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> or possessed of subjective experience in any measurable way We don't know how to measure subjective experience in other people, even, other than via self-rep
by vidarh 1y ago
> or possessed of subjective experience in any measurable way
We don't know how to measure subjective experience in other people, even, other than via self-reporting, so this is a meaningless statement. Of course we don't know whether they are, and of course we can't measure it.
I also don't know for sure whether or not you are "possessed of subjective experience" as I can't measure it.
> What they are not is conscious
And this is equally meaningless without your definition of "conscious".
> It's possible those latter two parts can be solved, or approximated, by an LLM, but I am skeptical.
Unless we can find indications that humans can exceed the Turing computable - something we as of yet have no indication is even theoretically possible - there is no rational reason to think it can't.
- nprateem 1y agoAnyone who believes an algorithm could be conscious needs to take mushrooms.
- visarga 1y agoConsider the river metaphor: water carves the banks, banks channel the water. At any moment water and banks have the same shape. Model/algorithm is the banks. Water could be the experiences. Maybe the algorithm does not have consciousness, but it is part of it. They co-create each other. They are part of a recursive loop which cannot be explained statically, or part by part in isolation.
- levitatorius 1y agoYes! If algorithm is conscious (without being alive) then the eaten magic mushroom is also very conscious, judged by it's effect on the subject.
- vidarh 1y agoUnless you can show me you can exceed the Turing computable, there is no reason to consider you any more than an algorithm.
- nprateem 1y agoTake a big enough dose and the mushrooms will show you that.
- vidarh 1y agoUnless those mushrooms provides you with a repeatable, testable computation that you can repeat, they are not showing you anything of the sort.
- nprateem 1y agoIf it wasn't repeatable people wouldn't frequently report experiences of oneness and similar spiritual experiences while tripping.
- ivraatiems 1y ago> Unless we can find indications that humans can exceed the Turing computable - something we as of yet have no indication is even theoretically possible - there is no rational reason to think it can't. But doesn't this rely on the same thing you suggest we don't have, which is a working and definable definition of consciousness? I think a lot of the 'well, we can't define consciousness so we don't know what it is so it's worthless to think about' argument - not only from you but from others - is hiding the ball. The heuristic, human consideration of whether something is conscious is an okay approximation so long as we avoid the trap of 'well, it has natural language, so it must be conscious.' There's a huge challenge in the way LLMs can seem like they are speaking out of intellect and not just pattern predicting, but there's very little meaningful argument that they are actually thinking in any way similarly to what you or I do in writing these comments. The fact that we don't have a perfect, rigorous definition, and tend to rely on 'I know it when I see it,' does not mean LLMs do have it or that it will be trivial to get to them. All that is to say that when you say: > I also don't know for sure whether or not you are "possessed of subjective experience" as I can't measure it. "Knowing for sure" is not required. A reasonable suspicion one way or the other based on experience is a good place to start. I also identified two specific things LLMs don't do - they are not self-motivated or goal-directed without prompting, and there is no evidence they possess a sense of self, even with the challenge of lack of definition that we face.
- nearbuy 1y ago> But doesn't this rely on the same thing you suggest we don't have, which is a working and definable definition of consciousness? No, it's like saying we have no indication that humans have psychic powers and can levitate objects with their minds. The commenter is saying no human has ever demonstrated the ability to figure things out that aren't Turing computable and we have no reason to suspect this ability is even theoretically possible (for anything, human or otherwise).
- vidarh 1y agoNo, it rests on computability, Turing equivalence, and the total absence of both any kind of evidence to suggest we can exceed the Turing computable, and the lack of even a theoretical framework for what that would mean. Without that any limitations borne out of what LLMs don't currently do are irrelevant.
- prmph 1y ago> I also don't know for sure whether or not you are "possessed of subjective experience" as I can't measure it. Then why make an argument based on what you do not know?
- vidarh 1y agoMy point exactly. The person I replied to did just that.
- ivraatiems 1y agoI think the parent is trying to point out the difference between our positions: You say the limits of LLMs don't matter, because we don't have definitions strong enough to describe them. I say the limits of LLMs do matter and the fact that we can't yet define them rigorously means we aren't able to fix them (assuming we want to).
- vidarh 1y agoNo, that is categorically not what I said.