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No, fail2ban is cargo cult security, and if you actually "need" it, you've misconfigured your system. Don't allow password authentication.
by tptacek 1y ago
No, fail2ban is cargo cult security, and if you actually "need" it, you've misconfigured your system. Don't allow password authentication.
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- dugite-code 1y agoIMHO Fial2ban, just like port knocking, isn't cargo cult security. They are a single tool that can be included in a general system security arsenal, not the only tool you should use but one of a suite of tools that can be used depending on what you want to achieve. Personally I use fwknop for port knocking as it doesn't suffer from replay attacks as it's an encrypted packet. But still serves the same niche
- akerl_ 1y agoThe point being made is that unless "what you want to achieve" is "run a tool that isn't improving your security posture", port knocking isn't providing value to the security model. Hence the cargo cult.
- dugite-code 1y agoI can't agree that it's "a tool that isn't improving your security posture", if it's a layer on top of other tools, you might argue it's effectiveness isn't great but to say it's effectively nothing is a reach.
- akerl_ 1y agoIt’s not nothing: it’s one more thing that can break or eat resources or have a vuln. And it’s not improving the thread model. It’s net negative.
- DaSHacka 1y agoHow is it not improving the threat model to not have a service directly connected to the internet, but instead put behind a layer of protection?
- wolrah 1y agoThey can't get in but they can still fill my logs up, so fail2ban cuts them off after a few failures. Also by collecting data on the IP addresses that are triggering fail2ban I can identify networks and/or ASes that disproportionally host malicious traffic and block them at a global level.
- tptacek 1y agoWhy bother logging them at all? What is this doing for you? You can't meaningfully characterize attacker traffic this way. They'll come from any AS they want to.
- hrimfaxi 1y agoDon't compliance regimes like NIST 800-53 require logging access attempts, whether successful or not, and especially for privileged users?
- akerl_ 1y ago> To balance monitoring and auditing requirements with other system needs, event logging requires identifying the subset of event types that are logged at a given point in time. For example, organizations may determine that systems need the capability to log every file access successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for specific circumstances due to the potential burden on system performance. It's possible that some compliance regimes exist that mandate keeping logs of all unsuccessfully authentication attempts. There's surely a compliance regime out there that mandates every possible permutation of thing. But the far more common permutation, like we see with NIST, is that the organization has to articulate which logs it keeps, why those logs are sufficient for conducting investigations into system activity, and how it supports those investigations.
- hrimfaxi 1y agoI was thinking of: > The need to limit unsuccessful logon attempts and take subsequent action when the maximum number of attempts is exceeded applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined, organization-defined time period. https://csf.tools/reference/nist-sp-800-53/r5/ac/ac-7/ https://csf.tools/reference/nist-sp-800-53/r5/ac/ac-7/