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At its core, the main drawbacks that need to be solved for them to be a viable option are imo: * Improving OS flows. Every passkey implementer that's also an O
by noirscape 11mo ago
At its core, the main drawbacks that need to be solved for them to be a viable option are imo:
* Improving OS flows. Every passkey implementer that's also an OS gets really excited about enrolling you into their proprietary clouds, and using alternate flows to respect the users wish to use their own manager is usually hidden in confusing UI forms that don't feel consistent if you don't already know what you're doing.
* Device loss scenario is already mentioned, although more broadly speaking a lot of the reasons people get leery is because all three major providers (Google, Microsoft, Apple) are notorious for their near black box technical support. Losing access to one of these providers on its own is already enough to heavily disrupt the average person's life. Having your login details stored with them makes this even worse.
* The FIDO Alliance Is Way Too Excited About Device Attestation And I Don't Like It. Basically the FIDO Alliance's behavior around passkeys reeks of security theater and them badgering an open source password manager for daring to let users export their passkeys in the format they preferred, rather than what the FIDO Alliance wanted (which is that passkeys must always be encrypted with a password) is telling. If they are as secure as promised, it's a bad look to start threatening device attestation as a means to get people to comply with your specific idea of security. The only real barrier right now to it outright being a thing is that Apple zeroes out the field and when Apple is the only meaningful halt to that kind of attestation, something has gone very wrong.
I think passkeys are interesting, but I just flat out don't trust the FIDO Alliance with the idea. They're way too invested in big tech being good stewards of the ecosystem, which is becoming increasingly unpalatable as more and more evidence piles up that they're really bad actors on everything else. (So why should we trust them with our credentials?) The idea genuinely has value (it's literally the same kind of mechanism as SSH keys), but the hostility towards user freedom is deeply concerning and a blocker to getting people to use it. Even non-technical people seem leery of them, just because of how aggressively big tech has been pushing it.
- AlexandrB 11mo ago> * Improving OS flows. Every passkey implementer that's also an OS gets really excited about enrolling you into their proprietary clouds, and using alternate flows to respect the users wish to use their own manager is usually hidden in confusing UI forms that don't feel consistent if you don't already know what you're doing. You're kidding yourself if you think that this is something Microsoft, Apple, or Google are incentivized to solve. Microsoft is especially bad here - pushing their crappy products in Windows every chance they get. Once some marketing director gets the idea that this can improve retention in Outlook or something the UI will get more confusing and the dark patterns will get darker.
- noirscape 11mo agoI never said they had an incentive to solve it. I said that it's one of the big blockers to getting regular adoption. It ought to be obvious that all these issues aren't a problem if you look at it through the big tech lens: why is it a problem when we're providing the service. They're a problem when you're a normal person with a healthy distrust of big tech companies. In practice, I expect someone to figure out a way to break into/bypass the OS flow entirely with a less "big tech wants your private details" solution and that's what winds up getting adoption.
- magackame 11mo agoGod if it could just be a single key that you dump to paper or titanium plate and don't worry about backing up a zoo of keys/password with a cloud. Just take my one and only public key. If you care about per service privacy, you are welcome to use multiple. I don't think there is any compromise scenario where you would leak any single specific passkey and they are not bruteforcable. Why is it not as simple as that?