7 ms·

The purpose of secure enclave is to prevent administrator from accessing the data. I don't want anyone doing "confidential computing" on my devices. I am the pe

The purpose of secure enclave is to prevent administrator from accessing the data. I don't want anyone doing "confidential computing" on my devices. I am the person which can be trusted so there is no need to hide the encryption keys from me.

hollerith 11mo ago
The false assumption in your argument IMHO is the assumption that none of the software on your device will ever betray you or contain an exploitable security hole. In actuality, it is useful from time to time to be able to run software you cannot completely trust such that the software cannot access all the data on the device (because the untrusted software cannot access your enclave).
- ndriscoll 11mo ago
  That's why you run that software as its own untrusted user and perhaps run it with some kind of sandbox. It's not a reason for you the owner to not have root access at all.
  - hollerith 11mo ago
    Running each app as its own untrusted user is one of the measures taken by Android, but the designers of Android do not consider that enough, so they also sandbox the app with selinux, but no one has implemented sandboxing an app with selinux on any non-Android non-ChromeOS Linux distro. In general, non-Android non-ChromeOS Linux is not good at this sort of thing: half a dozen sandboxing frameworks exist, but none of them are particularly secure. Also, suppose you want to load an obscure kernel module that reads an obscure filesystem format. How do you sandbox the module?
    - codedokode 11mo ago
      > In general, non-Android non-ChromeOS Linux is not good at this sort of thing: half a dozen sandboxing frameworks exist, but none of them are particularly secure. There are no frameworks that use secure enclave for this purpose either. It's purpose is copyright protection and preventing user from removing features like advertisement and telemetry, not making your system safer. > Also, suppose you want to load an obscure kernel module that reads an obscure filesystem format. How do you sandbox the module? You should use microkernels.
      - hollerith 11mo ago
        In the actual world with the actual options available, rejecting the technology of the secure enclave has significant opportunity costs. In a theoretical reality in which one of the options available to you and I is a secure-enclave-independent microkernel OS on which you can run a mainstream browser, then you might be right that secure enclaves are unnecessary.
        ndriscoll 11mo ago
        In the actual world, secure enclave is used for DRM, setting user permissions and running untrusted code as another user gets you 80% of the security you need if you don't trust something, and running it in a mostly empty container gets you another 19%. Unless you have a habit of running dubious code that you grant network access and keep up to date to ensure it knows the latest exploits, practically speaking you're fine. Of course the obvious solution is don't run malware. Android's need for security partly comes from the fact that the primary repository/store distributes tons of dubious code that it grants network access and keeps up to date. If you stick to e.g. F-droid and turn off automatic updates, you don't find yourself in this adversarial position.
        hollerith 11mo ago
        >running untrusted code as another user gets you 80% of the security you need if you don't trust something, and running it in a mostly empty container gets you another 19%. Like I said, the Android team does not think so. Nor does the ChromeOS team, which uses selinux to sandbox the browser, something no other non-Android Linux distro does (except possibly secureblue, which sadly almost no one uses).
embedding-shape 11mo ago
> The purpose of secure enclave is to prevent administrator from accessing the data Not only, it has many purposes. I'm also the administrator of my computer, and some things I want to be unchangable by software, unless I myself unlock it, like I don't want anyone to be able to boot or install other OSes than the ones I've installed myself. The secure enclave and secure boot is perfect for this, even if my computer gets malware they won't be able to access it, and even if someone gets physical access to my computer, they won't be able to boot their OS from a USB.
deleted 11mo ago
[deleted]
argomo 11mo ago
Agreed. We need legally enforceable standards granting owners full control of their devices. But also: TPMs could be used to prevent evil maid attacks and to make it uneconomical for thieves who stole your device to also steal your data. It makes it possible for devices to remotely attest to their owners that the OS has not been compromised, which is relevant to enterprise IT environments. There are a lot of good uses for this technology, we just need to solve the political problems of aggressive copyright, TIVOization, etc.
immibis 11mo ago
But I do want to secure my encryption keys on my device from someone who steals my device. Any feature controlled by the owner of the computer is good; features controlled by anyone else like the manufacturer can be bad. And note that in this viewpoint, leasing makes you temporary owner.

