The two paragraphs I quoted come from the description of the book, directly from the publisher: Stanford University Press. Below, I'll quote some sections from

The two paragraphs I quoted come from the description of the book, directly from the publisher: Stanford University Press. Below, I'll quote some sections from the book directly. But first, I will be transparent in saying I think the book is _deeply_ flawed. I expect a lot more from a philosopher. I'll explain my reasons below. The quotes below are from "The Society of Control" chapter. They are contiguous sentences taken from one paragraph, but below I have split them apart for commentary. > Trust is only possible in a state between knowing and not-knowing. Ok, but I don't think this framing is very useful or clarifying. One framing I find very useful for trust goes like this: Party X _expects_ Party Y to take some _action A_. It is a triple: (X, Y, A). > Trust means establishing a positive relationship with the Other, even in ignorance. This doesn't cut to the core of it. I don't think it is useful to frame trust only as a positive two-way relationship; one needs the third element: trust to do something. > [Trust] makes actions possible despite one’s lack of knowledge. No. Trust is not needed to make actions possible. Actions are possible in a state of incomplete knowledge. (This is painful to read; this is supposed to be thoughtful philosophy -- it is supposed to clear things up, not muddle things.) > If I know everything in advance, there is no need for trust. This sentence does not distinguish present knowledge from future knowledge. For example, if I know about a potential business partner's other financial interests (present knowledge), this is very helpful for predicting the future (what the person might do). It makes it easier to trust, in my sense of the word (above) -- it makes it sensible for me to expect that the person will act in ways that I'm ok with, in the scope of a potential business relationship. Why? Because I better understand their holdings, which is a part of their interests. > Transparency is a state in which all not-knowing is eliminated. I don't care for this binary framing. Practically speaking, transparency is a matter of degree. > Where transparency prevails, no room for trust exists. Restated: if a party has complete knowledge of the world, present and future, there is no need for trust. Stated that way, I agree, but is close enough to a tautology to be uninteresting. Personally, by this point I'm "off the train". Han's style of writing (and presumably thinking) is useless to me. > Instead of affirming that “transparency creates trust,” one should instead say, “transparency dismantles trust.” I will grant the author uses their terminology in a consistent way. I just find it maddening because it doesn't connect with reality. [1] But by this point, the cognitive dissonance between what everyday people mean by trust is so great that this sentence comes across as absurd. > The demand for transparency grows loud precisely when trust no longer prevails. There is a grain of truth here. But the word precisely is wrong to the extent it means "if and only if". Sure, one purpose for transparency is to "right the ship" so to speak. But once the ship is sailing in the right direction, smart people recognize that transparency was a contributing factor, so they rightfully think "let's maintain our levels of transparency so we can keep reaping the rewards." > In a society based on trust, no intrusive demand for transparency would surface. The society of transparency is a society of mistrust and suspicion; it relies on control because of vanishing confidence. This touches on how the author defines control from the last chapter "The Society of Control". Suffice it to say for now that I find the thinking behind it rather lacking. > Strident calls for transparency point to the simple fact that the moral foundation of society has grown faulty, that moral values such as honesty and uprightness are losing their meaning more and more. At this point, I want to be blunt, as I've lost most of my patience with the author. A philosopher that writes "the simple fact" is engaging with rhetoric instead of careful thinking. Shameful. Mention of morality and culture tend to be far from simple; they are complex in that they involve the interactions of millions of people. > As the new social imperative, transparency is taking the place of a moral instance that would break new ground.” This sentence posits that transparency somehow crowds-out morality. This is unconstrained by reality. We can see in the real world that transparency works symbiotically with morality. By this point in my commentary, I'm pretty much uninterested in this book by Byung-Chul Han. He's an interesting person, but in this case, I'm not getting much value. I seek clear writing, truth-seeking behavior, and insight. I recognize my cantankerousness. I decided to leave in my personal reactions not because I expect them to be persuasive but rather because they are transparent: you can read my logic and you can see how strongly it affects my emotions. As Daniel Kahneman explained, these are connected and not necessarily for the worse. Finally, there are philosophers that I highly value. The warmth and joy I get from them more than makes up for the frustration I get from philosophers like Han. I accept this as a kind of tradeoff. [1]: I have to admit, this is a common pain point I find when reading certain philosophers -- they reappropriate language in highly specific ways that lead to preposterous sounding claims. To some degree, I get it -- I want philosophers to define their terms. But in my view, this is little comfort. When a writer redefines words in a way that strikes people as outlandish, the writer must recognize that human cognition is a real factor. When words get mangled to the point of incredulity, it is high time the author think to themself "maybe I should find a clearer word or phrase here -- or maybe I should make one up."