It's hilarious, but the hilarity gets in the way of recognizing how much insight there is also there. It makes serious points. This part about the Mossad is esp

It's hilarious, but the hilarity gets in the way of recognizing how much insight there is also there. It makes serious points. This part about the Mossad is especially astonishing given the pager attack: > If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone It's like a Mossad agent read this paper and thought hey that's actually not a bad idea. But the core rant is about dubious assumptions in academic cryptography papers. I was also reading a lot of academic crypto papers in 2014, and the assumptions got old real fast. Mickens mocks these ideas: • "There are heroes and villains with fantastic (yet oddly constrained) powers". Totally standard way to get a paper published. Especially annoying were the mathematical proofs that sound rigorous to outsiders but quietly assume that the adversary just can't/won't solve a certain kind of equation, because it would be inconvenient to prove the scheme secure if they did. Or the "exploits" that only worked if nobody had upgraded their software stack for five years. Or the systems that assume a perfect implementation with no way to recover if anything goes wrong. • "you could enlist a well-known technology company to [run a PKI], but this would offend the refined aesthetics of the vaguely Marxist but comfortably bourgeoisie hacker community who wants everything to be decentralized", lol. This got really tiresome when I worked on Bitcoin. Lots of semi-technical people who had never run any large system constantly attacking every plausible design of implementable complexity because it wasn't decentralized enough for their tastes, sometimes not even proposing anything better. • "These [social networks] are not the best people in the history of people, yet somehow, I am supposed to stitch these clowns into a rich cryptographic tapestry that supports key revocation and verifiable audit trails" - another variant of believing decentralized cryptography and PKI is easy. He also talks about security labels like in SELinux but I never read those papers. I think Mickens used humor to try and get people talking about some of the bad patterns in academic cryptography, but if you want a more serious paper that makes some similar points there's one here: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1336.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1336.pdf