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I'm not talking about "identical" consciousnesses. I mean the same consciousness. The same consciousness cannot split into two, can it? Either it is (and conti

by prmph 1y ago

I'm not talking about "identical" consciousnesses. I mean the same consciousness. The same consciousness cannot split into two, can it? Either it is (and continues to be) the same consciousness, or it is not. If it were the same consciousness, then you would have a person who exists in two places at once.

gf000 1y ago
Consciousness has no agreed upon definition to begin with, but I like to think of it as to what a whirlwind is to a bunch of air molecules (that is, an example of emergent behavior) So your question is, are two whirlwinds with identical properties (same speed, same direction, shape etc) the same in one box of air, vs another identical box?
- prmph 1y ago
  Exactly, I guess this starts to get into philosophical questions around identity real quick. To me, two such whirlwinds are identical but not the same. They are the same only if they are guaranteed to have the same value for every conceivable property, forever, and even this condition may not be enough.
tsimionescu 1y ago
Well, "the same consciousness" it's not, as for example it occupies a different position in spacetime. It's an identical copy for a split second, and then they start diverging. Nothing so deep about any of this. When I copy a file from one disk to another, it's not the same file, they're identical copies for some time (usually, assuming no defects in the copying process), and will likely start diverging afterwards.
- pka 11mo ago
  It might be deeper than you think. Qualia exist "outside" spacetime, e.g. redness doesn't have a position in spacetime. If consciousness is purely physical, then how can two identical systems (identical brains with identical sensory input) giving rise by definition to the same qualia not literally be the same consciousness?
  - tsimionescu 11mo ago
    > Qualia exist "outside" spacetime, e.g. redness doesn't have a position in spacetime. I'm sensing redness here and now, so the sensation of redness exists very clearly tied to a particular point in spacetime. In what sense is the qualia of redness not firmly anchored in spacetime? Of course, you could talk about the concept redness, like the concept Pi, but even then, these concepts exist in the mind of a human thinking about them, still tied to a particular location in spacetime. > If consciousness is purely physical, then how can two identical systems (identical brains with identical sensory input) giving rise by definition to the same qualia not literally be the same consciousness? The two brains don't receive the same sensory inputs, nothing in the experiment says they do. From the second right after the duplicate is created, their sensory inputs diverge, and so they become separate consciousnesses with the same history. They are interchangeable initially, if you gave the same sensory inputs to either of them, they would have the same output (even internally). But, they are not identical: giving some sensory input to one of them will not create any effect directly in the other one.
    - pka 11mo ago
      > I'm sensing redness here and now, so the sensation of redness exists very clearly tied to a particular point in spacetime. In what sense is the qualia of redness not firmly anchored in spacetime? Of course, you could talk about the concept redness, like the concept Pi, but even then, these concepts exist in the mind of a human thinking about them, still tied to a particular location in spacetime. But qualia are inherently subjective. You can correlate brain activity (which exists at a position in spacetime) to subjective experience, but that experience is not related to spacetime. Said otherwise: imagine you are in the Matrix at a coffee shop and sense redness, but your brain is actually in a vat somewhere being fed fake sensory input. "Where" is the redness? You would clearly say that it arises in your brain in the coffee shop. Imagine then the vat is moved (so its position in spacetime changes), your brain is rolled back to its previous state, and then fed the same sensory input again. Where is the redness now? You can't differentiate the two sensations of redness based on the actual position of the brain in spacetime. For all intents and purposes, they are the same. Qualia only depend on the internal brain state at a point in time and on the sensory input. Spacetime is nowhere to be found in that equation. > The two brains don't receive the same sensory inputs But let's say they do. Identical brains, identical inputs = identical qualia. What differentiates both consciousnesses?

by prmph 1y ago

gf000 1y ago

Consciousness has no agreed upon definition to begin with, but I like to think of it as to what a whirlwind is to a bunch of air molecules (that is, an example of emergent behavior) So your question is, are two whirlwinds with identical properties (same speed, same direction, shape etc) the same in one box of air, vs another identical box?

prmph 1y ago
Exactly, I guess this starts to get into philosophical questions around identity real quick. To me, two such whirlwinds are identical but not the same. They are the same only if they are guaranteed to have the same value for every conceivable property, forever, and even this condition may not be enough.

tsimionescu 1y ago

Well, "the same consciousness" it's not, as for example it occupies a different position in spacetime. It's an identical copy for a split second, and then they start diverging. Nothing so deep about any of this. When I copy a file from one disk to another, it's not the same file, they're identical copies for some time (usually, assuming no defects in the copying process), and will likely start diverging afterwards.

pka 11mo ago
It might be deeper than you think. Qualia exist "outside" spacetime, e.g. redness doesn't have a position in spacetime. If consciousness is purely physical, then how can two identical systems (identical brains with identical sensory input) giving rise by definition to the same qualia not literally be the same consciousness?
- tsimionescu 11mo ago
  > Qualia exist "outside" spacetime, e.g. redness doesn't have a position in spacetime. I'm sensing redness here and now, so the sensation of redness exists very clearly tied to a particular point in spacetime. In what sense is the qualia of redness not firmly anchored in spacetime? Of course, you could talk about the concept redness, like the concept Pi, but even then, these concepts exist in the mind of a human thinking about them, still tied to a particular location in spacetime. > If consciousness is purely physical, then how can two identical systems (identical brains with identical sensory input) giving rise by definition to the same qualia not literally be the same consciousness? The two brains don't receive the same sensory inputs, nothing in the experiment says they do. From the second right after the duplicate is created, their sensory inputs diverge, and so they become separate consciousnesses with the same history. They are interchangeable initially, if you gave the same sensory inputs to either of them, they would have the same output (even internally). But, they are not identical: giving some sensory input to one of them will not create any effect directly in the other one.
  - pka 11mo ago
    > I'm sensing redness here and now, so the sensation of redness exists very clearly tied to a particular point in spacetime. In what sense is the qualia of redness not firmly anchored in spacetime? Of course, you could talk about the concept redness, like the concept Pi, but even then, these concepts exist in the mind of a human thinking about them, still tied to a particular location in spacetime. But qualia are inherently subjective. You can correlate brain activity (which exists at a position in spacetime) to subjective experience, but that experience is not related to spacetime. Said otherwise: imagine you are in the Matrix at a coffee shop and sense redness, but your brain is actually in a vat somewhere being fed fake sensory input. "Where" is the redness? You would clearly say that it arises in your brain in the coffee shop. Imagine then the vat is moved (so its position in spacetime changes), your brain is rolled back to its previous state, and then fed the same sensory input again. Where is the redness now? You can't differentiate the two sensations of redness based on the actual position of the brain in spacetime. For all intents and purposes, they are the same. Qualia only depend on the internal brain state at a point in time and on the sensory input. Spacetime is nowhere to be found in that equation. > The two brains don't receive the same sensory inputs But let's say they do. Identical brains, identical inputs = identical qualia. What differentiates both consciousnesses?