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Then how it's possible Mossad didn't know about what had happened on 7 October 2023?

by lifestyleguru 1y ago

INTPenis 1y ago
This is exactly the type of comment that will get you mossad'd.
- lifestyleguru 1y ago
  ok I'll keep you updated, but I don't own any real estate they could "de-Hamasify"
ozirus 1y ago
Domestic intel = Shin Bet, not Mossad
b112 1y ago
The same way the US didn't know about 9/11. Intelligence failures. (Portions of the US intelligence apparatus knew, but that knowledge didn't transition into action)
- energy123 1y ago
  Israel's intelligence services (not Mossad) did collect valid signals, such as sim cards in Gaza being swapped out for Israel sim cards, but it was ignored as another false positive. What the public don't see are all the false positives (like many drills for an attack that don't materialize) that drown out valid signals when the attack is actually going to happen. There's also hesitancy to act on signals because drills are used to expose intelligence. It's one of the many asymmetries that changes when you are the defender versus the attacker. As the defender, you have to be right 100% of the time. As the attacker, you have the luxury of being right only 30% of the time. The law of large numbers is on the side of the attacker. This applies to missile offense/defense and to usage of intelligence. This information asymmetry is also one of the key drivers of the security dilemma, which in turn causes arms races and conflict. The defender knows they can't be perfect all the time, so they have an incentive to preemptively attack if the probability of future problems based on their assessment of current information is high enough. In the case of Gaza there was also an assessment that Hamas were deterred, which were the tinted glasses through which signals were assessed. Israel also assumed a certain shape of an attack, and the minimal mobilisation of Hamas did not fit that expected template. So the intelligence failure was also a failure in security doctrine and institutional culture. The following principles need to be reinforced: (i) don't assume the best, (ii) don't expect rationality and assume a rival is deterred even if they should be, (iii) intention causes action, believe a rival when they say they want to do X instead of projecting your own worldview onto them, (iv) don't become fixated on a particular scenario, keep the distribution (scenario analyses) broad
  - dominicrose 1y ago
    Avoiding a car accident has a low cost, you just have to take it slowly and be 1 min late to your meeting or whatever, but deciding wether you should attack first based on a small suspicion, that a hell of a problem, because if you're wrong, you're seen as the bad guy. And maybe even if you're right and can't prove it.
    - energy123 1y ago
      > because if you're wrong, you're seen as the bad guy. And maybe even if you're right and can't prove it. An example of this is France cutting off all support after Israel's initiation of the Six Day War, which followed signals such as Egypt massing troops on the border. The problem for Israel was the lack of strategic depth combined with the geographical low ground, which creates these hair trigger scenarios with no room for error, reducing the threshold to act preemptively. The more abstract problem was the absence of a hegemon in the late 20th century that had security control over West Asia, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for resolving the security dilemma.
  - IAmBroom 1y ago
    > As the attacker, you have the luxury of being right only 30% of the time. Interesting number you suggested. That's a pretty normal success rate for a carnivore attacking prey.
throwaway_dang 1y ago
Maybe they did but it was permitted to happen to provide the pretext to expand those Greater Israel borders.
2rsf 1y ago
a. I am too lazy to search but they probably did, the problem was what was done with the information. Same with 8200 the all mighty signal intelligence corps b. The Mossad is the equivalent of the CIA, they are not meant to act inside Israel
- ta1243 1y ago
  > b. The Mossad is the equivalent of the CIA, they are not meant to act inside Israel For that purpose is Gaza inside or not inside Israel?
  - 2rsf 1y ago
    Yes (TBD)
  - lifestyleguru 1y ago
    Israel would probably dispute it, but for most of the world Gaza in relation to Israel is "abroad" and not "domestic".
  - rgblambda 1y ago
    Shin Bet (Israeli internal security service) have an Arab desk that covers the West Bank & Gaza.
smashah 1y ago
They didn't know about the pretense they wanted to spend the following 2+ years making unlimited fallacious justifications for committing a live-streamed holocaust of children? Who told you that?
drdrek 1y ago
Actually Gaza and the West Bank are handled by the "Shabak" agency which is the equivalent of the FBI while the "Mossad" agency is only for foreign operations and is equivalent to the CIA And asking how did they miss something is like asking how come AWS has downtime. But I'm sure you could come to this conclusion on your own if you didn't really want the answer to be something else.
- torginus 1y ago
  And the article is a huge rant about why security people are stupid for worrying about the most clearly implausible shit ever.
IAmBroom 1y ago
Lack of omniscience, infinite computing power, and yottabyte storage facilities?
- lifestyleguru 1y ago
  Dunno, Microsoft was quite generous with their cloud plan.
smashah 1y ago
They didn't know about Hannibal Directive Celebration Day? Who told you that?

