4 ms·

Thank you for your comment. For a minute I thought I was going insane because there is no way that GPG/PGP is used only by the minority. Literally everyone uses

Thank you for your comment. For a minute I thought I was going insane because there is no way that GPG/PGP is used only by the minority. Literally everyone uses it, even non-techies. phew > any engineering role where security matters that is -not- using PGP smartcards to sign and push their commits, sign code reviews, sign build reproductions of container images, encrypt their passwords, etc. I agree. Even without smartcards, at the very least sign your commits, among other things. Absolute minimum. Very low bar.

zikduruqe 1y ago
Every time I get a dev or executive sending me a Slack message saying "can you reset my password" or "can your provision me in...", my very next reply is "please send me your public key". They do not get their credentials until they do so. And once they do, our security posture gets better and better.
- Vegenoid 1y ago
  I think I'm missing something, how does asking for their public key improve security or verify their identity?
  - rmunn 1y ago
    It allows the security guy (in this case, zikduruqe) to send an email that can only be read by the person who possesses the corresponding private key. Which means that either the email is going to the executive who really does own the account, or else that the attacker has already breached that executive's laptop to the point of having acquired his private key (and passphrase, if there was one), in which case phishing attempts to get a password would be utterly pointless (like trying to pick the lock of the front door when you're already inside the house).
    - akerl_ 1y ago
      So I email you asking for something. You say “send me your public key first”. I generate a key pair and send the public key to you. You encrypt response giving me what I wanted. How do you have any idea that I’m the person I said I am?
      - johnisgood 1y ago
        The question makes no sense in this context. The identity verification problem is orthogonal to the encryption scheme. This problem exists regardless of PGP. If someone's Slack is compromised: With PGP: attacker gets credentials encrypted to their key Without PGP: attacker gets plaintext credentials But both fail at the same point: verifying who you're talking to. That's not a PGP problem, it's a "doing password resets over unauthenticated Slack" problem. PGP does provide multiple identity verification mechanisms, e.g. web of trust, key signing, fingerprint verification, in-person key exchange, and Keybase-style social proofs linking keys to verified accounts. The workflow described just doesn't use them. Identity verification is required for ANY secure credential exchange system; you either verify keys properly (signed by trusted parties, verified fingerprints, pre-enrolled, social proofs) or you have the same problem with passwords, TOFU SSH keys, or anything else. Are you criticizing PGP for not solving a problem that the workflow simply didn't implement a solution for?
        akerl_ 1y ago
        I’m saying asking somebody for a public key in the example scenario is pure security theater, no matter if it’s PGP or some other scheme.
        johnisgood 1y ago
        That's only true if the key's authenticity isn't verified. If you just accept any key a person gives you, then yes, it's meaningless. But if you independently confirm the key's fingerprint through a trusted channel, it becomes a real security measure that prevents impersonation and ensures confidentiality. The workflow as described (no verification step) is theater. But that's true for any credential exchange without identity verification, PGP or otherwise. The issue isn't PGP, it's skipping the verification step. PGP provides the tools (fingerprint verification, web of trust, key signing), but you have to actually use them.
  - johnisgood 1y ago
    Asking for their public key lets you encrypt messages that only their private key can decrypt, and verify signatures they create. It doesn't by itself prove their real identity, you still need to verify the key's authenticity (e.g. via fingerprint comparison or a trusted keyserver) to avoid impersonation or man-in-the-middle attacks.
    - tptacek 1y ago
      He's asking how this procedure learns which public keys are trustworthy, not how asymmetric cryptography works.
      - Vegenoid 1y ago
        I think what I’ve gathered is that the person I replied to is going with a TOFU model of key security (trust on first use), or is just seeking to avoid plaintext passwords in slack messages and is treating the key as disposable for the one-time encryption of the password. Presumably they must trust that the user messaging them on slack is indeed who they say they are and is in control of the account. If I’ve understood correctly, this seems like one of those cases where PGP is adding quite little security to the system, and may be preventing the implementation of more secure systems if it is providing a false sense of security. But it’s probably just someone doing their best in a system beyond their control.
        johnisgood 1y ago
        Like I have said in another comment, the question of identity verification makes no sense in this context. The identity verification problem is orthogonal to the encryption scheme. See: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45919561 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45919561
        tptacek 1y ago
        That is an extremely weird argument. They aren't separable concerns. If you have a trusted identity in place you could use a password-protected AES ZIP file for all the encryption matters.
  - rmunn 1y ago
    As for how it improves security, I'm going to hazard a guess that many of the people sending zikduruqe those messages hadn't previously set up a PGP key. So by asking for the public key and refusing to send them the credentials until he receives it, he's forcing them to set one up, which then makes it possible for them to do things like sign messages. Just making someone set up a keypair doesn't mean they'll use it correctly, but it's hard to argue against the idea that a company's security posture is improved when more people have PGP keys.
    - akerl_ 1y ago
      It’s so easy to use insecurely that I will argue that employees setting up PGP keys and then potentially trying to use them does weaken the company’s security posture.
      - johnisgood 1y ago
        Care to elaborate on this? How come using PGP insecurely is somehow more insecure than not using it at all? And what do you exactly mean by using it insecurely? Care to give me an example of this insecure use of PGP?
      - lrvick 1y ago
        I agree it is easy for people to shoot themselves in the foot with many historcal PGP tools, which is exactly why we made keyfork. It generates modern ECC PGP keychains with best practices in one shot, with multiple reasonably secure user friendly paper or smartcard, backup solutions. You will really know what you are doing to force keyfork to generate an unsafe keychain. Especially if you use it on AirgapOS, which ships with it.

zikduruqe 1y ago

Every time I get a dev or executive sending me a Slack message saying "can you reset my password" or "can your provision me in...", my very next reply is "please send me your public key". They do not get their credentials until they do so. And once they do, our security posture gets better and better.