hollerith 11mo ago

The false assumption in your argument IMHO is the assumption that none of the software on your device will ever betray you or contain an exploitable security hole. In actuality, it is useful from time to time to be able to run software you cannot completely trust such that the software cannot access all the data on the device (because the untrusted software cannot access your enclave).

ndriscoll 11mo ago
That's why you run that software as its own untrusted user and perhaps run it with some kind of sandbox. It's not a reason for you the owner to not have root access at all.
- hollerith 11mo ago
  Running each app as its own untrusted user is one of the measures taken by Android, but the designers of Android do not consider that enough, so they also sandbox the app with selinux, but no one has implemented sandboxing an app with selinux on any non-Android non-ChromeOS Linux distro. In general, non-Android non-ChromeOS Linux is not good at this sort of thing: half a dozen sandboxing frameworks exist, but none of them are particularly secure. Also, suppose you want to load an obscure kernel module that reads an obscure filesystem format. How do you sandbox the module?
  - codedokode 11mo ago
    > In general, non-Android non-ChromeOS Linux is not good at this sort of thing: half a dozen sandboxing frameworks exist, but none of them are particularly secure. There are no frameworks that use secure enclave for this purpose either. It's purpose is copyright protection and preventing user from removing features like advertisement and telemetry, not making your system safer. > Also, suppose you want to load an obscure kernel module that reads an obscure filesystem format. How do you sandbox the module? You should use microkernels.
    - hollerith 11mo ago
      In the actual world with the actual options available, rejecting the technology of the secure enclave has significant opportunity costs. In a theoretical reality in which one of the options available to you and I is a secure-enclave-independent microkernel OS on which you can run a mainstream browser, then you might be right that secure enclaves are unnecessary.
      - ndriscoll 11mo ago
        In the actual world, secure enclave is used for DRM, setting user permissions and running untrusted code as another user gets you 80% of the security you need if you don't trust something, and running it in a mostly empty container gets you another 19%. Unless you have a habit of running dubious code that you grant network access and keep up to date to ensure it knows the latest exploits, practically speaking you're fine. Of course the obvious solution is don't run malware. Android's need for security partly comes from the fact that the primary repository/store distributes tons of dubious code that it grants network access and keeps up to date. If you stick to e.g. F-droid and turn off automatic updates, you don't find yourself in this adversarial position.
        hollerith 11mo ago
        >running untrusted code as another user gets you 80% of the security you need if you don't trust something, and running it in a mostly empty container gets you another 19%. Like I said, the Android team does not think so. Nor does the ChromeOS team, which uses selinux to sandbox the browser, something no other non-Android Linux distro does (except possibly secureblue, which sadly almost no one uses).

embedding-shape 11mo ago

> The purpose of secure enclave is to prevent administrator from accessing the data Not only, it has many purposes. I'm also the administrator of my computer, and some things I want to be unchangable by software, unless I myself unlock it, like I don't want anyone to be able to boot or install other OSes than the ones I've installed myself. The secure enclave and secure boot is perfect for this, even if my computer gets malware they won't be able to access it, and even if someone gets physical access to my computer, they won't be able to boot their OS from a USB.

deleted 11mo ago

[deleted]

argomo 11mo ago

Agreed. We need legally enforceable standards granting owners full control of their devices. But also: TPMs could be used to prevent evil maid attacks and to make it uneconomical for thieves who stole your device to also steal your data. It makes it possible for devices to remotely attest to their owners that the OS has not been compromised, which is relevant to enterprise IT environments. There are a lot of good uses for this technology, we just need to solve the political problems of aggressive copyright, TIVOization, etc.

immibis 11mo ago

But I do want to secure my encryption keys on my device from someone who steals my device. Any feature controlled by the owner of the computer is good; features controlled by anyone else like the manufacturer can be bad. And note that in this viewpoint, leasing makes you temporary owner.