3 ms·

iOS is also compromised according to other cellebrite docs so that makes me think Graphene OS just might not be worth the effort for them.

ls612 1y ago
iOS was hackable in 2024 for certain hardware (in particular the checkm8 era phones) or for iOS versions which had known vulns at that point. Modern hardware with updates was still listed as “in research” which means “we can’t”.
- int0x29 1y ago
  The last leak was in 2024. Hopefully somone nabs the latest iOS release information Edit: last released leak showed they had broken the then most recent iOS release (17.5.1) in AFU state on all but the most recent hardware which was marked "available in CAS" https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2024-documentation https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-ju... The good news is neither pixel nor iOS seems to show full file system extract under BFU state in the recent tables I can find.
  - ls612 1y ago
    Neither have had any known BFU on the latest iOS for years. AFU is occasionally possible but most of the leaks had latest software and hardware as still protected. Powering off the phone is always still a good idea though if you can.
    - strcat 1y ago
      That's not true. Cellebrite has working BFU and AFU exploits for recent iOS and usually catches up to the latest iOS versions and hardware in weeks or a couple months. They do not have working brute force support for the Pixel 2 / Pixel 6 or later / iPhone 12 or later due to the secure elements but can still exploit the devices in BFU mode and extract the data available before unlocking. iPhone 17 may work out better due to hardware memory tagging but previous iOS and iPhone models did not hold out in the way you're claiming at all.
      - commandersaki 1y ago
        Citation needed.
        strcat 1y ago
        It's a statement directly based on the regularly updated Cellebrite Premium documentation from the past 2 years. At a bare minimum, the April 2024, July 2024 and February 2025 documentation was posted publicly and even that subset shows what's said above. Do you think Cellebrite's documentation isn't accurate or that the leaked documentation was tampered? We aren't posting it publicly ourselves, but we do have a source providing it to us and can compare it over time. Only Pixels and iPhones are successfully stopping brute force but neither is successfully stopping exploiting the OS whether they're BFU or AFU.
      - Sesse__ 1y ago
        What data _is_ there to extract BFU, really, if you can't break the secure element? I mean, the main storage isn't decrypted yet, right?
        strcat 1y ago
        Android and iOS both use filesystem-based disk encryption with fine-grained keys, not only a global encryption key. There's a subset of the OS data available before first unlock to have basic functionality available there. Three examples are installed apps, saved Wi-Fi networks including passwords and alarms with the system clock apps being available before first unlock via explicitly storing it in the before first unlock encrypted data. All of the data and metadata blocks are encrypted, but not all of it is encrypted with keys tied to the user's credentials. Android uses per-profile encryption so it gets security benefits from it too, but both operating systems mainly use it for usability benefits needed to make always on disk encryption suitable for their broad audience. They were able to deploy disk encryption to everyone without complaints partly because they did it this way, so in that sense the before first unlock data has a security benefit. Apps are installed so that their packages are available before first unlock and can explicitly opt-in to supporting a specific subset of their components and data before available before first unlock. An app can implement push notifications before first unlock if the developers want to do it, and they could do that in a way where no message data, etc. is available before first unlock. The OS leaves it up to apps to decide what to do, and nearly all apps stick with the default of all their functionality and data available After First Unlock instead of either making it available Before First Unlock or having it go back at rest while locked again.
  - strcat 1y ago
    February 2025 documentation was posted by someone in that thread and a blog post was written by someone about it which was linked there. The initial link posted with the February 2025 documentation died and the blog post only focuses on Android and GrapheneOS rather than iOS too. GrapheneOS has access to the latest Cellebrite Premium documentation since we have a contact able to share it with us. In April 2024 and then July 2024, we posted screenshots of specific capability tables from the documentation but then stopped doing it because it could result in losing access to it. The contact sharing it with us was still fine with us doing it but later came to the same conclusion we did that it's best not to post anything from it. Cellebrite doesn't like it being posted publicly even though it's essentially marketing their products, probably because it results in pressure on Android and iOS to stop it happening.
    - oddmiral 1y ago
      Any info on recent ban of SafeDot by Android and GOS? Any plans to implement SafeDot as an official GOS app?
      - int0x29 1y ago
        Isn't that now a native android function?
        oddmiral 1y ago
        A little green dot? No, it's a small fraction of SafeDot functionality. I'm interested in audible notification when camera, mic, or gps is accessed. Currently, I cannot make it work on GOS (maybe, may phone is hacked).
        oddmiral 1y ago
        It works properly again after post on HN. :-/
- strcat 1y ago
  No, that's wrong. You're basing your claims on outdated leaks of Cellebrite documentation showing they didn't support the most recent iOS version yet, which they did end up support weeks later. You can't simply point to outdated documentation where they were working on catching up to claim they don't support those versions and devices today, which is in fact untrue.