Then how it's possible Mossad didn't know about what had happened on 7 October 2023?

INTPenis 1y ago

This is exactly the type of comment that will get you mossad'd.

lifestyleguru 1y ago
ok I'll keep you updated, but I don't own any real estate they could "de-Hamasify"

ozirus 1y ago

Domestic intel = Shin Bet, not Mossad

b112 1y ago

The same way the US didn't know about 9/11. Intelligence failures. (Portions of the US intelligence apparatus knew, but that knowledge didn't transition into action)

energy123 1y ago
Israel's intelligence services (not Mossad) did collect valid signals, such as sim cards in Gaza being swapped out for Israel sim cards, but it was ignored as another false positive. What the public don't see are all the false positives (like many drills for an attack that don't materialize) that drown out valid signals when the attack is actually going to happen. There's also hesitancy to act on signals because drills are used to expose intelligence. It's one of the many asymmetries that changes when you are the defender versus the attacker. As the defender, you have to be right 100% of the time. As the attacker, you have the luxury of being right only 30% of the time. The law of large numbers is on the side of the attacker. This applies to missile offense/defense and to usage of intelligence. This information asymmetry is also one of the key drivers of the security dilemma, which in turn causes arms races and conflict. The defender knows they can't be perfect all the time, so they have an incentive to preemptively attack if the probability of future problems based on their assessment of current information is high enough. In the case of Gaza there was also an assessment that Hamas were deterred, which were the tinted glasses through which signals were assessed. Israel also assumed a certain shape of an attack, and the minimal mobilisation of Hamas did not fit that expected template. So the intelligence failure was also a failure in security doctrine and institutional culture. The following principles need to be reinforced: (i) don't assume the best, (ii) don't expect rationality and assume a rival is deterred even if they should be, (iii) intention causes action, believe a rival when they say they want to do X instead of projecting your own worldview onto them, (iv) don't become fixated on a particular scenario, keep the distribution (scenario analyses) broad
- dominicrose 1y ago
  Avoiding a car accident has a low cost, you just have to take it slowly and be 1 min late to your meeting or whatever, but deciding wether you should attack first based on a small suspicion, that a hell of a problem, because if you're wrong, you're seen as the bad guy. And maybe even if you're right and can't prove it.
  - energy123 1y ago
    > because if you're wrong, you're seen as the bad guy. And maybe even if you're right and can't prove it. An example of this is France cutting off all support after Israel's initiation of the Six Day War, which followed signals such as Egypt massing troops on the border. The problem for Israel was the lack of strategic depth combined with the geographical low ground, which creates these hair trigger scenarios with no room for error, reducing the threshold to act preemptively. The more abstract problem was the absence of a hegemon in the late 20th century that had security control over West Asia, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for resolving the security dilemma.
- IAmBroom 1y ago
  > As the attacker, you have the luxury of being right only 30% of the time. Interesting number you suggested. That's a pretty normal success rate for a carnivore attacking prey.

throwaway_dang 1y ago

Maybe they did but it was permitted to happen to provide the pretext to expand those Greater Israel borders.

2rsf 1y ago

a. I am too lazy to search but they probably did, the problem was what was done with the information. Same with 8200 the all mighty signal intelligence corps b. The Mossad is the equivalent of the CIA, they are not meant to act inside Israel

ta1243 1y ago
> b. The Mossad is the equivalent of the CIA, they are not meant to act inside Israel For that purpose is Gaza inside or not inside Israel?
- 2rsf 1y ago
  Yes (TBD)
- lifestyleguru 1y ago
  Israel would probably dispute it, but for most of the world Gaza in relation to Israel is "abroad" and not "domestic".
- rgblambda 1y ago
  Shin Bet (Israeli internal security service) have an Arab desk that covers the West Bank & Gaza.

smashah 1y ago

They didn't know about the pretense they wanted to spend the following 2+ years making unlimited fallacious justifications for committing a live-streamed holocaust of children? Who told you that?

drdrek 1y ago

Actually Gaza and the West Bank are handled by the "Shabak" agency which is the equivalent of the FBI while the "Mossad" agency is only for foreign operations and is equivalent to the CIA And asking how did they miss something is like asking how come AWS has downtime. But I'm sure you could come to this conclusion on your own if you didn't really want the answer to be something else.

torginus 1y ago
And the article is a huge rant about why security people are stupid for worrying about the most clearly implausible shit ever.

IAmBroom 1y ago

Lack of omniscience, infinite computing power, and yottabyte storage facilities?

lifestyleguru 1y ago
Dunno, Microsoft was quite generous with their cloud plan.

smashah 1y ago

They didn't know about Hannibal Directive Celebration Day? Who told you that?