ekr____ 1y agoThanks for explaining. I think this concern is reflects a misunderstanding of how the security of the WebPKI works. Specifically, any CA can issue certificates for your domain whether you are their customer or not. What that means is that if CA #1 is compromised but you choose CA #2, CA #1 can still be used to attack connections to your domain. The situation is slightly worse if the CA you actually use is compromised because the main defense we have against misissuance is Certificate Transparency, and it's easier to detect that a certificate was issued by a CA you don't use than that too many certificates were issued by a CA you do use, but it's just slightly easier. The bottom line here is that if you are worried about some group of CAs being compromised, then using a different CA doesn't help you much.
- ranger_danger 1y agoYes I understand all of that, but I still choose to trust free services less. Of course the (more secure?) alternative would be to generate self-signed certs, but for customer-facing sites that's a big UX problem.
- ekr____ 1y ago> Yes I understand all of that, but I still choose to trust free services less. Well, you can choose to do whatever you want, but given that you're posting to a public forum, it would be helpful if you actually explained your reasoning. > Of course the (more secure?) alternative would be to generate self-signed certs, but for customer-facing sites that's a big UX problem. It's not just a big UX problem, it's a big security problem, because the customers have no way of knowing if your certificate is actually valid.
- nixosbestos 1y ago> it would be helpful if you actually explained your reasoning. It's exceedingly clear that's not going to happen, and I think we all know why. Good reminder to anyone that anyone can just post here. Including people that logic-lessly think that paying a shitty third party that probably has a bad track record is somehow better than using LE. Like, this isn't a serious conversation?
- nixosbestos 1y ago[flagged]
- oarsinsync 1y ago> I certainly don't trust free providers What does this mean in practice? Do you remove the free providers from your OS & browser trust stores? Does this mean you get warnings every time you visit a site that uses LetsEncrypt (and other free providers)?
- stackskipton 1y agoWe do or will until Certificate lifespan changes. We have customers cert pinning our API cert at work (shitty Enterprise security practices) so constant 60 days rotation with LE or ZeroSSL caused endless support heartache because these enterprise customers demanded we tell them when and what new fingerprint was. So, 1-year certs and renew 60 days out, send out new fingerprint and at 30 days, we would occasionally swap it in and out as brownout with replacement at 15 days. We have already indicated when it drops to 100 days, we will swap to automation and no longer communicate when changes will occur. Account Managers are already getting push back from customers. It's possible we will continue using Digicert because they seem to promise that Intermediate certs won't rotate unlike Let's Encrypt which rotates them more frequently which is better security practice. So Enterprise customers will cert pin to Intermediate instead.