Vegenoid 1y ago
I think I'm missing something, how does asking for their public key improve security or verify their identity?
- rmunn 1y ago
  It allows the security guy (in this case, zikduruqe) to send an email that can only be read by the person who possesses the corresponding private key. Which means that either the email is going to the executive who really does own the account, or else that the attacker has already breached that executive's laptop to the point of having acquired his private key (and passphrase, if there was one), in which case phishing attempts to get a password would be utterly pointless (like trying to pick the lock of the front door when you're already inside the house).
  - akerl_ 1y ago
    So I email you asking for something. You say “send me your public key first”. I generate a key pair and send the public key to you. You encrypt response giving me what I wanted. How do you have any idea that I’m the person I said I am?
    - johnisgood 1y ago
      The question makes no sense in this context. The identity verification problem is orthogonal to the encryption scheme. This problem exists regardless of PGP. If someone's Slack is compromised: With PGP: attacker gets credentials encrypted to their key Without PGP: attacker gets plaintext credentials But both fail at the same point: verifying who you're talking to. That's not a PGP problem, it's a "doing password resets over unauthenticated Slack" problem. PGP does provide multiple identity verification mechanisms, e.g. web of trust, key signing, fingerprint verification, in-person key exchange, and Keybase-style social proofs linking keys to verified accounts. The workflow described just doesn't use them. Identity verification is required for ANY secure credential exchange system; you either verify keys properly (signed by trusted parties, verified fingerprints, pre-enrolled, social proofs) or you have the same problem with passwords, TOFU SSH keys, or anything else. Are you criticizing PGP for not solving a problem that the workflow simply didn't implement a solution for?
      - akerl_ 1y ago
        I’m saying asking somebody for a public key in the example scenario is pure security theater, no matter if it’s PGP or some other scheme.
        johnisgood 1y ago
        That's only true if the key's authenticity isn't verified. If you just accept any key a person gives you, then yes, it's meaningless. But if you independently confirm the key's fingerprint through a trusted channel, it becomes a real security measure that prevents impersonation and ensures confidentiality. The workflow as described (no verification step) is theater. But that's true for any credential exchange without identity verification, PGP or otherwise. The issue isn't PGP, it's skipping the verification step. PGP provides the tools (fingerprint verification, web of trust, key signing), but you have to actually use them.
- johnisgood 1y ago
  Asking for their public key lets you encrypt messages that only their private key can decrypt, and verify signatures they create. It doesn't by itself prove their real identity, you still need to verify the key's authenticity (e.g. via fingerprint comparison or a trusted keyserver) to avoid impersonation or man-in-the-middle attacks.
  - tptacek 1y ago
    He's asking how this procedure learns which public keys are trustworthy, not how asymmetric cryptography works.
    - Vegenoid 1y ago
      I think what I’ve gathered is that the person I replied to is going with a TOFU model of key security (trust on first use), or is just seeking to avoid plaintext passwords in slack messages and is treating the key as disposable for the one-time encryption of the password. Presumably they must trust that the user messaging them on slack is indeed who they say they are and is in control of the account. If I’ve understood correctly, this seems like one of those cases where PGP is adding quite little security to the system, and may be preventing the implementation of more secure systems if it is providing a false sense of security. But it’s probably just someone doing their best in a system beyond their control.
      - johnisgood 1y ago
        Like I have said in another comment, the question of identity verification makes no sense in this context. The identity verification problem is orthogonal to the encryption scheme. See: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45919561 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45919561
        tptacek 1y ago
        That is an extremely weird argument. They aren't separable concerns. If you have a trusted identity in place you could use a password-protected AES ZIP file for all the encryption matters.
- rmunn 1y ago
  As for how it improves security, I'm going to hazard a guess that many of the people sending zikduruqe those messages hadn't previously set up a PGP key. So by asking for the public key and refusing to send them the credentials until he receives it, he's forcing them to set one up, which then makes it possible for them to do things like sign messages. Just making someone set up a keypair doesn't mean they'll use it correctly, but it's hard to argue against the idea that a company's security posture is improved when more people have PGP keys.
  - akerl_ 1y ago
    It’s so easy to use insecurely that I will argue that employees setting up PGP keys and then potentially trying to use them does weaken the company’s security posture.
    - johnisgood 1y ago
      Care to elaborate on this? How come using PGP insecurely is somehow more insecure than not using it at all? And what do you exactly mean by using it insecurely? Care to give me an example of this insecure use of PGP?
    - lrvick 1y ago
      I agree it is easy for people to shoot themselves in the foot with many historcal PGP tools, which is exactly why we made keyfork. It generates modern ECC PGP keychains with best practices in one shot, with multiple reasonably secure user friendly paper or smartcard, backup solutions. You will really know what you are doing to force keyfork to generate an unsafe keychain. Especially if you use it on AirgapOS, which ships with it.