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I have only read that single post by that author and it passed my logic smoke test on a first pass. I am not commenting on any other work by that author and thi

by lrvick 1y ago

I have only read that single post by that author and it passed my logic smoke test on a first pass. I am not commenting on any other work by that author and this seems like an ad hominem argument rather than refuting any content of that article. Also I never actually disagreed that PGP as a specification, has a lot of 1990s holdovers given its history and age. Thankfully we have modern tooling now with reasonably secure defaults. I was mostly arguing against the article you shared whose conclusions I absolutely disagree with. IMO OpenPGP, however aged the spec design, when used with modern tools in turn using the unified smartcard interfaces, is still a way better choice than a hodge podge of ssh keys, minisign, age, openssl, etc without any standardized solutions for key revocation, rotation, backup, discovery, verification, etc.

tptacek 1y ago
This has been a mostly unproductive thread that has done a good job of avoiding the point of my original comment, which is that the archaisms in PGP are not merely a consequence of the GnuPG implementation, but also deeply embedded into the standard itself. I don't care if you feel like PGP is still a worthy tool (I don't think it is, but I get that we can go back and forth on that). You made (by implication) a false claim, and it was false in an important way, and it has now been falsified.
- lrvick 1y ago
  I have made no false claims or implications that I am aware of. Mainly I was arguing at your implication that PGP is the wrong tool for any job as your link concluded. I don't doubt you or a lot of people could build something better, but nobody has yet, and I doubt any will get it as widely adopted and supported end to end for all the use cases PGP is used for today. PGP is here to stay, and thus must be maintained and improved. I don't see bike shedding about things that could have been done better historically in the spec itself as productive as there are no significant security problems with any of the active uses of PGP I use or am aware of in wide use today, if done with modern tools and with modern cipher defaults. I would not recommend generating keys with GnuPG today any more than I would recommend using Internet Explorer. Advising against old broken implementations is not the same thing as saying we should abandon an established widely used cryptographic identity standard for which no comparable alternatives exist. Especially when alternative tooling with reasonable secure defaults exists now. I doubt this discussion was productive for you or me, but hopefully it will be productive for others reading trying to make sense of their choices and tradeoffs. I do appreciate people like you keeping me honest on this stuff regardless.
  - tptacek 1y ago
    "Nobody has built something better" is not responsive to the argument that "PGP is fundamentally outmoded, not just one implementation of it".
    - johnisgood 1y ago
      Are you arguing that OpenPGP itself is fundamentally flawed, or only GnuPG (which is one implementation of OpenPGP, Sequoia is another)?
      - tptacek 1y ago
        That OpenPGP itself is fundamentally flawed (it clearly is, and my interlocutor here has conceded that.)
        johnisgood 1y ago
        I believe lrvick said that the spec isn't perfect but works fine in practice, and advises against old broken implementations of it. We will see. In any case, imperfection does not imply fundamental flaw. I might have missed it. Have you elaborated on why you think OpenPGP is fundamentally flawed? Do you know of any GPG replacements (or rather, OpenPGP replacements)? I want encryption, signing, key management, email integration (optional), multiple recipients, subkeys, revocation certificates, web of trust (even if unused), smart card support, and so on.
        tptacek 1y ago
        "Works fine in practice" is not responsive to "outmoded fundamentally, not just by one implementation". That commenter is substituting their own rooting interest in a particular outcome with a straightforward descriptive claim about the standard.
        johnisgood 1y ago
        I would appreciate it if you answered to the rest of my comment. It may be quite useful.

by lrvick 1y ago

tptacek 1y ago

This has been a mostly unproductive thread that has done a good job of avoiding the point of my original comment, which is that the archaisms in PGP are not merely a consequence of the GnuPG implementation, but also deeply embedded into the standard itself. I don't care if you feel like PGP is still a worthy tool (I don't think it is, but I get that we can go back and forth on that). You made (by implication) a false claim, and it was false in an important way, and it has now been falsified.

lrvick 1y ago
I have made no false claims or implications that I am aware of. Mainly I was arguing at your implication that PGP is the wrong tool for any job as your link concluded. I don't doubt you or a lot of people could build something better, but nobody has yet, and I doubt any will get it as widely adopted and supported end to end for all the use cases PGP is used for today. PGP is here to stay, and thus must be maintained and improved. I don't see bike shedding about things that could have been done better historically in the spec itself as productive as there are no significant security problems with any of the active uses of PGP I use or am aware of in wide use today, if done with modern tools and with modern cipher defaults. I would not recommend generating keys with GnuPG today any more than I would recommend using Internet Explorer. Advising against old broken implementations is not the same thing as saying we should abandon an established widely used cryptographic identity standard for which no comparable alternatives exist. Especially when alternative tooling with reasonable secure defaults exists now. I doubt this discussion was productive for you or me, but hopefully it will be productive for others reading trying to make sense of their choices and tradeoffs. I do appreciate people like you keeping me honest on this stuff regardless.
- tptacek 1y ago
  "Nobody has built something better" is not responsive to the argument that "PGP is fundamentally outmoded, not just one implementation of it".
  - johnisgood 1y ago
    Are you arguing that OpenPGP itself is fundamentally flawed, or only GnuPG (which is one implementation of OpenPGP, Sequoia is another)?
    - tptacek 1y ago
      That OpenPGP itself is fundamentally flawed (it clearly is, and my interlocutor here has conceded that.)
      - johnisgood 1y ago
        I believe lrvick said that the spec isn't perfect but works fine in practice, and advises against old broken implementations of it. We will see. In any case, imperfection does not imply fundamental flaw. I might have missed it. Have you elaborated on why you think OpenPGP is fundamentally flawed? Do you know of any GPG replacements (or rather, OpenPGP replacements)? I want encryption, signing, key management, email integration (optional), multiple recipients, subkeys, revocation certificates, web of trust (even if unused), smart card support, and so on.
        tptacek 1y ago
        "Works fine in practice" is not responsive to "outmoded fundamentally, not just by one implementation". That commenter is substituting their own rooting interest in a particular outcome with a straightforward descriptive claim about the standard.
        johnisgood 1y ago
        I would appreciate it if you answered to the rest of my comment. It may be quite useful.