ls612 1y ago

iOS was hackable in 2024 for certain hardware (in particular the checkm8 era phones) or for iOS versions which had known vulns at that point. Modern hardware with updates was still listed as “in research” which means “we can’t”.

int0x29 1y ago
The last leak was in 2024. Hopefully somone nabs the latest iOS release information Edit: last released leak showed they had broken the then most recent iOS release (17.5.1) in AFU state on all but the most recent hardware which was marked "available in CAS" https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2024-documentation https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-ju... The good news is neither pixel nor iOS seems to show full file system extract under BFU state in the recent tables I can find.
- ls612 1y ago
  Neither have had any known BFU on the latest iOS for years. AFU is occasionally possible but most of the leaks had latest software and hardware as still protected. Powering off the phone is always still a good idea though if you can.
  - strcat 1y ago
    That's not true. Cellebrite has working BFU and AFU exploits for recent iOS and usually catches up to the latest iOS versions and hardware in weeks or a couple months. They do not have working brute force support for the Pixel 2 / Pixel 6 or later / iPhone 12 or later due to the secure elements but can still exploit the devices in BFU mode and extract the data available before unlocking. iPhone 17 may work out better due to hardware memory tagging but previous iOS and iPhone models did not hold out in the way you're claiming at all.
    - commandersaki 1y ago
      Citation needed.
      - strcat 1y ago
        It's a statement directly based on the regularly updated Cellebrite Premium documentation from the past 2 years. At a bare minimum, the April 2024, July 2024 and February 2025 documentation was posted publicly and even that subset shows what's said above. Do you think Cellebrite's documentation isn't accurate or that the leaked documentation was tampered? We aren't posting it publicly ourselves, but we do have a source providing it to us and can compare it over time. Only Pixels and iPhones are successfully stopping brute force but neither is successfully stopping exploiting the OS whether they're BFU or AFU.
    - Sesse__ 1y ago
      What data _is_ there to extract BFU, really, if you can't break the secure element? I mean, the main storage isn't decrypted yet, right?
      - strcat 1y ago
        Android and iOS both use filesystem-based disk encryption with fine-grained keys, not only a global encryption key. There's a subset of the OS data available before first unlock to have basic functionality available there. Three examples are installed apps, saved Wi-Fi networks including passwords and alarms with the system clock apps being available before first unlock via explicitly storing it in the before first unlock encrypted data. All of the data and metadata blocks are encrypted, but not all of it is encrypted with keys tied to the user's credentials. Android uses per-profile encryption so it gets security benefits from it too, but both operating systems mainly use it for usability benefits needed to make always on disk encryption suitable for their broad audience. They were able to deploy disk encryption to everyone without complaints partly because they did it this way, so in that sense the before first unlock data has a security benefit. Apps are installed so that their packages are available before first unlock and can explicitly opt-in to supporting a specific subset of their components and data before available before first unlock. An app can implement push notifications before first unlock if the developers want to do it, and they could do that in a way where no message data, etc. is available before first unlock. The OS leaves it up to apps to decide what to do, and nearly all apps stick with the default of all their functionality and data available After First Unlock instead of either making it available Before First Unlock or having it go back at rest while locked again.
- strcat 1y ago
  February 2025 documentation was posted by someone in that thread and a blog post was written by someone about it which was linked there. The initial link posted with the February 2025 documentation died and the blog post only focuses on Android and GrapheneOS rather than iOS too. GrapheneOS has access to the latest Cellebrite Premium documentation since we have a contact able to share it with us. In April 2024 and then July 2024, we posted screenshots of specific capability tables from the documentation but then stopped doing it because it could result in losing access to it. The contact sharing it with us was still fine with us doing it but later came to the same conclusion we did that it's best not to post anything from it. Cellebrite doesn't like it being posted publicly even though it's essentially marketing their products, probably because it results in pressure on Android and iOS to stop it happening.
  - oddmiral 1y ago
    Any info on recent ban of SafeDot by Android and GOS? Any plans to implement SafeDot as an official GOS app?
    - int0x29 1y ago
      Isn't that now a native android function?
      - oddmiral 1y ago
        A little green dot? No, it's a small fraction of SafeDot functionality. I'm interested in audible notification when camera, mic, or gps is accessed. Currently, I cannot make it work on GOS (maybe, may phone is hacked).
        oddmiral 1y ago
        It works properly again after post on HN. :-/
strcat 1y ago
No, that's wrong. You're basing your claims on outdated leaks of Cellebrite documentation showing they didn't support the most recent iOS version yet, which they did end up support weeks later. You can't simply point to outdated documentation where they were working on catching up to claim they don't support those versions and devices today, which is in fact untrue.