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737 Max was a compendium of failures. Airframe wasn’t one of them. If anything, the 737 series’ airframes are perfected to a fault.
by JumpCrisscross 1y ago
737 Max was a compendium of failures. Airframe wasn’t one of them. If anything, the 737 series’ airframes are perfected to a fault.
- ViewTrick1002 1y agoTons of problems that only are accepted due being grandfathered in.
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> Tons of problems that only are accepted due being grandfathered in What are you basing this on?
- ViewTrick1002 1y agoFor example a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max. The 737 Max 7 and 10 had to get a waiver due to not being certified in time by the hard requirement to have one when updating old types. Let alone certifying new types.
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max Instrumentation. Not airframe. Boeing’s failure was in trying to make a great airframe compensate for failings in other systems.
- ViewTrick1002 1y agoIt is a lackluster airframe but with an entire workforce certified to fly it and thus it is forced to stay around. Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified.
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified Not airframe!
- ViewTrick1002 1y agoIgnore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome!
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> Ignore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome! You’re moving the goalposts because you didn’t understand what an airframe is.
- ViewTrick1002 1y agoThe engine anti ice system are literally generic aerodynamic parts and control systems provided by Boeing. You know, part of the same assembly causing MCAS to exist. But that is of course not part of the airframe.
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> that is of course not part of the airframe Correct. The 737’s airframe’s excellence is the reason Boeing was loath to let it go. It’s a really good airframe, and a market fit to boot for the transition from hub and spoke. A clean-sheet design for the 737 would look a lot like the 737. That is what makes the shortcuts tempting. Engines, avionics and control software are distinct components and not part of the airframe. (Debatable only on engine cowlings and mounts. Neither of which were relevant to the 737 Max’s faults.)
- kuschku 1y agoConsidering the low ground clearance is one of the major issues of the 737 today (which lead to the whole MAX disaster), you'd have to replace the landing gear, and with that you'd also need to make changes to the airframe itself.
- miyuru 1y agoDidn't the problems start when Boeing began using new engines on an old airframe for the Max? https://www.eetimes.com/software-wont-fix-boeings-faulty-airframe/ https://www.eetimes.com/software-wont-fix-boeings-faulty-air...
- JumpCrisscross 1y agoYes. The problem wasn’t the airframe, nor even frankly the engines, it was the combination plus the decision to fix an aerodynamic instability with an undocumented software patch.
- _DeadFred_ 1y agoAnd putting certain related functionality behind a paywall.
- acdha 1y agoThat last part is key: the MCAS system was designed to fake handling like the older planes but they skimped on safety to save the cost of a second sensor and didn’t train pilots on it or have an override mechanism. If the whole thing had been aboveboard they’d have saved so many lives…
- exidy 1y agoThere was an override system, MCAS drove the stabiliser trim motors and so flipping the stabiliser trim motor cutout switches would disable MCAS. This relied on the pilots diagnosing an MCAS runaway as a stabiliser trim runaway and enacting the same checklist. However, to add insult to injury, the MAX also had another change. In the 737 NG, there were two switches, one would disable automated movement of stabiliser trim, the other would cutout the electric trim motors entirely. This allowed the pilots to disable automation without losing the ability to trim the aircraft using the switches on the yoke. The MAX changed this arrangement, now either switch would cut power to electric trim. Tragically the pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 recognised the runaway, enacted the correct checklist, but the aircraft was now so far out of trim that aerodynamic loads made correcting the situation using the hand trim crank impossible. In desperation the pilots restored electrical power to the trim motors, MCAS re-engaged and drove the aircraft into the ground.