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Crypto identities are anonymous. I don't see the issue?
by didibus 1y ago
Crypto identities are anonymous. I don't see the issue?
- tadfisher 1y agoCrypto identities are identities, as much as human names or Social Security numbers. If you know who the identity represents, then you know that human's transaction history for all time on that blockchain. Ballots do not have any identifying information, intentionally. There is no tracking number or possible mechanism to de-anonymize a ballot back to the human who cast it. Notably, there is not even a unique identifier for a single ballot that could potentially be used to identify a person. Most importantly, there is no value that is unique to the ballot that I can use to verify that I am indeed the person who filled it out, so some nefarious organization could threaten me or my family to produce proof of how I voted. Or pay me, or influence me based on the outcome. So there is no "identity" that you can record in a blockchain to prevent that identity from casting two ballots in the same election.
- Aloisius 1y agoCrypto doesn't limit participation, unlike voting. At some point, one needs determine whether voting transaction 123 by votecoin address 3456 was made by a valid voter and that the voter has only voted once. So how do you do that? If a central authority does it by say, issuing votecoin addresses to voters or asks voters for their self-generated addresses, then your ballot is no longer secret since they can see exactly who voted for what. If a voter shares their votecoin address with anyone, then anyone can see how they voted inviting vote buying and pressure schemes.
- didibus 1y agoI think you're restricting your thinking to Bitcoin. The question is, can cryptography methods solve the problem, not can Bitcoin solve it. I'm not a super expert, but from the little I know, I think it's possible to issue a one time use key that lets you sign a private/public key pair. So when that public key enter the network with 1 vote and cast it on the distributed ledger, the network can validate the key is signed by the authority. You know that the authority allowed the key to exist, but not who the key ties back too. And the user could only sign one key, so they can't create more.
- tadfisher 1y ago> I think it's possible to issue a one time use key that lets you sign a private/public key pair Keys are just numbers, there's nothing inherent to them that prevents their reuse. These one-time-use schemes rely on out-of-band protocols to honor that they should not be reused, for example by trusting in a central authority to check and reject such keys, which defeats the purpose of using the cryptographic scheme in the first place. > You know that the authority allowed the key to exist, but not who the key ties back too. That's not the point of ballot secrecy. Under this scheme, I can be coerced into revealing my vote, because you can't create a control to prevent me from storing the signing key or signed keypair; either of which would suffice for a third party to find the public key on the chain which corresponds to my signing key. If you make these actions entirely remote, so I have no access to key material, then you are trusting the remote authority to issue me a secure keypair that can't be reused. That said, there's no good reason to issue a keypair or use PKI for this, as there is no encryption happening and there's only one subject (the voter). A cryptographically-signed ID in this case can only be useful to tie votes to voters, which we have established violates the secret-ballot constraint.
- didibus 1y agoWith zero-knowledge proofs and a trusted decentralized ledger, you can prevent double-counting and make the vote untraceable back to the voter. You can also guarantee that the voter was authorized to vote as per the authority, but the authority cannot know which specific vote was theirs. As for coercion, there are really two types: coercing someone into voting a certain way, and coercing them afterward to reveal how they voted. I don’t think the second one is much of a problem, because you can just delete your keys after using them if you don’t want to be coerced. It might suck if the coercer doesn’t believe you and you really did delete them, but at that point thugs beating you up is kind of its own separate problem. Similar to if they asked you to take a photo or video at the poll booth and if you didn't they might beat you up. If the coercion is about making you vote a particular way, some schemes let you vote multiple times and only count the last one, so you can just vote again after the coercer leaves. And even then, I believe some schemes actually make it impossible to show proof of your vote. Here's two papers that are promising in all those areas for example: - https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/zkVoting-%3A-Zero-knowledge-proof-based-and-E2E-Park-Choi/b4e3f8bac1a1faa60379a8db292b17bdf208a875 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/zkVoting-%3A-Zero-know... - https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/SmartphoneDemocracy%3A-Privacy-Preserving-E-Voting-on-J'o'zwik-Pouwelse/4d66cae43e26c580dd36e4af03ac6d189cf93b34 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/SmartphoneDemocracy%3A...
- arielcostas 1y agoThey are until you need to verify them and ensure nobody owns multiple identities. The following must be true: - We should know whether you may vote (you are a citizen, over the legal voting age, and haven't been taken away that right because of a crime, etc.) - We should know whether you did or didn't cast a vote (to prevent you from voting twice) - We should NOT know who you voted for - You should be able to know the votes are counted towards the party intended You can't solve that with crypto, since you need a way of proving your identity, while at the same time making the payload anonymous and not traceable back to you.
- tadfisher 1y ago> We should NOT know who you voted for > You should be able to know the votes are counted towards the party intended These requirements are contradictory. If you can verify that your vote was counted toward one outcome or another, your vote can be coerced as that verification can be demonstrated to a third party.